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This thesis represents the results of research on cost
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A. EVOLUTION OP THE COST IMPACT ASSESSMENT PROCESS
The Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASE) was bom out of Congres-
sional concern over "the lack of uniform accounting standards ... in
Government procurement " During 1968, debate in the House of
Representatives Banking and Currency Committee, over extension of the
Defense Production Act of 1950, became the vehicle to voice this concern.
House Resolution 17268, which would have required the Comptroller General
of the United States to formulate uniform cost accounting standards, was
subsequently altered in the Senate to mandate:
...The Conptroller General, in cooperation with the Secretary of Defense
and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. . .[to] undertake a study
to determine the feasibility of applying uniform cost acc::unting stand-
ards to be used in all negotiated prime contract and subcontract procure-
ments of iTDre than $100,000.2
In January 1970, the Conptroller General reported to Congress:
It is feasible to establish and apply cost-accounting standards to
provide a greater degree of uniforro.ty and consistency in cost
accounting as a basis for negotiating and administering procurement
contracts.
3
Admiral Hyman C. Rickover, as cited in U.S. Congress, ^Senate,
26 June 1968, Congressiona.1 Record
, p. 18848.
^Public Law 90-379, Section 7l8.
^Conptroller General of the United States, ''Report on the Feasibility
of Applying Uniform Cost-Accounting Standards to Negotiated Defense Contracts,"
to the Conmittee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, 91st
Congress, Second Session, January 1970, p. 2.
14

During the next biennial debate over its extension, the Defense Production
Act of 1950 was amended by Senate Resolution 3302 v\*iich proposed the
establishment of a Cost Accounting Standards Board as an agent of Congress.
S-3302 cleared both Houses of Congress and was enacted as Public Law 91-379
of 15 Augfast 1970. In part, it reads:
The Board is authorized to make, promulgate, amend and rescind rules
and regulations for the implanentation of cost-accounting standards
Such regulations shall require defense contractors and subcontractors
as a condition of contracting. . .to agree to a contract price adjustment,
with interest, for any increased costs paid to the defense contractor
by the United States because of the defense contractor's failure to
caiply with duly promulgated cost accounting standards or to follow
consistently his disclosed cost-accoanting practices in pricing contract
proposals and in accumulating and reporting contract perfomiance cost
data.^
The first promulgations of the Board were published in the Federal
Register on 29 February 1972, Included were: Part 331, "Contract Coverage;"
Part 351, "Disclosure Statement;" Part 400, "Definitions;" and the first
two of what would become a body of Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), Parts
401 and 402.
The contract clause contained within Part 331 requires the contractor
to agree to a contract price adjustment if a material shift in costs
allocated to the contract results from a required or discretionary variation
in his cost accounting practices. The cognizant Administrative Contracting
Officer thus becomes charged with assessing the cost inpact, i.e., the
shift in costs, of the variation in practices and, subsequently, making the
adjustment to the negotiated price appropriate to the situation.
The accounting mechanics of the assessment, evaluation and negotiation
of cost impact related to cost accounting practice changes were unknown
^Public Law 91-379, Section (h)(1)
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territory to field contract administration in 1972. Nonetheless, with the
advent of Cost Accounting Standards legislation. Federal agency (most
notably. Department of Defense) implementing regulations, and the antici-
pation of a growing catalog of Cost Accounting Standards, the Administrative
Contracting Officer became responsible to;
. . .negotiate price adjustments aiid execute supplemental agreements
pursuant to the Cost Accounting Standards Clause in [Defense Acqui-
sition Regulations] 7-104.83.5
The talents and procedures necessary to fulfill this responsibility were
unlike those utilized in pricing or costing contract change orders or
excusable delays. No new costs were introduced to the system of contracts
as a result of a manipulation of cost accounting practices, nor were costs
deleted. Instead, the actual assignment and allocation of costs through
the contractor's accounting systan had to be traced. In its earliest
stages, the implications of the charge to assess cost inpact were neither
widely understood nor appreciated in the acquisition arena.
At this writing, after over eight years of experience and continuing
refinement of regulations governing the process, the requir-ement to prohibit
increased costs paid by the United States and the desire to keep the contract
parties whole in the face of desir-able or required changes to the contractor's
accounting practices remain a significant challenge to the Administrative
Contracting Officer. One highly placed official in a Defense Contract
Administration Services Region headquarters has referred to the assessment
-^Defense Acquisition Regulations (hereinafter, "DAR"), para. l-406(c).
(On 8 March 1978, the Armed Services Procurement Regulations ^ere officially
redesignated the Defense Acquisition Regulations. All references in this




of cost lnpact as "the hardest part of Cost Accounting Standards adminis-
tration." Another former contract administrator interviewed called it
"the most conpllcated accounting, fiscal forecasting and estimating problem
in this business . . . .
"
B. OBJECTIVES OP THE RESEARCH
The objectives of the research were twofold:
1. To explore the current environment within v\iiich cost inpact is
measured; and
2. To develop a structured approach to guide the decision-maker
through the cost impact assessment process.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
Central to this study was the exploration of the cost inpact assess-
ment process, from discovery of the change to final resolution of the
issue of cost allocation shifts. Thus, the primary research question
posed was: How can the cost impact of changes to, or noncorrpliance with,
cost accounting practices or Cost Accounting Standards be measured?
To respond to the primary research question, the following subsidiary
questions were studied:
1. What are the requiranents of the mandatory Cost Accounting Stand-
ards clause concerning the measurement of cost impact and the nature of
DOD and contractor response to these requirements?
2. What guidance, regulatory or otherwise, has been provided DOD
contract administrators in this area and, specifically, where is it lacking?
3. What pricing methodologies have been developed and are being utilized?
17

4. Can a model be devised to structure and sinplify the real-world
accounting variations in which cost allocation shifts or deviations in
the measurement of costs are manifested?
D. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The scope of this research was to examine cost impact assessment
within the administration of CAS by DOD. Other issues within the umbrella
of potential CAS study, such as the development and interpretation of the
Standards, cost-benefit analysis of the CAS system and the present legis-
lative controversy over continued existence of the Board, were not examined.
Though CAS is applicable to non-DOD Federal procurement and contract
administration, the research centered around its affects within defense
contracting, though the analysis that is the result of this research will
be general enough to have universal application.
1. Assumptions
This study is intended to provide guidelines to the Administrative
Contracting Officer (ACO) to be utilized in the post-award assessment of
cost impact. It is written from the standpoint of a non-accountant, albeit
one with a rudimentary understanding of cost accounting and a familiarity
with the basic applicability of CAS. It is the purpose of this research
to design a structured framework within which complex accounting and audit
procedures and the general background of the reader can merge for the purpose
of better decision-making within the cost inpact assessment scenario.
2. Limitations
Actual examples of the accounting transactions involved will be
limited to those unique to the CAS environment and highly simplified.
This study is not intended to replace standard cost accounting texts or
18

substitute for experience in cost or price analysis. Instead, this study
vd.ll approach the cost Inpact assessment process from a conceptual,
decision-making level as opposed to presenting a specific, quantitative,
analysis model applicable to raw cost accounting data.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
1. Literature Search
Much more has been written on the propriety of Cost Accounting
Standards than on the day-to-day issues facing the contract ac3ministrator
.
Within the last three years, however, both limited and extensive procedural
guidance have become available.
A search of the literature was conducted via the Naval Postgraduate
School LibiTary and custom bibliographies were obtained from the Defense
Logistics Studies Inforination Exchange (DLSIE), Ft. Lee, Virginia. Addi-
tionally, many materials, of which the researcher was previously unaware or
which were available on a regional basis only, were discovered during the
course of conducting interviews.
2. Interviews
Due to the paucity of published literature specifically dealing
with the research topic, it was determined that interviews with Federal
officials, of both policy-making and field contract administration positions,
and members of defense industry, would be the most productive source of
information. Interviewees who were personally involved on a daily basis
with promulgating regulations for, or administering, or accounting for,
CAS-susceptible contracts were sought. Although the interviews were
structured, they were conducted along conversational lines to allow the
researcher to direct questions to the specific strengths and interests of
19

the subject. Interviews were taped, however subjects were assured that
their remarks would not be specifically attributed to them without their
express permission. It was felt that the anonymity offered allowed the
subjects to frankly express their views on the topic. Interviews averaged
two hours in length. Sessions were conducted with nine Government and
ten industry representatives.
Telephone conversations, though not utilized extensively, supple-
mented the data collection when subjects were not available for, or funding
precluded, personal interviews.
Appendix C represents a complete list of the interviews conducted.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The research effort is organized in order to place the cost impact
assessment process properly within the defense procurement environment,
explore the current guidance given to this aspect of CAS administration
and develop a simplified approach to the complex issues involved. It is
anticipated that the results of this study will be useful to the Adminis-
trative Contracting Officer in making him a better consumer of audit recon-
mendations and, ultimately, a better decision-maker in CAS matters.
Chapter Two explores the significance of Cost Accounting Standards to
both the pre- and post-award scenarios. This Chapter discusses the relevence
of cost accounting to Government procurement and the nature of the defense
industry marketplace that makes CAS necessary. Chapter Three is a thorough
discussion of the CAS administration process with concentration on cost
impact assessment of changes to cost accounting practices. The current
guidance and pricing methodologies available to the ACO are presented.
Chapter Four discusses hindrances, inherent in the process, and pricing
20

methodologies utilized, to the efficient conduct of cost irrpact assessment.
Chapter Five is the development of a structured framework to clarify and
sinplify the responsibilities of the AGO. A model identifying information
required and procedures to be followed is recomnended . Chapter Six
synthesizes the findings of the research, reconmending inprovements to the
process and responding to the research questions. It additionally suggests
areas for further research.
G . DEFINITIONS ^^
Definitions of most of the terms that may be unfamiliar to the reader
are contained within the body of this report. Definitions of the more
cormon terms, however, follow:
Cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer - is the ACO charged with
the four CAS contract administration functions listed in DAR l-406(c).
Individual contractors are assigned a unique cognizant ACO in order to
fulfill the requirement of a single face to industry on CAS matters.
The term, "ACO," when it is used in this report, is considered synonymous
with cognizant ACO.
Contract Administration - is the Government ' s management and surveillance
of all assigned contracts, from award to the completion of performance,
to ensure that the resulting end item, either product or service, received
by the Government is in conformance with the contract's terms and conditions,
Covered Contract - refers to any prime or sub-contract awarded with the
Cost Accounting Standards clause in force. Contracts to which CAS does
not apply will be referred to as uncovered contracts.
Procurement - will be used throughout this report to set off that portion
of the acquisition process in which CAS is a concern, namely the pre-award
and post-award activities surrounding the performance of a contract.
21

II. BACKGROUND AMD SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH
Essential to an understanding of the research is the development of
a perspective from which the assessment of cost impact can be examined.
In this Chapter, it vd.ll be shown that Cost Accounting Standards evolved
in response to some unique conditions of the defense procurement market-
place and in recognition of a need for greater market leverage and
control by defense procurement agencies. In the course of this discussion,
accepted procurement methodologies, contract accounting, the relationship
of Cost Accounting Standards to the defense procurement process, both
pre- and post-award, and the resultant necessity to be able to assess
cost iirpact of a cost accounting practice change will be examined.
A. THE NATURE OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
The economic models offered by classical price theory are incapable
of totally explaining the varied ramifications of Government in the market-
place. Certainly some aspects of the phenomenon fit into the simplified
models, but a body of knowledge is unavailable that completely captures
the character and market interactivity of the Federal Government, "the
world's largest business,"-'- in the variety of roles it assumes: sover-
eign, monopsonist, conpetitor, primary buyer of high technology, regulator
of the econany and irrpleraenter of national objectives. As Professor
U.S. Conmission on Government Procurement, Final Report
,
prepared
by Study Group 1, Part 1, "Utilization of Resources," Volume 2, p. IX-3.
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Stanley N. Sherman has stated:
Buying by the Government is so large and varied in scope that few per-
sons, whether Government employee, industrial marketer, policy maker,
or interested member of the public, are fully cognizant of the range
and dimension of the system being eiiployed.
A brief excursus into two unique characteristics of defense procurement
will lend insight to the development of the research perspective.
1. The Marketplace
In a competitive environment, interaction between buyers and
sellers, and the relative bargaining strength of each r brings about a
market price which serves to allocate and ration scarce factors of pro-
duction, or econonic resources. The marketplace that surrounds widely-
produced and highly-sought goods is a structured economic center within
which a set number of dollars are exchanged for an end item. Under
"perfect" conpetition, a potential buyer need be unconcerned with the
cost incurred by the offeror in producing the product. Forces of the
marketplace will set the prices at which the latter will sell:
In a price competitive market, a seller's price may be related more
closely to what his competitors are likely to quote than his own cost
of manufacture or acquisition. All else being equal, perforroance must
be effective and economical if the conpany is to make a profit.
3
Over the long run, however, the seller's price is bound by a minima: the
costs of production. Additionally, a price set by the seller that is much
more than that available from other sources of the end item will drive buyers
2Stanley N. Sherman, Procurement Management: The Federal System
,
(Bethesda, MD: SLCormiunications , 1979), pT T.
Airoed Services Procurement Regulation Manual for Contract Pricing
(hereinafter, "ASHVI No. 1"), (Chicago, II: Coimerce Clearing House,
Inc., 1975), p. 2A2.
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away from him and toward his conpetitors. Thus, a maxima also exists.
Therefore, "[t]he idea that conpetition results in fair prices must be
viewed as a truism...." Even in the more realistic scenario, something
slightly less than perfect competition, a buyer of defense products that
encounters or can gauge strong canpetitive interactions may be assured
he is responding to his charge to pay a price no more than "fair and
reasonable" when he consummates a contract at the price set in the market-
place .
Though ". . .coirpetition among private sector suppliers is a cornerstone
of the [defense procurement] system," the majority of defense procurement
dollars are expended without the benefit of price conpetition:
DOD procurement data for 1977 shows that less than 27 percent of the
nearly $50 billion in contract awards that year were based on price
ccmpetition.
'
Absent the competitive environment that assures a fair and reasonable price,
the defense procurement agencies are forced to either rely upon artificial
devices injected into the marketplace by legislation designed to replace
the corrpetitive forces or to succumb to the unequal leverage exerted by the
seller. The latter is seldom a politically feasible option when it inpacts
upon the expenditure of public funds.
^Ibid, p. 2B8.
^Ibid, p. lAl.
^COGP Final Report , Part 1, V. 2, p. IX-14.
'General Accounting Office, "Impediments to Reducing the Costs of
Weapon Systems," Report PSAD-80-6, 8 Nov 79, p. l6.
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2. StateKPf-the-Art End Items
Reasons for the absence of price conpetition from the defense
marketplace among potential offerors are legion. Entry to and exit from
the market is not free and unencumbered. High capital investment by
sellers is frequently a prerequisite to maintaining a market posture. The
statutory and regulatory maze of Federal contracting frightens many poten-
tial entrants. Public funding, and therefore, demand, is inconstant. The
single largest contributor, however, to the lack of price carpetition in
the defense marketplace is the inherent risk that must be assumed by the
seller, or shared by the Government and the seller, in much of the type
of performance sought:
. . .the really vital distinction between the base line market situation
(off-the-shelf, commercial procurement) and that surrounding major
systems procurement. .. i s that the latter is characterized and often
dominated by high technical and economic risk, especially in its earlier
phases .
°
Elements of perfect competition may develop when the end item sought by
the Government is well-defined and widely produced. When defense procure-
ment agencies solicit for state-of-the-art, high technology, end items,
built to performance specifications, however, price ceases to be the sole
deciding factor for award. Perforrnance and schedule conpetition predominate.
Since the manufacture of conplex end items is a highly unpredictable activity,
a stable, well-functioning marketplace does not exist. Assurance of a fair
and reasonable price, therefore, must be found via other means.
°Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Technical Risk and the Corpetitive Process
,
as cited in COGP Final Report , Part 1, V. 2, p. IX-13.
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B. PROCUREMENT METHODOLOGIES UTILIZED
Defense procurement agencies encounter widely varying marketplace
scenarios. A continuum of economic conditions exists in the defense
marketplace, with well-defined, commercial needs or military agency
unique needs to be produced to design specifications, neither of which
pose substantial risk to the seller, at one extreme and state-of-the-art,
highly complex end items, with opportunities for successful seller
performance considerably less, at the other. In recognition of this, two
different procurement methodologies are utilized.
1. Formal Advertising
The sealed-bid procurement method, preferred by statute, may
be utilized when marketplace forces are sufficient to lead to effective
price competition:
Several models exist in viiich procurement is accomplished on a strategy
which attempts to take advantage of market forces. Each of these
models is organized around the concept that independent offerors operat-
ing freely in an open marketplace will, through their bidding procedures,
make priced offers to sell. The offers are treated as being generally
reasonable, based upon the operation of the free enterprise system
[These] strateg[ies] should generate prices that reflect the reasonable
cost of performing. . .[or]. . .current appraisals of value. -^
Several other criteria, of course, must be met before formal advertising
may be sucessfully utilized, but, for the purposes of this discussion,
those conditions that bring about an active, efficient marketplace (many
sellers, significant demand, well-defined end item, low risk in perfor-








Should the defense buyer encounter little or no price competition,
a situation he can seldon affect in the short run, procurement via
negotiation may seiTve to inject conpetition, in the form of technical or
schedule considerations, into the marketplace or capitalize upon any
measure of price coipetition that does exist. Lacking effective price
competition for the end item sougl-it, the buyer can rely upon the tech-
niques of price negotiation, cost and/or price analysis, to guarantee
the defense agency a fair and reasonable price:
Price negotiation is a technique used in the absence of effective
price coipetition in order to reach a sound decision on-price [Its]
objective obviously is a fair and reasonable price
Price analysis alone may be used on smaller or sinpler negotiated
procurements in the effort to negotiate a bottan-line price. It generally
includes conparing the offeror's price with those offered by any conpeti-
tors, with agreed-upon prices from prior or current procurements, with
published prices or with prices developed by estimates or parametric
relationships. In the greater majority of negotiated procurement scenarios,
it is seldon sufficient. Effective price conpetition would have to exist
before the reliable information needed could be obtained.
In the absence of a marketplace to set one, a fair and reasonable
price can be determined using a "cost-plus theory" of pricing. Though
it is disputed in seme circles, this theory holds that the cost of




performance, plus a reasonable return on that cost as profit,
will result in a price acceptable to both buyer and seller. Thus,
emphasis must be placed on the costs incurred by the seller.
The buyer must then depend upon cost analysis, in addition
to his use of price analysis, in establishing his pricing ob-
jective :
Contract cost analysis is used to establish the basis for
negotiation of contract prices where price competition is
adequate or lacking altogether and where price analysis, by
itself, does not assure the reasonableness of price.
Costs are analyzed to determine if the total cost estimate
approximates the dollars it should cost to perform the con-
tract if the -company operates with reasonable economy and
efficiency.
Though the Government negotiator seldom seeks agreement with the
seller on the levels of cost, particularly by cost element, that
will be (prospective pricing) or have been (retroactive pricing)
incurred in his effort to establish a fair and reasonable price,
he must make use of contract audit techniques in order to eval-
uate the cost data submitted by the seller.
C. THE NATURE OF COST ACCOUNTING
Generally, a solicitation that indicates the agency's inten-
tion, or requirement, to procure material via negotiation will
necessitate a proposal, by cost elements, from interested
offerors. Barring exceptions to the requirement for a detailed
cost estimate, the seller must utilize a "cost-plus" method to
price his offer. Government procurement regulations notwithstanding
most rational entrepreneurs utilize the tools of cost accounting
and maintain a cost accounting system.
-•^ASPM No. 1, p. 2B19.
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Cost accounting involves the process of planning and ac-
ccounting for, and controlling, the costs incurred in the daily
operations of the firm. By means of budget forecasts and actual
cost tracking, management is capable of applying unexpired costs
against revenues in order to determine profit. Professor Gordon
Shillinglaw offers:
Cost represents the resources that have been or must be
sacrificed to obtain a particular objective.
Cost accounting, then, deals with the measurement of re-
source sacrifices.^
He further defines cost accounting as follows:
[It isj...the body of concepts, methods and procedures used
to measure, analyze and estimate the costs, profitability and
performance of individual products, departments and other
segments of a company's operations, for either internal or
external use or both, and to report on these questions to the
interested parties.^
"Product costing" is directed toward utilizing an accounting
system, the system of organization and procedures utilized by
the firm to collect, record and report accounting data, in order
to track the costs incurred in the manufacture of end product
units, from commencement, through shops and processes, to completion
The second major objective of the accounting system is
product costing for purposes of inventory valuation and income
determination. This product-costing purpose means that de-
partmental costs must be applied to the physical units which
pass through the departments.
By means of product costing, the profitability of various product
lines can be assessed and important managerial decisions made by
13Gordon Shillinglaw, Cost Accounting: Analysis and Control
,
Rev. Ed., CHoraewood, IL; Richard D. Irwin: 1967), p. 11.
14^Ibid, p. 12.
Charles T. Horngren, Cost Accounting: A Managerial Emphasis
,




the firm. The results of these decisions can then be translated into the
detailed cost proposals demanded by the Government buyer. Cost proposals
subnitted are then subjected to rigorous contract audit to allow the pro-
curement agency to establish, pricing objectives, conduct price negotiations
and reach a sound pricing arrangement with the seller:
The terms "audit review" and "audit" refer to examinations by contract
auditors of contractors' statements of costs to be incurred (cost
estimates) or statements of costs actually incurred to the extent deem.ed
appropriate by the auditors in the light of their experience with the
contractors and relying upon their appraisals of the effectiveness of
the contractors' policies, procedures, controls and practices. Such
audit reviews or audits may consist of desk reviews, test checks on a
limited number of transactions, or examinations in depth at the dis-
cretion of the auditors. 16
The buyer of defense material thus utilizes an output of the seller's cost
accounting system in order to assist him in agreeing upon a fair and rea-
sonable price.
D. GOVERMENT KEGUIATTONS TO SIMULATE MARKETPLACE FACTORS
It has been established thus far that, in the absence of price ccmpe-
tition, the negotiation methodology is best suited to the defense procure-
ment agency's responsibility of arriving at a price that is fair and
reasonable to both buyer and seller. The negotiation environment, a mutual
give and take scenario characterized by the buyer's offers and the seller's
counteroffers, in defense procurement has been artificially altered through
the passage of legislation that serves to simulate the workings of effective
competition:
16
Department of Defense, Defense Contract Audit Agency, Contract Audit
Manual, DCAAM 7640.1, May 1979 Edition (hereinafter, "DCIAM"), para. 3-101(a)
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Most authorities believe that a degree of regulation is necessary;
to substitute for natural forces inherent in the open marketplace, to
alert the seller to special rights reserved by the Government as a buyer,
and to identify the needs of the Government in its role as sovereign. '
The first of v\diat the Ccmraission on Government Procurement referred to
1
8
as "...good and valid reasons..." led to two significant statutes passed
in an effort to bring the Government buyer on par with the seller of
defense material.
1. Truth in Negotiations
Public Law 87-653, the Hebe rt amendment to the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 19^7, was enacted by Congress on 10 September 1962 and
is commonly referred to as the Truth in Negotiations Act. Applicable to
the Department of Defense, Coast Guard and National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, it requires a prime contractor or subcontractor to
submit cost or pricing data under certain circumstances in support of his
detailed cost proposal and certify, to the best of his knowledge and belief,
that the data is accurate, cmrrent and complete as of the date of final
agreement on price. The requirement to submit and certify cost or pricing
data is levied upon every prime contractor and subcontractor (at every
tier) who enter a negotiated contract or contract modification in excess
of $100,000. Contracts whose prices are set by law or regulation, as a
result of catalog or market prices, or through the benefit of adequate
price competition are exenpted from the P.L. 87-653 provisions. Addition-
ally, the requirements may be waived for appropriate reasons by the head of
the procuring agency.




After certification 3 the law provides that the contract price may
be adjusted downward if the data submitted by the contractor, and relied
upon when the agreement on price was reached, is found to be defective.
19
A subsequent amendment to the Truth in Negotiations Act provides that
Defense Contract Audit Agency auditors are permitted to examine the
firm's books and records for the purpose of determining if the data sub-
mitted is inaccurate, inccmplete or noncurrent and thereby susceptible
to defective pricing.
The Truth in Negotiations Act bestows upon defense buyers the right
to review the historical data accumulated or budget projections utilized
by the contractor in product costing. The law diminishes the leverage
the contractor is able to exert in the absence of price competition. By
means of contract audit and the price adjustment penalty for defective
pricing, a movement toward equal footing for both parties in the negotia-
tion process was initiated' with its passage:
In general, these data requirements attempt to give the Government
buyer an ability to analyze the relationship between cost and price,
and to attack in negotiations the validity of price by attacking elements
of cost. Their importance lies in aiding negotiations when conpetition
on a price basis does not constitute a major factor in selection for
award. By setting these requirements, the Congress acted to prescribe
affirmatively the nature of the negotiations process associated with
federal procurement .^0
The requirement to Justify cost proposals allows the negotiation process
to bring artificially-created forces, that simulate those of the price
ccmpetitive marketplace, to bear upon the defense contractor.






2. Cost Accounting Standards
In and of itself, however, the Truth in Negotiations Act did not
completely give the parties equal footing in the negotiation arena.
Even with the law's requirement that contractors fully support and Justify
their product costing to the defense procurement agency, ceiTtify that such
data submitted is current, accurate and canplete, and be held liable for
the facts and judgments presented until three years had elapsed after the
date of final payment for performance, contractors had considerable
opportunity to inconsistently apply or manipulate the manner in which the
cost or pricing data were estimated, accumulated or reported.
During the 1968 and 1970 hearings. Congress expressed a general
dissatisfaction with the evidence presented them of the lack of rigidity
in cost accounting for negotiated Government contracts. In the majority
of cases, where contract price was based upon product costing estimates,
it was argued that a uniform cost accounting system was vital, since
reimbursement to the contractor from taxpayers' monies was the logical
result of the cost proposal. The Defense Acquisition Regulations offered
some general guidelines in the form of Section XV Cost Principles, but
directed contracting officers to generally-accepted accounting principles
on the complex issues of product costing: measurement of costs incurred,
assignment of costs measured to cost accounting periods, allocation of
assigned costs to final cost objectives, and consistent application of the
practices chosen. Generally-accepted accounting principles, however, were
harshly dismissed during the debates. They were referred to as "accounting
21fantasies" that were never Intended to resolve the difficulties of
PI





Government contract costing. By allowing considerable discretion in the
manner in which contractors accounted for costs, they provided for neither
uniforTOity or consistency. The Conptroller General questioned the Defense
Department's reliance on the principles in testimony, noting their
inappropriateness
.
Congress was witness to testimonies of "the elastic nature of
cost accounting"^ and accusations that sane contractors, in their
application of the most convenient of the diverse methods of accounting
available, were "bigamists when monogamy [was] needed." ^ Without a way
24
to bring "comnon meaning to [the] technical words." of defense contract
costing, there was sinply "no way of determining precise costs. "^5
Standing alone, the Truth in Negotiations Act only required
justification of cost estimates via verifiable cost or pricing data:
.. .consist[ing] of all facts which reasonably can be expected to contri-
bute to sound estimates of future costs as well as the validity of costs
already incurred."^
The accounting procedures utilized in ascertaining these facts were not
prescribed and consistent maintenance of these procedures throughout
performance was, in effect, not controlled. Congressional attention had
^^U.S. Congress, Senate, 9 July 1970, Congressional Record
,
p. 23454.
-^U.S. Congress, Senate, 26 June 1968, Congressional Record
,
p. 18848.
2\j.S. Congress, Senate, 9 July 1970, Congressional Record
,
p. 23454.







been gained by charging defense contractors with profiteering, but the
real issue was the inability of Public Law 87-653 to conpletely simulate
the marketplace forces that guarantee a fair and reasonable price when
price conpetition exists:
Profit is only pcort of the real income to a coirpany ... large additional
profits on defense work can be hidden as costs just by the way over-
head is charged. . .how company parts are. . .[costed], or how intra-
ccrapany profits are handled. .. .Thus, profit statistics are meaningless
unless measured in accordance with a uniform standard [T]he Truth
in Negotiations Act... [is] based on the presumption that the Govern-
ment can readily determine supplier costs. The Gcvemment can't. '
By enacting Public Law 91-379, commonly referred to as the Cost
Accounting Standards Act, as a companion to Public Law 87-653, artificial
factors to substitute for the forces of price caipetition are in place.
The defense contractor is required to establish and justify his price
through the presentation of auditable, factual data, consistently estimated
and accumulated through uniform accounting practices. In the course of
the negotiation, the contracting officer has access to most. of the salient
books and records utilized by the contractor to develop the proposal and
is protected by the statutory prohibition against defective pricing and
affirmation of accounting uniformity and consistency. The parties to the
process are essentially equal and the course of the negotiation will be
determined by their inherent bargaining strengths.
a. Efforts of the CASE and DOD
A thorough history of the activities of the Cost Accounting
Standards Board (CASE), the implementation of the Board's output by the
Department of Defense (DOD) and the administrative efforts of both agencies
27





to cope with the statute and Interpret applicable rulings Is not the pur-
pO
pose of this study. Other research, collections and unofficial guidance
of private reporting services, ^ publications of Industry associations-^
and countless articles are available to the interested reader. Certain
aspects are, however, appropriate to briefly introduce at this point in
the development of the background and perspective of the research.
(1) CASB Rules, Regulations and Standards . The first pro-
mulgations of the Board were published in the Federal Register on 29 Feb-
ruary 1972. In addition to its first two Cost Accounting Standards, CAS
401, "Consistency in Estimating, Accumulating and Reporting Costs," and
CAS 402, "Consistency in Allocating Costs Incurred For the Same Purpose,"
Rules and Regulations were issued that govern: applicability to, and
exenption
.
and waiver from, the Standards; the disclosure of practices; con-
tractual provisions for CAS-susceptlble contracts; and a body of unique
definitions for accounting terms the Board would use in its pronouncements.
As of this writing, I6 additional Standards have becane effective, one
more is in the proposal stage and two interpretations to previously-issued
"Tor exanple, David V. Lamm, "The Administration of Cost Accounting
Standards," (Doctoral Dissertation, The George Washington University, 1976)
29
Procurement Associates, Inc. includes a sumnary of CASB history and
rulings in Government Contracts Service (Covina, Ca: Paul R. MacDonald,
1973) and has developed a thorough procedural publication entitled Cost
Accounting Standards (Covina, Ca: Paul R. MacDonald, 1976). Ccmmerce
Clearing House publishes the Cost Accounting Standards Guide (Washington,
DC: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1973), easily the most conplete,
authoritative and up-to-date reference work available.
-^^or exanple, A Compendium of Cost Accounting Standards' Impact
Upon the Procurement Process
, Aerospace Industries Association, Inc.,
August 1979, et al.
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standards have been published. The prcmulgation of a Cost Accounting Stan-
dard, from initial research to final proposed rule, is a long and arduous
process characterized by several opportunities for public comment, that
inevitably leads to significant revisions, and Congressional consideration.
The Board has issued an average of two CAS for each year of its existence.
Occasionally, a new Standard has forced larger defense contractors to
significantly amend their accounting practices and procedures. Industry
caiplaints of continuing turbulence in the cost accounting field has led
one influential member of the Defense Department to call for "...the end
of the administratively disruptive need for extensive cost accounting
revisions required by the pronulgation of new Standards."-^
(2) POD Implementation of CAS . Within a few months of the
initial CASE promulgations, the Defense Acquisition Regulatory Committee
issued Defense Procurement Circular (DPC) Number 99, dated 4 May 1972. The
Circular created four new contract administration functions, four new
contract audit responsibilities, two new DAR sections (3-1200, containing
implementation procedures, and Appendix 0, to serve as a repository for
CASB-issued Rules , Regulations and Standards ) , and adopted the solicita-
tion notice, certification and CAS Contract Clause mandated by the Board,
in addition to some changes necessitated to Part XV Cost Principles.
The creation of the CASE brought on a flurry of activity
within the Defense Department : the Defense Contract Administration Ser-
vice (DCAS) created an ad hoc group of project officers at headquarters
level to resolve procedural and interpretive problems and the Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) developed a Cost Accounting Standards branch
of their existing Special Projects Division. Meanwhile, the DAR Canmittee
on
-^ Dale Church, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Policy),
in a letter to CASE Chairman Elmer Staats, 9 March 1979-
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formed a CASE Ftules and Regulations Subconmlttee to consider changes to
DAR necessitated by experience.-^
By the end of 1975, DOD had taken much more extensive
Inplementatlon action. Both DCAS and DCAA had created "CAS networks"
In the field, staffed by hlghly-canpetent accountants and auditors, that
had direct access to headquarters and could offer assistance and guidance
on-site when problems arose. Training seminars were conducted regionally
via a traveling "road show" of experts. The DAR Committee Issued, as
DPC 7^-5, dated 4 March 1975, an additional clause, "Administration of
Cost Accounting Standards," and clarified the Issue of contract price ad-
justments that were specified in the CAS Clause issued by the Board,
Finally, a two-week training course on CAS was developed fot DOD
personnel at th» Antiy Logistics Management Center, Ft. Lee, Virginia.
Despite these extensive efforts, the Inplementatlon and
monitoring of Cost Accounting Standards by DOD has proven to be an ongoing,
monumental task.
(3) The DOD CAS Working Group . In 1976, DOD established a
CAS Steering Committee, whose purpose was to develop interim procedures
and policy guidance useful to integrating CAS promulgations into procure-
ment practices. The Working Group, made up of representatives of policy
offices of the services, DCAS and DCAA, carries out the detailed work of
the Committee. The intent of the Working Group Is to provide quick response
by high-level policy officials to problems and questions surfaced In the field.
-"David V. Lamm, "The Administration of Cost Accounting Standards"
(Doctoral Dissertation, The George Washington University, 1976), pp. 62-64.
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To date, the Working Group has published 24 papers on a variety of CAS-
related issues. The guidance contained therein, however, is advisory
only, not binding upon Administrative Contracting Officers.
E. THE RELATIONSHIP OF CAS TO THE PROCURBVENT PROCESS
The argument thus far in this Chapter of the research study was
aptly summarized in a report by Professor William J. Vatter, University
of California (Berkeley), canmissioned by the Coirptroller General:
When prices are established under something less than fully conpetitive
conditions and the restraints of the market operate inperfectly as
in the case of most Government contracts cost data must play a large
role in contract negotiation and settlement. Under such conditions,
the method of cost accounting can make a substantial difference in
results, and variations in cost assignments may become a matter for
concern. -^-^
The creation of a Cost Accounting Standards Board, and the Standards it
would subsequently issue, with the full force and effect of law, were
intended to be the appropriate response to this concern. An exploration
of the relationship of Cost Accounting Standards to the defense procuiTe-
ment process, as a reaction to the primacy of cost data in the imperfect
marketplace, will be beneficial to the continuing development of the
research perspective.
1. The Process of Procurement By Negotiation
The negotiated procurement cycle was described by the Carmission
on Government Procurement in an extensive, three-year study initiated by
Congress
:
The procurement process includes all actions taken by the Federal agencies
in obtaining goods and services. The process begins with identification
of a need and ends with delivery. . .-^
Villiam J. Vatter, "Standards for Cost Analysis," found as Appendix IV,
p. 490, to Comptroller General, "Feasibility of CAS."
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Government Printing Office, 1972) Vol. 1, p. 2.
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The process has seven phases, each of which is briefly described below:
a. Identification of Need and Funding
In this, the initiation of the pixDcess, a need is recognized
and a product or service conceptualized to fill that need. After funding




At the cognizant buying office, a number of preliminary
steps are taken in the effort to translate the procurement request into
a solicitation document and plan the course of the procurement. The soli-
citation may be drawn up in the rough and circulated as a draft; the market
can then be tested by response to this document; the breadth of solicitation
and competition is studied; and a milestone chart to track significant
events is constr^icted.
c. Solicitation
This document, an advertisanent for offers, is promulgated
as a request for proposals or a request for quotations and disseminated
as widely as practicable to take advantage of any measure of conpetition
that exists.
d. Selection
In negotiated procurement, the field of offerors, respondents
to the solicitation, is narrowed to a coipetitive range of those that have
a reasonable opportunity of award.
e. Negotiation
In this step, the proposals of all offerors in the ccmpetitive
range are evaluated via cost and price analysis and on the basis of management
40

or technical criteria. Discussions with all offerors may be held and
a "best and final offer" requested fran each.
f. Award
The execution of the contract itself binds both Government
and the contractor chosen to perfonnance.
g. Contract Administration
This final step may be the most important. Performance is
monitored until completion to ensure that the terms and conditions of
the contract are carried out.
Many minor variants of the process are possible, however, in those
procurements subject to the Truth in Negotiations Act and the Cost Account-
ing Standards Act, or Just the latter alone, three steps, selection, nego-
tiation and contract administration, always have at the center of their
execution the consideration of the contractor's detailed cost proposal.
Selection of the offerors to form the competitive range is based
upon, among other criteria, the estimate of performance costs contained
within their proposals.
The negotiation process begins with consideration of the contrac-
tor's proposal as the initial offer and the proposal forms the basis
from which the Government buyer determines a negotiation objective
.
Among the functions of the contract administration office is the




In 1970, when the CASE was given its charge to:
. . .pronulgate cost-accounting standards to achieve unifonnity and
consistency in the cost-accounting practices followed by defense
contractors and subcontractors under Federal contracts. -^^
these phases of the procurement process, and the treatment of cost data
therein, would be affected most.
2. CAS Affects on the Selection and Negotiation Phases
The CASE has recogiized uniformity as a prime objective:
Uniformity relates to comparison of two or more accounting entities
and the Eoard's objective in this respect is to achieve coragarability
of results of entities operating under like circumstances.
During the pre-award phases, involving selection and negotiation. Congress
intended that the promulgation of Cost Accounting Standards would require
a contractor, contemplating the treatment of cost data, to execute this
treatment identical to the manner required of another CAS-susceptible
contractor in a similar situation. Assurance of this uniformity among
contractors increases comparability of different proposals, aiding the
selection process:
In the absence of "uniform principles," the entire burden is placed
upon procurement officials to evaluate the contractor's accounting
practices without the guidance of authoritative support for the use
of alternatives in specific circumstances and thus results in more
work for auditors and procurement officials, delays in important
technical work, and excessive procurement costs. 3'
Insistence upon uniformity guarantees the "conmon meaning to technical
terms" sought and establishes a corrmon base of understanding, from which the
negotiation process can more efficiently proceed:
35u.S. Congress, House, 10 August 1970, Congressional Record , p. 28098.
CASE, "Restatement of Objectives, Policies and Concepts, May 1977, p. 1.
^"^Conptroller General, "Feasibility of CAS," p. 2.
42

Properly administered cost-accounting standards ... do much, to promote a
common understanding as to the methods of cost determination to be used
. . .under specific circumstances and thereby minimize subsequent contro-
versy . . . ^
As the Board's first Executive Secretary remarked, the purpose of CAS
39
"...Is to narrow the options in cost accounting that. . .[were]. . .available"
In an effort to bring coiparablllty and uniformity to Government contract
costing.
3. CAS Affects on The Contract Administration Phase
The CASE recognized that consistency In contract costing after
award was another worthwhile goal to pursue:
Essentially, consistency relates to the allocation of costs, both
direct and Indirect, and to the treatment of costs with respect to
Individual cost objectives as well as among cost objectives in
like circumstances.^
During the Comptroller General's Feasibility Study, examples of the incon-
sistent treatment of costs were discovered repeatedly: contractors were
Inconsistent in their Identification of costs as direct or Indirect; con-
tractors allocated indirect cost pools in the manner most beneficial and
convenient to the recovery of costs; and some contractors frequently were
guilty of "double-counting," treating the same cost both directly and in-
directly. Requiring, monitoring and enforcing consistency in Government
contract costing Insures that the negotiation pricing assumptions made by
the Government, and based upon the contractor's statement of estimated
costs, continue to remain sound throughout the life of the contract. By
^^Ibid, pp. 12-13.
on
-^^Arthur Schoenhaut, "Attitudes Toward Cost Accounting Standards," The
GAP Review
, Winter 1973, p. ^1.
^^CASB, "Restatement of Objectives," March 1977, p. 2.
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means of its earliest Standards issued, the CASE has mandated that the
practices through which the contractor develops cost and pricing data to
support his proposal also be utilized in product costing, the accumulation
and reporting of his costs. In its requirement for disclosure of those
practices, the Board has established visibility in contract costing and
enabled the contract administrator and auditor to monitor contractor com-
pliance with the consistency dictum. It is in the post-award environment
that Cost Accounting Standards clearly respond to many of the concerns
expressed, including the "profiteering" and "gaming" charges levied against
sane defense contractors, during the I968 and 1970 Congressional hearings.
F. CAS IN THE POST-AWARD ENVIRONMENT
It is after the agreement upon price between the contractor and the
Government, post-award, that the mandates contained within the Rules Reg-
ulations and Standards of the CASE are strongest. Pre-award, the Govern-
ment requires only that the contractor's disclosure of his cost accounting
practices be adequate and that his proposal and the Disclosure Statement
be in conpliance with Cost Accounting Standards. Once the contract is
executed and performance begins, however. Government surveillance and
scrutiny of the contractor's accounting practices and procedures intensifies.
The rigor with which this audit takes place can be seen as a response to
three needs present in a procurement environment lacking price competition:
a stabilization of prices and funding levels and a prohibition against the
manipulation of accounting practices.
1. The Pricing Stabilization Need
During negotiation, the Government buyer relies upon the contrac-
tor's disclosure of cost accounting practices, the practices the contractor
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has utilized in the past Chis "established" practices) and the mandates of
uniformity that are Cost Accounting Standards in order to develop assunp-
tions upon which he can base a pricing objective. This objective is thus
reached via a conmon understanding of the costing methods the contractor
will utilize to trace or assign costs to the final end product. From
these assunptions, profit, incentive and limitation of costs or funds
constraints evolve, each designed to motivate the contractor to, and
reward him for, successful performance.
If the pricing assumptions, however, fail to materialize in fact,
the pricing formula utilized to reach a negotiated settlement may be in-
valid and incapable of promoting and fostering the profit-maximizing
orientation of the contractor in the manner intended. Through its consis-
tency and uniformity requirements, the CASE has responded to the need for
stabilizing the pricing assunptions developed during the course of nego-
tiation, thereby maintaining through contract completion the cost, profit
and incentive structure established at award.
2. The Anti-Manipulation Need
In the 1968 and 1970 hearings, debate in the Banking Committees,
as well as on the floor of both Houses, was characterized by charges that
defense contractors were profiteering through manipulations of their
accounting practices. Though the accusations tended to exaggerate the
scope and range of this illicit activity, it was certainly true that suf-
ficient opportunity and motivation existed for unscrupulous contractors to
practice "gaining" in product costing.
The ability to manipulate the measurement, assignment and alloca-
tion of costs incurred to end products carries with it the opportunity to
45

shift costs from commercial to Government work and from fixed-price to
cost-relmbursafeile work. Without continual scrutiny, advance agreements
or a conmon understanding and conpliance with the rules of cost allowability,
contractors were capable of directing the movement of costs to their own
advantage. Indeed, costs legitimately incurred could be illegitimately
reimbursed by mo3?e than one customer, providing the motivation of increased
profits. Though regulations contained within DAR XV and the conventions
of generally-accepted accounting principles essentially proscribed this
activity, enforcement was lax and corrpliance was uneven.
The statutory prohibition of the payment of "increased costs" by
the United States contained within Public Law 91-379, and repeated in
the Cost Accounting Standards Contract Clause, responds to the need to deter,
if not eliminate, the manipulation of accounting practices in post-award.
The opportunity for unpenalized duplicity and deceit in product costing is
eliminated by the application of cost accounting practices that are consis-
tent with those established pre-award and uniform with those mandated by CAS.
3. The Funding Level Stabilization Need
In some situations, the Rules and Regulations of Cost Accounting
Standards permit adjustments to final contract price to correct a material
shift in costs between contracts. This provision allows funding levels to
be stabilized within programs and enables the Administrative Contracting
Officer to amend the effects of a deviation in cost accounting practices
that otherwise might reduce the price of one contract at the expense of
another, with no change in the level of effort expended.
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G. THE DYNAMICS OF THE CONTRACTOR'S ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
1. CiTanges In AccQunting Practices
It Is clear from the 1970 Hearings in the Senate that a prohi-
bition of all changes to cost accounting practices was never intended to
be the result of P.L. 91-379- The Conptroller General offered this
argument in testimony:
Yes, there can be legitimate reasons for contractors to vary their
accounting practices over any period of a given contract and it will
be necessary to recognize these reasons in any attenpt to gain con-
sistency Whether the contractor or the Government is entitled to
a favorable price change in the circumstances cited would depend on
the type of contractual instrument and other considerations involved
in the particular circumstances. -^
Yet some measure of the resistance in Congress over the establishment of
the Cost Accounting Standards Board was forged on the fear that the
proposed agency would restrict contractors frcm making legitimate changes
in addition to those legitimately prohibited. A review of the range of
potential, changes to a contractor's accounting system would be beneficial
to the discussion.
Cost accounting practice changes in the CAS environment can be
grouped into four categories:
a. Mandatory changes are those made to an accounting system to
corply with the requirements of a Cost Accounting Standard and to which
the Government's representative agrees represent a proper, and necessary,
inplementation of the Standard;
b. Discretionary changes are those proposed and voluntarily effected
by the contractor for his own benefit:
-'Hearings before the Subconmittee on Production and Stabilization of
the Senate Ccmmittee on Banking and Currency, 91st Congress, 2nd Session,
March 1970, pp. I4l-l42.
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c. Sanctioned changes are those proposed by either party to
the contract, agreed to be beneficial by both parties, and accepted and
effected by the contractor with the blessings of the Government;
d. Noncorpliant changes are those effected by the contractor
to which the Government objects and charges the contractor with incon-
sistency or a lack of uniformity.
The above range of options is available to contractors susceptible
to Cost Accounting Standards and the responsibilities of the parties in
the face of each category of potential change are detailed in the Cost
Accounting Standards Contract Clause and the Administration of Cost Account-
ing Standards Clause. Thus, the occurrence of, or necessity of, changes
to a contractor's cost accounting practices is accepted as central to the
post-award administration of covered contracts.
2 . . The Need to Assess Cost Inpact
Attendant with the recognition that changes to a contractor's
practices may occur is the Government's obligation to prohibit increased
costs in some situations, discretionary or noncorapliant changes, and to
provide for equitable adjustment for the cost shifts in others, mandatory
or sanctioned changes. In the face of these obligations, the monetary
effect, or cost iirpact, of the shift in costs caused by a change to cost
accounting practices, for whatever reason, must be traced. This assess-
ment allows contract price adjustments, upward and downward, or downward
only, to be made to the contract and enables the Government to maintain
pricing assunptions throughout performance, prohibit the payment of increased
costs and stabilize contract funding levels, thus responding to the needs
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recognized In the post-award environment. Given the potential for changes,




It was the intention of this Chapter to provide a brief history, and
discuss the significance of Cost Accounting Standards in order that a
perspective, through which the research study could be properly viewed,
would be established.
Given the nature of the marketplace in which the majority of defense
procurement dollars are expended, the benefits of market forces, absent
when price coirpetition is not present, can only be attained through
Government regulations. The most significant of these regulations that
serve to simulate the price conpetitive marketplace, and equalize the
footing en,ioyed by buyer and seller, evolved from the Truth in Negotiation
and Cost Accounting Standards Acts.
The two companion laws provide the Government buyer with product costing
infonnation, established through the seller's cost accounting system. The
contractor's cost accounting options are circumscribed by contractual re-
quirements of veracity in the submission of cost or pricing data and con-
sistency and uniformity in its production or treatment. Public Laws 87-653
and 91-379 enable the Government to require and rely upon the data produced
by the contractor's cost accounting system in its attempts to reach a fair
and reasonable price.
Through these regulations, the Government is assured that cost proposals
submitted in response to the solicitation are essentially uniform, and thus
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comparable. Additionally, the contractor is charged with consistently
applying his cost accounting practices, made visible through disclosure,
throughout the period of performance. This responsibility insures sta-
bilization of negotiation pricing assumptions and contract funding levels.
Additionally, it serves to implement the Congressional prohibition against
the payment of increased costs.
Despite these regulations, changes to cost accounting practices can
and do occur after award. In view of this undeniable fact, and jn order
to respond to the needs Congress recognized in negotiated procurement
when it established the CASE, the shift in costs between contracts caused
by the change must be measured. This process, the assessment of cost
Inpact, is the continuing responsibility of the Administrative Contracting
Officer throughout performance and, with contract audit, the action most




III. THE ASSESSMENT OF COST IMPACT: THE CURRENT PROCESS
The purpose of the previous Chapter was to explore the
history and significance of Cost Accounting Standards as they
relate to the defense procurement process. As a result of
that presentation, a perspective has been developed through
which the need to assess the cost impact of a cost accounting
practice change can be seen to be a cornerstone of the admin-
istration of Cost Accounting Standards and an essential response
to the defects recognized in the negotiated defense procurement
marketplace.
This Chapter describes the regulatory and conceptual
environment that currently surrounds and defines the cost impact
assessment process. The contractual obligations of the Cost
Accounting Standards covered contractor, as mandated by the
Board's Cost Accounting Standards Contract Clause and DOD's
Administration of Cost Accounting Standards Clause, will be
discussed. From this discussion, a model of the administra-
tion of Cost Accounting Standards, that incorporates the salient
requirements binding each party, will be presented. DOD gui-
dance available to Government players in the process, and cost




A. THE ADMINISTRATION OF COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
David V. Lamm, as a conclusion to the most extensive
research work published to date on the affects of CAS on the
DOD procurement process, wrote: "Cost Accounting Standards
administration is extremely complex, rigid and confusing."
In the five years that have passed since the publication of
Lamm's dissertation, both DOD and the CASE have had the oppor-
tunity and inclination to refine and improve the rules and
regulations that govern the workings of CAS in the post-award
environment. Since the assessment of cost impact and resul-
tant contract price adjustment actions are the major respon-
sibility of the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) during
CAS administration, it is appropriate to briefly review the
post-award aspects of Cost Accounting Standards administration.
1. The CAS Contract Clause
Part 331, "Contract Coverage," of the CASB's Rules
and Regulations has been subject to continuing amendment since
1972. It covers the applicability of the Cost Accounting
Standards to defense contracts, including exemption and waiver
from the Standards, and dictates the notice, requiring dis-
closure of cost accounting practices, to be included in the
solicitation of any negotiated defense contract expected to
exceed $100,000. Central to this discussion is Part 331.50
of the Contract Coverage provisions, the Cost Accounting
David V. Lamm, "Administration of CAS," p. 305,
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standards Contract Clause (Appendix A) , hereinafter referred
to as the "CAS Contract Clause." This Clause, identical to
that incorporated into DAR, requires a contractor, as a con-
dition of contracting, to:
Cil disclose his cost accounting practices in writing;
Cii) follow consistently his disclosed and "established"
(i.e., where disclosure is not required) practices
in accumulating and reporting contract performance
costs;
(iii) apply changes to his disclosed and established
practices to the contract prospectively;
Civ) comply with all Standards in effect on the date of
award or date of final agreement on price, as appro-
priate;
Cv) comply prospectively with any Standard which be-
comes applicable to the contract after award and
agree to an equitable adjustment, under the Changes
Clause of the contract, if the contract cost is
affected;
(vi) negotiate with the contracting officer to determine
the terms and conditions under which a change to
disclosed or established practices may be made;
(vii) agree to an adjustment in contract price if he fails
to comply with any applicable Standard or his dis-






(viii) utilize the Disputes Clause of the contract as a
remedy for any failure to agree on whether he has
complied;
(ix) permit audit of his books or records by appropriate
officials to resolve any question related to com-
pliance; and
(x) flow down the substance of the Clause to any appli-
cable subcontract.
The balance of Part 331 and the working of the CAS Contract
Clause, which together express conceptually the rights and
obligations of each party to the contract, can best be ex-
plained through a sequential discussion of their provisions,
a. Changes to Cost Accounting Practices
Until February 1977, the CASB had not published
a definition of the terms "cost accounting practice" or
"change to cost accounting practice." As a result, considerable
confusion existed in the field, among both contract adminis-
trators and members of affected industry, over implementa-
tion and administration of the Board's Rules governing changes
to cost accounting practices (CAP's). At its first evaluation
conference in July 19 75, industry participants were especially
critical of both the Board's failure to clearly define its
prohibitions and the actions of Government personnel attempting
to enforce compliance despite the confusion.
The 19 77 proposed rule, which became effective





...any accounting method or technique which is used for
measurement of cost, assignment of cost to cost account-
ing periods, or allocation of cost to final cost objectives.
(1) Measurement of cost encompasses accounting methods
and techniques used in defining the components of cost,
determining the basis for cost measurement and establishing
criteria for use of alternative cost measurement techniques...
C2) Assignment of cost to cost accounting periods refers
to a method or technique used in determining the amount of
cost to be assigned to individual cost accounting periods....
/including/- •• requirements for the use of specified accrual
basis accounting or cash basis accounting for a cost element.
(3) Allocation of cost to cost objectives includes
accounting methods or techniques used to accumulate cost,
to determine whether a cost is to be directly or indirectly
allocated, to determine the composition of cost pools, and
to determine the selection and composition of the appropriate
allocation base.
A change to a disclosed or established cost account-
ing practice has been defined in the amendment as :
...any alteration in a cost accounting practice, whether or
not such practices are covered by a Disclosure Statement. .
.
The Board made provision for several exceptions to this defi-
nition. The following situations are not considered cost
accounting practice changes
:
(i) the initial adoption of a cost accounting practice;
(ii) the partial or total elimination of a cost; and
(iii) the revision of a CAP for a cost previously consid-
ered immaterial.







of accounting practice cliange scenarios to illustrate the
definitions.
TKese clarifications of the Board's mandates are
central to the proper administration of CAS. The letter and
spirit of the statute was aptly cited in a 1977 Air Force Con-
tract Management Division letter to all AFPRO's (Air Force
Plant Representative Offices) and Corporate ACO's:
The GAO Feasibility Study is permeated with examples where
alterations in the contractor's measurement or allocation
of costs resulted in an inequitable amount of costs being
charged against Government contracts ...[ It] was just this
type of activity that P.L. 91-379 was designed to prevent.^
With the publication of definitions of cost accounting prac-
tices and changes to cost accounting practice, the CASB has
communicated its understanding of the "alterations" that GAO
had discovered and to which Congress had responded with legis-
lation. A common meaning has thus been established,
b. Sources of the CAP Change
Discovery of a deviation, or identification of
an alteration, in disclosed or established cost accounting
practices inevitably leads to investigation of the source, or
reason, for the change. Determination of the source governs
the treatment, accorded by the Government and described by the
CAS Contract Clause, of the shift in costs caused by the change.
Four scenarios of potential change sources exist, however,
only two alternate treatments of a material shift in costs
5As cited in A Compendium of Cost Accounting Standards
'
Impact Upon the Procurement Process , Aerospace Industries
Association of America, Inc., August 1979, p. 9.
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are possible: mandatory changes, required by the issuance of
new Cost Accounting Standards, and sanctioned voluntary changes
give rise to equitable adjustment; discretionary voluntary
changes and noncortpliant changes may result in downward adjust-
ment only if a material shift in costs accrues.
CI) New Cost Accounting Standards . When the
Board's initial drafts of Rules and Regulations were published
for review, many respondents argued that, over the course of
performance, cost accounting practices would have to be modi-
fied on existing contracts as new Standards were promulgated.
Accordingly, the CASB provided that newly-published Standards
would be applied prospectively to any existing contracts:
Further, the Board has been persuaded by the strong argu-
ments from industry comentators that companies with more
than one contract, subject to different Cost Accounting
Standards, cannot maintain multiple records to account
for each contract related to its set of standards ....[ The]
vast majority of companies must apply any required cost
accounting practices across their total business, and...
it would be impractical if not impossible for companies
to apply different practices to different contracts. The
Board has accommodated this view by enabling contractors
to apply uniform practices to different contracts.
Thus the CAS Contract Clause makes the following requirements
of the contractor:
...The contractor shall also comply with any Cost Accounting
Standard which hereafter becomes applicable to a contract
or subcontract. .. .prospectively from the date of applica-
bility. . .
6
General Comments prefacing publication of 4 CFR 331, 37




When a new Standard is published, two dates
are mandated to define implementation. The effective date
of the Standard defines those contracts eligible for either
upward or downward price adjustment. All open contracts in
existence on the effective date are considered. The appli-
cability date is that date subsequent to the effective date
when the provisions of the Standards, the change in CAP '
s
mandated, must be implemented. Any contract awarded after
the effective date must be priced, at award, with the fore-
knowledge that cortpliance with the new provisions is required
on the applicability date. Generally, the applicability date
is triggered by receipt of a covered contract. Most Standards
have provided that a contractor must implement the new provi-
sions at the beginning of the next fiscal year following the
award of the first covered contract after the effective date.
CAP changes necessitated by the issuance of
new Standards are considered mandatory changes and give rise" to
equitable adjustment to the prices of covered contracts in
existence prior to the effective date of the Standard.
(2) Voluntary Changes . Prior to March 1978, all
changes to CAP ' s that were proposed by the contractor, pro-
posed by the Government and accepted by the contractor, or
required by the passage of legislation, the issuance of regu-
lations, or the advisory promulgations of professional organi-
zations (e.g., the Financial Accounting Standards Board),
other than those necessitated by a new Cost Accounting Standard,
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were considered "voluntary." The CASE interpreted Public Law
91-379 such that increased costs arising as a result of
voluntary changes were prohibited. Since this interpretation
restricted organization and accounting changes that had tra-
ditionally been the prerogative of corporate management as well
as changes required by law or regulation, e.g., the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 19 74, (unless the contrac-
tor was prepared to allow his contract prices to be unilater-
ally adjusted downward only for any material shift in costs
caused by the change) a controversy developed that dominated
the first five years of the Board's existence. On 10 March 1978,
however, the Board amended the CAS Contract Clause to recognize
"desirable" changes.
A sanctioned change is one which leads to a
beneficial effect, recognized by the Government, on the prac-
tices the contractor is using to estimate, accumulate and
report costs. By definition, a sanctioned change cannot give
rise to increased costs; the CAS Contract Clause authorizes
either upward or downward adjustment:
When the parties agree to a change to either a disclosed
cost accounting practice or an established cost accounting
practice, other than a change under (4) (A) above [(new
Standard), the parties shall ].. .negotiate an equitable






The Contract Clause provisions provide that the ACQ shall make
the determination to sanction a voluntary change:
Prior to the utilization of the provisions of subparagraph
(a) (4) (C) of the contract clause set out in Part 331.50,
the contracting officer shall make a finding that the change
is desirable and is not detrimental to the interests of the
Government.
^
The DOD CAS Working Group has offered the following guidance
to ACO's to assist them in making the desirability determina-
tion :
The teirm "desirable" encompasses the tests of being warranted,
appropriate, equitable, fair or reasonable. The contracting
officer's finding shall not be made solely because of the
financial impact on the contractor's current CAS-covered
contracts. A change may be desirable and not detrimental
to the interest of the Government even though costs increase.
Thus the Board has provided for upward or
downward adjustment in contract prices for two sources of CAP
changes that give rise to a material shift in cost: mandatory
and sanctioned changes. This upward or downward, or equitable,
adjustment has been defined by the Court of Claims as "simply
a corrective measure utilized to keep the contractor whole."
The Clause recognizes the Gcvernment ' s obligation, in mandating
or sanctioning a change to CAP ' s , to adjust the contract price
after the change to a level such that the contractor will be
in a position neither better nor worse than he occupied before
^4 CFR 331.51
.
"•^DOD CAS Working Group Item 79-23 of 2 January 1979.
As cited by Frederick Neuman, "Government Equitable




the change. In the second category of voluntary changes,
discretionary changes, however, the CAS Contract Clause pro-
vides for downward adjustment only of covered contract prices.
Discretionary changes may arise when the con-
tractor implements an alteration in CAP ' s that fails the
desirability determination of the ACQ. Later modifications
to cost accounting practices in contracts awarded after the
effective date, but before the applicability date, of a new
Standard that fail to apply prospectively the mandatory pro-
visions of the CAS before award will also generally be consi-
dered discretionary when the changes are implemented. Changes
proposed and implemented in response to a new Standard that
are judged to exceed its requirements will be classified
discretionary. In each of the latter two cases, however, the
changes will be subjected to the potential benefits of the
desirability determination.
(3) Noncomp li ance . The final source of CAP changes
are those discovered and determined to be noncompliant . CAS
noncompliance determinations can arise as a result of three
potential accounting failures of the contractor either during
the proposal or performance stages of the contract:
(i) a failure to comply with disclosed CAP ' s
;
(ii) a failure to comply with established CAP ' s ; or




In addition to the routine cost estimating, accumulating and
reporting noncompliance scenarios occurring prior to, or
during, the contract, the contractor's proposals to alter
practices to implement new Standards or effect voluntary changes
can also lead to a contracting officer's judgment of non-
compliance. Provisions of the Clause are identical to the
wording contained within the legislation in requiring the
contractor to:
Agree to an adjustment of the contract price or cost
allowance, as appropriate, if he or a subcontractor fails
to comply with an applicable Cost Accounting Standard or
to follow any practice disclosed. .. and such failure results
in any increased costs paid by the United States. Such
adjustment ^shall provide for recovery of the increased costs
to the United States together with interest thereon . . . from
the time the payment by the United States was made to the
time the adjustment is effected. -^^
Other than the determination of compliance
itself, the striking difference between voluntairy changes
and noncompliant changes is the contractor's proposal, or
revelation, of the voluntary change in advance of its imple-
mentation. The similarity among those voluntary changes
classified discretionary and noncompliant changes is the pro-
visions of the Contract Clause that prohibit increased costs
as a result of discretionary changes:
[The contractor shall] negotiate with the contracting
officer to determine the terms and conditions under
which a change may be made to either a disclosed cost




practice. .. .Provided, that no agreement may be made under
this provision that will increase costs paid by the United
States. '^
c. Increased Costs
Several concepts were introduced in Part 331 that
are important to an understanding of the implications of the
CAS Contract Clause. P.L. 91-379 clearly prohibits "increased
costs paid to the defense contractor by the United States."
In its application of the prohibition to discretionary and
noncompliant changes, the Board defines the term in Part 331.70,
"Interpretation :
"
(a) Increased costs paid by the United States ... shall
be deemed to have resulted whenever the cost paid by
the Government results from the application of practices
other than the contractor's disclosed practices or from
failure to comply with applicable Cost Accounting Stan-
dards, and such cost is higher than it would have been had
the disclosed practices been followed and applicable Cost
Accounting Standards complied with.
A simple scenario will illustrate the definition. A contrac-
tor with a flexibly-priced covered contract (i.e., not fixed-
price) and a fixed-price commercial contract could increase
his cost recovery by manipulating, via noncompliance or a
voluntary change, his disclosed practices after negotiation
of price to shift the allocation of some portion of the costs
from the commercial contract to the Government contract:
Original Costs
Negotiated Allocation Allocated to
Cost Shift the Contract
Gov't CPFF 250,000 +10,000 260,000








Prior to the advent of CAS, an unscrupulous contractor could
collect $260/000 from the Government and $100,000, the con-
tract fixed-price, from his commercial customer. 4 CFR 331.70(a)
defines this situation as "increased costs" of $10,000 and
the Contract Clause authorizes the ACO to reduce the price of
the Government contract by this amount to $250,000.
The previous definition, however, is not appropriate
for covered fixed-price contracts:
In negotiated firm fixed-price contracts, however, "increased
costs" cannot be interpreted in terms of a higher level of
costs reimbursed during contract performance, since in such
contracts the price to be paid would normally be the price
agreed to. That price will have to be based on the require-
ment that the contractor use his disclosed practices and
comply with applicable Cost Accounting Standards. Subse-
quently, if the contractor fails during contract performance
to follow his disclosed practices or to comply with appli-
cable Cost Accounting Standards, any increased cost to the
United States by reason of that failure must be measured
by the difference between the cost estimates used in nego-
tiations and the cost estimates that would have been used
had the contractor proposed on the basis of the practices
actually used during contract performance. '^
A scenario similar to the earlier portrayed situation will
serve to illustrate increased costs in a firm fixed-price
contract:
Original Costs
Negotiated Allocation Allocated to
Cost Shift the Contract
Gov't FFP 250,000 -10,000 240,000




Here, the CAS stipulations prevent the contractor from
unscrupulously recovering $250,000 from the Government, the
negotiated fixed-price, and $110,000 from his commercial
customer. Upon discovery, the AGO will reduce the price of
the covered contract by $10,000, to $240,000.
In siammary, therefore, increased costs on a flex-
ibly priced contract are defined to be the difference between
the higher level of costs allocated to the contract, through _-
noncompliance or a discretionary change, and the lower level
that would have been allocated had no change in CAP ' s taken
place. In a fixed-price contract, however, increased costs
come about as a result of the lower level of costs allocated
to the contract by the noncompliance or discretionary change,
d. Offsets
In order to be consistent with existing contract
principles, the "offset" concept from the regulations covering
defective pricing was utilized by the CASE, but the Board
extended the notion to allow offsets between contracts. As
a result of the offset provision, increased costs occuring as a
result of noncorapliant or discretionary changes to one covered con-
tract may be applied to decreased costs allocated to another contract:
In one circumstance an adjustment to the contract price or
of cost allowances. . .may not be required when an amendment
to disclosed or established practices is estimated to result
in increased costs being paid. ...This circumstance may arise
when a contractor is performing two or more contracts, sub-
ject to Cost Accounting Standards Board rules, regulations
and standards. .. .The amendment may increase the cost paid
under one or more of the contracts , while decreasing the
cost paid under one or more of the contracts. In such case,
the Government will not. .. require price adjustment for any
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increased costs paid... so long as the costs decreased under
one or more contracts are at least equal to the increased
cost under the other affected contracts...^
If a noncompliance is judged inadvertent, a similar offset is
16
allowed. An illustration of the simplest cases, where two
covered contracts comprise the entire "universe" of contracts
for the contractor, will be beneficial to the discussion:
Original Costs






Gov't CPFF 100,000 +10,000 110,000
(2) Gov't FFP 250,000 -10,000 240,000
Gov't CPFF 100,000 +10,000 110,000
(3) Gov't FFP 250,000 -10,000 240,000
Gov't FFP 100,000 +10,000 110,000
In example (1), the effect of the higher level of costs allo-
cated to the first CPFF contract is exactly equal to the lower
level of costs allocated to the second CPFF contract. The ACO
has the option of authorizing payment of the costs allocated
to the contracts, or, by disallowing the additional $10,000
on the second contract, encouraging the contractor to revert
to his old practices. In either case, the Government would
only pay the total of $350,000, and the contractor would recog-
nize no windfall profits. In example (2), the change in CAP '
s
results in increased costs for both the fixed-price and the





(In cases where an offset of decreased costs allocated to
firm fixed-price contracts against increased costs allo-
cated to cost reimbursement type contracts may be involved,
the provisions of subparagraph (f) [the offset provision ]
hereof shall apply.)
Lamm explains:
The CAS Board is saying in its interpretations that where
the situation presented in. ..[ example (2)] .. .exists , the
definition of increased costs on FFP contracts is "sus-
pended" and, in fact, such costs are not "increased costs"
but rather "decreased costs" for the purpose of the offsets. 18
In example (2) , a positive action is required by the AGO in
order to achieve the offsetting adjustment. Either the FFP
contract should be unilaterally lowered to $240,000, or $10,000
in costs should be disallowed on the CPFF contract, to pre-
vent increased costs from occurring. In example (3) , the AGO
again has the option of adjusting the prices of both contracts
or leaving them at their fixed-price levels, without the risk
of violating the prohibition.
The offset rule is permissive; the AGO is encour-
aged, but not required, to offset increased costs against
decreased costs to minimize price adjustments to covered con-
tracts. In their training course entitled "Advanced Gost Ac-
counting Standards," DGAA recognizes the distinction:
It should be noted that application of the offset principle
is not mandatory. The CAS rules and regulations permit
''^4 GFR 331.70(b).
18David V. Lamm, "The Administration of CAS," p. 116.
67

offsets "provided that the contractor and all affected con-
tracting officers agree on the method by which the price
adjustments are to be made for all affected contracts."
The restriction of the utilization of the offset rule on deli-
berate noncompliance is not permissive, however. The DOD CAS
Working Group offers ACO's guidance to assist them in making
the distinction between inadvertent and deliberate noncompli-
ance. Deliberate noncompliance should be determined if the
contractor has not made a reasonable effort to introduce appro-
priate personnel to CAS requirements, if repeated noncompliances
of the same nature are discovered, if a contractor makes a
clearly frivolous appeal of an ACO determination, or if a
contractor takes no action to correct or dispute a noncompliance
• ^ 20recognized.
Only a brief introduction of the offset principle
and mechanism has been attempted here. Further discussion,
that includes extensive examples of offset scenarios, can be
found in the "Administration of Cost Accounting Standards" by





Materiality is an accounting principle providing
guidance on the relative significance of a cost or accounting
19Defense Contract Audit Agency, "Cost Impact Proposals
and Contract Price Adjustments," Advanced Cost Accounting
Standards , undated, p. 2.
^Odod CAS Working Group Item 77-12 of 29 March 1977.
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method or technique. Generally, materiality criteria set out
judgmental, or quantitative, yardsticks through which the
decision-maker can assess the influence a cost or treatment
may have on an accounting measurement.
The CASB has provided both general materiality
statements, applicable to the body of Rules, Regulations and
Standards promulgated, and specific materiality statements of
significance, peculiar to one ruling. In general, these
criteria recognize that the
...Board believes that the administration of its rules,
regulations and Cost Accounting Standards should be
reasonable and not seek to deal with insignificant amounts
of costs. ^-^
The materiality of a cost allocation shift caused
by a change in CAP ' s is therefore always a consideration in the
acq's decision to adjust contract prices. The following cri-
teria are considered by the Board to be useful guidelines in
any materiality determination of CAS issues
:
(i) the absolute dollar amount involved;
(ii) the amount of the total contract cost compared with
the amount under consideration;
(iii) the relationship between a cost item and a cost
objective;
^^ CASB Statement of Operating Policies, Procedures and
Objectives, 6 March 1973.
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(iv) the impact upon Government funding;
(v) the relationship of the cost in question to con-
tact price; and
(vi) the cumulative effect of individually immaterial
22items.
The determination that a shift in costs is im-
material is not irrevocable/ however, and is generally
accompanied by a caveat warning the contractor that the issue
could potentially lead to a contract price adjustment if, in
the future, the amount of costs becomes material.
2. POD Implementation of the CAS Contract Clause
The conceptual post-award obligations of the parties
are specified in the CAS Contract Clause. This Clause, how-
ever, is silent as to each party's procedural requirements
during Cost Accounting Standards administration. These re-
quirements are contained within the Administration of Cost
Accounting Standards Clause^-^ (hereinafter, the "CAS Adminis-
tration Clause").
a. The CAS Administration Clause
The CAS Administration Clause (Appendix B) is the
result of DOD efforts to translate the conceptual provisions






procedural obligations made of the contractor necessary to
administer covered contracts. The Clause prescribes the
guidelines to be followed by the contractor in the course of
proposing changes to his cost accounting practices.
A covered contractor is required to submit a two-
stage proposal to the administrative contracting officer for
approval whenever a change is proposed or made necessary
by a noncompliance determination. The initial stage of the
proposal shall provide a complete description of the account-
ing practice change and a gross estimate, or statement of
"general dollar magnitude," of the allocation shifts caused
by the change
:
[The contractor shall] Submit to the cognizant Contract-
ing Officer a description of the accounting change and
the general dollar magnitude of the change to reflect the
sum of all increases and the sum of all decreases for all




The CAS Administration Clause requires the submission to be
made within 60 days of the applicability date in the case of
changes necessitated by new Standards, within 60 days of the
implementation date for voluntary changes and within 60 days
"after the date of agreement" of both parties to a noncompliance
determination. The Clause allows "a mutually agreed to date"





After the contractor's proposal has been deter-
mined adequate and compliant, the final stage of the change
proposal shall be submitted within 60 days, or a mutually-
acceptable period. The Clause stipulates only that the con-
tractor "... [s ]ubmit a cost impact proposal in the form and
manner specified by the cognizant Contracting Officer..." and
agree to any appropriate contract price adjustments as required
by the CAS Contract Clause.
Finally, the CAS Administration Clause requires
contractors who flow down both Clauses to subcontractors to
report the following information to their ACO within 30 days
of the award of a covered subcontract: subcontractor's name
and number, dollar amount and date of award and
...a statement as to whether the subcontractor has made
or proposes to make any previously unreported changes to
accounting practices that affect other CAS covered prime
or subcontracts. If award of the subcontract requires the
subcontractors to comply with a Standard for the first
time, this also shall be reported. ^^
b. Duties of the Principal Government Players
A brief discussion of the roles and duties assumed
by Government actors in the administration of Cost Accounting
Standards will be beneficial to this Chapter's description
of the current regulatory environment.
^^Defense Logistics Agency, Contract Administration
Manual for Contract Administration Services , DLAM 810 5.1
(hereinafter, "DLAM"), January 1979, paragraph 3-1200 . 14a (4),
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(1) The Procuring Contracting Officer . Cost
Accounting Standards administration is not limited to actions
after contract award. The Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO)
is responsible for including the appropriate notice in the
contract solicitation and for securing the offeror's Dis-
closure Statement of cost accounting practices, if applicable.
Unless the PCO makes a written determination waiving the con-
tractor's pre-award submission, the Disclosure Statement is
forvarded to the cognizant ACO for a determination of adequacy.
This review is essential to the conduct of the procurement
process
:
Award of a contract shall not be made until a determination
has been made by the cognizant ACO that a Disclosure State-
ment is adequate unless, in order to protect the interests
of the Government, the PCO waives this requirement. In
this event, a determination shall be made as soon after
award as possible. ^^
The PCO is additionally responsible for
taking action on any "preaward noncompliance" discovered
during the contract auditor's initial compliance review of
the contractor's proposal. In response to the ACO's initial
finding of noncompliance, the PCO must negotiate a proposal
reduction with the offeror, reaching agreement with the con-
tractor to delete the costs associated with the noncompliance.
The PCO must cite the disposition of the noncompliance issue in
a post negotiation memorandum and provide a copy to the ACO, ad-





C2) The Administrative Contracting Officer . The
duties of the ACO, as the central Government representative
in all CAS administration activity, are extensive. He is
responsible for:
(i) determining the adequacy of the contractor's
Disclosure Statement;
(ii) reviewing and determining compliance of the
Disclosure Statement with CASH mandates;
(iii) reviewing and approving CAP change proposals and
any amendments to the Disclosure Statement
necessitated thereby;
(iv) determining proposal and performance compliance
with the Disclosure Statement and CAS; and
(v) negotiating the impact of accounting changes,
and executing subsequent supplemental agreements
27to modify the contract for any changes to CAP's.
(3) The Contract Auditor . Both DCAM and DAR are
specific in their citations of the duties of the contract
auditor as the principal advisor to the ACO on CAS adminis-
tration. The contract auditor shall provide recommendations
on
:






(ii) the Disclosure Statement's compliance with
applicable Standards;
(iii) the contractor's proposal and perfoirmance com-
pliance with CAS and disclosed or established
CAP ' s ; and
(iv) the adequacy, compliance and reasonableness of
contractor proposals for changes to disclosed
or established CAP ' s . °
(4) The Price Analyst . Until the most recent
29
change to the DLAM, the price analyst was assigned no
specific duties in regard to the administration of CAS. DAR
presently makes no requirements of this member of the field
pricing team other than as the financial services element
liaison between the ACO and the DCAA auditor. In the specific
role the Defense Logistics Agency (Defense Contract Adminis-
tration Services) has now assigned him, however, the price
analyst is responsible for reviewing Disclosure Statements,
"for use in performing proposal review and evaluations,"
issuing pricing reports to support the ACO's adequacy and
compliance determinations and for reviewing and evaluating
cost impact proposals. The price analyst retains the audit
liaison role, but is given the new charge to "Maintain thorough
familiarity with the CASB's rules, regulations and Standards."
^^DCAM L-000.3(a)
.




In his current duties, the responsibilities
of the price analyst are very similar to those assigned the
contract auditor.
(5) CAS Board of Review . DCAS Regional Commanders
are responsible for establishing various contract management
boards to review contractual actions contemplated, or per-
formed, by the ACO. In addition to the examination and eval-
uation of the ACO's determinations regarding Contractor
Purchasing System Reviews, Contractor Employee Compensation
System Reviews, and settlements of contract terminations for
convenience, the Board is required to review CAS actions that
result in a contract price adjustment of $100,000 ormore, that
are the subject of controversy with any field pricing team
member, including the auditor, or on which the ACO desires
advice and assistance. In CAS actions, the Board's recom-
mendations are advisory only, not binding upon the ACO.
Though the Board is only a vehicle through which the ACO's
determination is ratified, there is significant opportunity
to influence the ACO's decision through its mandatory mechanisms
(6) Other Players . Both DCAA and DCAS, with their
CAS monitors and CAS specialists, respectively, have created
staff positions at regional headquarters to provide tech-
nical guidance to ACO's and auditors, conduct training as
needed, maintain liaison with headquarters and monitor deter-
minations of field personnel, in an effort to assure consistent
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Governmental action in the administration of CAS. Here again,
the CAS monitors and specialists are in a position to influence
the conduct of CAS matters.
3. A Model of CAS Administration
To this point, the Chapter has reviewed the concep-
tual and procedural aspects of the CAS clauses and provided
a brief overview of roles and responsibilities assumed by
both contract parties in CAS administration. Utilizing a
combination of the background established by the preceding
discussion and reference to DAR coverage of the process,
it is possible to model the salient features of Cost Accounting
Standards administration.
An effort to graphically portray the CAS administra-
tion process can be presented via a line chart illustrating
actions and decision points typical to the administration of
a covered contract. Two basic scenarios must be presented:
the discovery of a noncompliant change and the identification
of a voluntary or mandatory change. " It will be necessary to
portray each scenario over several pages, the sequence of
procedures and decisions moving left to right, unless otherwise
indicated by arrows. The following abbreviations will be used:
31DAR 3-1205 to 3-1214
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"KTR" or "ktr" for contractor; "KO" for contracting officer;
"DS" for Disclosure Statement; and "CIP" for cost impact
proposal.
Over the following four pages , the discovery or
determination of noncompliance during proposal or performance
is portrayed in Figure 3-1. As Figure 3-l(a) indicates,
adequate disclosure of cost accounting practices is a condition
of award. The ACO's determination of adequacy is based upon
recommendations made by the contract auditor as to the cur-
rency, accuracy and completeness of the practices described
within 30 days of receipt of the Disclosure Statement. If the
offeror has submitted a Certificate of Monetary Exemption,
certifying that the level of covered awards received during the
preceding cost accounting period was $10 million or less, thus
exempting the contractor from disclosure, or a Certificate of
Previously Submitted Disclosure Statement, the adequacy review
is not necessary. Additionally, post-award submission or
waiver of the Disclosure Statement may be authorized in certain
circumstances
.
Noncompliance may be discovered during a post-award
detailed review of the Disclosure Statement or, thereafter,
at any point in contract performance. If it is alleged prior
to award, the PCO will negotiate a reduction in the price
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proposed to delete costs related to the noncorapliant practice.
Nonetheless, compliance is not a condition of award. If non-
compliance is determined after award. Figure 3-1 (b), the con-
tractor is given 30 days to propose changes to his CAP ' s to
bring them into compliance and submit a statement of general
dollar magnitude of the change or to submit his argument for
compliance if he disagrees with the ACO's finding. This argu-
ment is considered and a final determination, indicated on —
Figure 3-1 (c), is rendered. The contractor has an opportunity
to appeal the ACO's final determination of noncompliance under
the contract's Disputes Clause.
The contractor's submission of a description of the
change necessary to alleviate the noncompliance is reviewed
for both adequacy and compliance. If his proposal fails
either test, the deficiencies are specified and an amended
description is requested. If the description is both adequate
and compliant, a cost impact proposal, "in the form and manner
33
specified," shall be submitted by the contractor within 60
days. An identical requirement is made of the contractor who
disputes the ACO's final determination of noncompliance. DAR
3-1212 provides that a cost impact proposal will be subjected
to an acceptability determination by the ACO. If it is




has not been provided, it is returned to the contractor for
correction. If the contractor fails to submit a proposal,
the AGO and the auditor are required to assess the cost
impact independently.
As a result of the information contained within the
cost impact proposal, materiality and increased costs deter-
minations can be made, as shown in Figure 3-l(d). If no
increased costs have accrued to the Government as a result
of the noncompliance, or if the level of the shift in costs
is considered immaterial, the contractor is warned, in writing,
that a future material shift causing increased costs may
result in a contract price adjustment. If the level of in-
creased costs is material, however, the contractor is given
20 days to agree to the appropriate downward adjustment to
contract price (s). If the contractor agrees, the price is
modified by means of a supplemental agreement. Failure to
reach agreement within the allotted time should be followed
by a unilateral adjustment in contract price by the AGO. The
amount of this adjustment is subject to the Disputes Glause.
Over the following three pages, the contractor's
submission of a proposal to effect changes to his disclosed
or established practices is presented as Figure 3-2. Figure
3-2 (a) , detailing voluntary changes and changes to implement
new Standards, is similar to Figure 3-1 (a). Each circumstance
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advance of implementation. The contractor is again responsi-
ble for both an adequate description and a statement of
general dollar magnitude of the shift in cost allocation. An
AGO review for compliance and adequacy is performed and a
subsequent determination of noncompliance may be appealed.
One important difference from the earlier diagrams
of a noncompliant change scenario is the desirability deter-
mination made by the AGO in the case of voluntary changes.
If the change is judged desirable, no subsequent determination
of increased costs is necessary; the contractor is due an
equitable adjustment. Informal liaison with a prominent mem-
ber of the CASE staff reveals that the result of this deter-
mination is not subject to appeal. The GAS Gontract Glause
allows a sanctioned change only "if the parties agree...."
The nature of the Government's disagreement _is not a question
of fact under the contract, therefore the right to sanction
a change is exclusively retained by the AGO.
But for the split in procedures between mandatory or
sanctioned changes and discretionary changes shown in Figure
3-2 (b), the actions and decision points follow those presented
in Figure 3-1. Figure 3-2 (c) also illustrates one occasion
that could result in a determination of deliberate noncompliance
4. The Gost Impact Assessment Gycle
This discussion of the current GAS administration
process may be concluded by summarizing the events of the
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cost impact assessment cycle, and time constraints for those
events dictated by DAR, in the schedule shown in Figure 3-3.
The total time involved, from discovery or proposal of the
alteration to final resolution of the allocation shift, is
an optimistic estimate, however. The time constraints shown
make no allowance for delays caused by disputes or repeated
submittals of proposals forced by determinations of inadequacy
or unacceptability. The process is further complicated and
lengthened by the existence and necessary analysis of several,
even hundreds, of covered contracts that may be, or have been,
affected by the change.
B. DOD GUIDANCE ON THE COST IMPACT PROPOSAL
In the preceding description of the CAS Clauses, obliga-
tions of the contract parties and the administration process,
it is evident that the measurement of the shift in costs caused
by the accounting change is the central, and most important,
responsibility of the ACO, as the primary Government represen-
tative in CAS matters. It is as a result of this cost impact
assessment that the effects of CAP changes can be ascertained
and necessary contract price adjustments determined. Ultimately,
this leads to the maintenance of stable pre-award price
assumptions and funding levels and the ability to correct any
accounting manipulations aimed at enhancing cost recovery,
the goals of CAS administration over the life of the contract.
Given the significance of this task, the guidance and direction
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THE COST IMPACT ASSESSMENT CYCLE
1. Initial Proposal By Contractor (60-90 days)
A. New Standard or Voluntary Change : Contractor submits
proposal including a detailed description of the
change and a statement of general dollar magnitude;
B. Noncompliance : Contractor is served with a notice of
the acq's initial finding, requiring him to submit
a proposal for bringing his practices into compliance
and a statement of general dollar magnitide, if he
agrees, or the reasons he considers his present
practices compliant if he does not agree.
2. ACQ and Auditor Initial Review (30-60 days)
A. Contractor's submission is reviewed for adequacy and
compliance. If the contractor has disagreed with the
acq's initial determination of noncompliance, the ACQ
reviews the contractor's submission and makes his
final determination.
3. Contractor Preparation and Submission of CIP (60-90 days)
A. If the contractor submits a cost impact proposal, it
is reviewed for acceptability, increased costs and
materiality;
B. If the contractor refuses , the ACQ and auditor assess
cost impact.
4. ACQ/Contractor Negotiation (30-60 days)
A. Agreement is required within 20 days. If agreement
on increased costs and the extent of contract price
adjustments can be reached, supplemental agreements
are executed. If no agreement can be reached,
contract prices are adjusted unilaterally by change
order.




provided the AGO and his principal CAS advisor, the contract
auditor, on the cost impact proposal submission requirement
that enables the assessment deserves exploration.
1. Guidance Available to the ACQ
Several potential sources of guidance on the require-
ments of the two-stage impact assessment proposal are available
to the administrative contracting officer in DAR/ Working
Group advisories and DLAM. A review of the emphasis given
the proposal submission by each regulatory or advisory source
follows.
a. Defense Acquisition Regulations
A DOD contract administrator faced with carrying
out his obligations under the CAS Administration Clause would
look to DAR, the massive compendium of agency procurement
regulations and implementing authority for Executive or
Legislative Department mandates, as a primary source of
guidance and direction on the nature of the cost impact proposal
(CIP) requirement. DAR Sections 3-1212, "Administration of
Noncompliance Issues," 3-1213, "Administration of Equitable
Adjustments for New Standards," and 3-1214, "Administration
of Voluntary Changes," provide some elaboration on the two-
stage proposal for cost impact assessment, the statement of
general dollar magnitude and the subsequent CIP itself, specified
in the CAS Administration Clause.
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(1) The Statement of General Dollar Magnitude . There
exists, within DAR, no further guidance on the nature of the
statement of general dollar magnitude, the rough order estimate
of the impact of an accounting practice change of any type,
other than that available within the CAS Administration Clause:
Submit to the cognizant Contracting Of ficer. . . the general
dollar magnitude of the change to reflect the sum of all
increases and the sum of all decreases for all contracts
containing the Cost Accounting Standards Clause...
Additionally ^ DAR makes no provision for a materiality deter-
mination by the ACO based solely on this gross summary of
shifts of costs from or to the body of covered contracts. In
each case, noncompliant, mandatory, sanctioned or discretion-
ary changes to CAP's, the ACO is directed to obtain a CIP
from the contractor, subsequent to this initial submission.
In the case of a final determination of noncompliance,
necessitated by the contractor's disagreement with the ACO's
initial determination, the ACO is directed to pursue the cost
impact proposal without requiring a statement of general
dollar magnitude.
In summary, therefore, this first stage
proposal serves only to indicate the net shift in costs to
(increases) and from (decreases) the CAS universe of contracts




both Government and commercial. The impact assessment process
must proceed to the second stage submission.
(2) The Cost Impact Proposal . This second stage
proposal is therefore the determinant of the impact of allo-
cation shifts caused by the change in CAP's. It is from the
information contained within the CIP that the AGO can base a
determination on equitable adjustment or increased costS/
information necessary to make any appropriate adjustments in
contract price.
For each type of change, DAR specifies only
the minimum information required on the GIP. On noncompliant
changes, this shall include:
(i) identification of all contracts and subcontracts
containing the Gost Accounting Standards clause;
and
(ii) the effect on each contract and subcontract from
the date of failure to comply until the noncompliance
is corrected.
On mandatory changes, the GIP must contain:
(i) identification of each additional standard, to-
gether with contracts and subcontracts containing
the Gost Accounting Standards clause having an
award date prior to the effective date of such
standard; and
(ii) the effect on each contract and subcontract from
the date the contractor is required to follow






For both sanctioned and discretionary changes, the contractor
shall submit a CIP detailing:
(i) identification of all contracts and subcontracts
containing the Cost Accounting Standards clause;
and
(ii) the effect on each contract or subcontract from
the effective date of the proposed change until
completion of the contract or subcontract.
In each case, therefore, the contractor is required to identify
the entire, or a tailored, CAS Contract Universe. For volun-
tary changes, this Universe would include all covered contracts
open on the implementation date of the change. For changes
due to the applicability of new Standards, this would include
all covered contracts open on the effective date of the change;
those eligible for equitable adjustment (any contracts awarded
after the Standard's effective date that were not in compliance
with the new provision would be covered under the voluntary
change guidelines). For noncompliant changes, the CAS Contract
Universe could conceivably include contracts that were closed
as of the discovery and determination of the noncompliance.
Generally, the contractor would be required to identify all
covered contracts affected by the noncompliance, including
those completed. One interviewee interprets the DAR noncom-. .
pliance provisions in this fashion:
You can open up contracts for defective pricing, fraud




In a field guidance memorandum issued by their CAS Division,
DCAA advises auditors that this interpretation had been upheld
in Bailfield Industries, Division of A-T-0^ Inc
.
/ ASBCA 19025,
75-1 BCA Para. 11,245:
Basing its opinion on the lack of a specific time limit
in the [Price Reduction for Defective Cost and Pricing
Data] clause and by confetruing the clause together with
the audit and disputes clause, the Board [of Contract
Appeals] ruled that the contracting officer could issue
the final determination within a reasonable period of time
after the expiration of three years from the date of
final payment. A similar result could be expected if
recovery was sought by the Government under the "Cost
Accounting Standards" clause.
In addition to identifying the CAS Contract
Universe appropriate to the change, the contractor is required
to indicate the cost impact of the alteration in practices,
by contract, for the lifetime of the change. For noncompliant
changes, this lifetime would extend from the date of award,
or date of implementation of the noncompliant practice, which-
ever is later, for each contract, to the date of performance
completion, or date of correction of the practice, whichever
is earlier. For voluntary changes and those required by new
Standards, the change lifetime is from the date of implementa-
tion of the change to the date of completion of each contract.
3 8DCAA, PCD Memorandum for Regional Managers, "Adjustment
of Closed CAS-Covered Contracts for Noncompliance," 23
February 1977, p. 2.
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No further guidance is available within DAR
as to the cost impact assessment process, including the CIP
itself. Presumably, the AGO may demand the contractor's sub-
mission be in a particular format designed to facilitate the
measurement of cost impact, since the CAS Administration Clause
requires the proposal to be "in the form and manner specified
by the cognizant Contracting Officer," however there is no
indication in the manual of any particular form or manner that
would enhance the impact assessment,
b. Working Group Items
The DOD CAS Working Group advisories are avail-
able and applicable to all defense contract administrators.
Thus, the Working Group Items provide a secondary potential
source of guidance on cost impact proposals.
Working Group Item 76-8, published 17 December
1976, "Interim Guidance on the Use of the Offset Principle
in Contract Price Adjustment Resulting from Accounting
Changes," suggests possible formats useful in presenting a
cost impact proposal that may facilitate the ACO's materiality
and increased costs/equitable adjustment determinations and
the negotiation of contract price adjustments:
No specific method for applying the offset concept has been
established. It remains the responsibility of the Adminis-
trative Contracting Officer to address each specific
situation in a way that best accomplishes the overall
objective. One method that may simplify the computation in
many instances .. .would be to compute the impact of a change
by types of contracts (e.g., firm fixed-price, cost type)
and adjust as few contract prices as necessary within each
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group before merging the net impact from each contract
group with that of the other groups. Different approaches
may provide a better procedure in other cases. For example,
contracts may be grouped according to relative materiality
of the impact of the change. This type of segregation can
be helpful in identifying contracts which can be eliminated
from further consideration.
In the course of conducting research for this study, all CIP '
s
made available to this researcher utilized the format recom-
mended here, grouping the Contract Universe by contract type.
This guidance, however, is all that is offered by the Working
Group on the nature of the cost impact proposal.
c. Contract Administration Manual
The DLAM is applicable only to DCAS ACO's and
thus guidance offered does not carry with it the wide-ranging
agency-wide implications of that available from DAR and the
Working Group. The DLAM, however, sheds no further light on
the form and manner necessary in the cost impact proposal
other than to echo DAR in requiring the contractor to submit:
...a cost impact proposal in sufficient detail to permit
evaluation and negotiation of the impact upon each contract
and subcontract.
The DLAM makes no substantial contribution to the search for
regulatory guidance on the nature of the cost impact proposal.
2 . Guidance Available to the Contract Auditor
The DCAA auditor is considered the principal advisor





AGO also has available to him the services and recojnraendations
of the regional CAS specialist, at his level the primary source
advice is the contract auditor, generally a resident in the
plant or corporate office of the covered contractor in ques-
tion, familiar with the intricacies of the contractor's ac-
counting system and privy to the books and records necessary
to monitor compliance. Since the auditor frequently provides
the input upon which the ACO's CAS determinations are made,
the unique guidance made available by DCAA, supplementing the
direction provided by DAR and the Working Group, may describe
further the format and detail necessary in the contractor's
cost impact proposal.
a. Defense Contract Audit Manual
The DCAA Contract Audit Manual is no more specific
on the format and type of information necessary in the GIP to
facilitate impact assessment than is DAR. DGAM recognizes
the importance of the contractor's identification of the GAS
Universe
:
An integral part of the cost impact proposal is the list
of GAS-covered contracts and subcontracts which will be
effected by the change or noncompliance.
It additionally references the DAR requirements for minimum
data in each circumstance:
A basic problem encountered by auditors is the proper
preparation of a proposal by the contractor. DAR outlines





include in cost impact proposals (such as identification
of and cost impact on each CAS-covered contract and sub-
contract) . If inadequately prepared, the auditor should
return the proposal to the contractor through the AGO
with deficiencies specifically identified. ^
Thus, though DCAM charges the auditor with making recommenda-
tions to the AGO on the adequacy of the contractor's GIP
submission, it offers no more guidance than that available
from DAR and Working Group advisories as to any detail greater
than the minimum specified by DAR that would affect the
proposal's adequacy.
b. DGAA Training Guide
It is not until semi-official agency training
guides developed by DGAA are consulted that substantive
guidance on the format and detail necessary, and desirable,
in the cost impact proposal is available. In the "Gost
Impact Proposals and Gontract Price Adjustments" lesson of
DGAA's Advanced Gost Accounting Standards course, relatively
explicit recommendations are made as to procedures to be
followed in requesting and reviewing the contractor's
submissions
.
The training guide addresses . the initial stage,
of the contractor's cost impact submission, the statement of




DAR interpretation that this rough order estimate cannot be
utilized for materiality determinations:
There is no regulatory guidance for the specific contents
and format of the general magnitude estimate. The CAS
Administrative Clause, DAR 7-104. 83(b), requires only
that the general dollar magnitude estimate be the sum of
all increases and the sum of all decreases. Although DAR
3-1212Cd) , 3-1213(c) and 3-1214(b) require that the AGO
request a cost impact proposal detailing the cost impact
by covered contract. .. auditors must be alert to the poten-
tial significance of the general dollar magnitude estimate
since field experience indicates it is sometimes accepted
by ACO's as the definitive cost impact estimate. .. .When-
ever the cost impact appears significant, or other factors
(e.g., varying adjustments to various contract types)
warrant a more detailed submission, the audit report should
explain to the ACO why a detailed cost impact proposal is
needed (in addition to citing the DAR requirement).^^
DCAA generally directs its auditors to pursue the second-
stage CIP and persuade ACO's to refrain from making a deter-
mination, either of materiality or increased costs, from the
statement of general dollar magnitude.
DCAA addresses the complications of multiple
accounting changes, a potentially frequent occurrence given
the propensity of contractors to implement voluntary changes
at the beginning of fiscal years, simultaneous with the
applicability date required in many new Standards:
Cost impacts for multiple accounting changes generally
must be considered individually for each change.... If a
contractor submits a composite general magnitude esti-
mate (or cost impact proposal) , recommend to the ACO that
the submission be returned to the contractor with a request
for separate identification of the cost impact of each
change. ^-^
"^^DCAA, Advanced Cost Accounting , "Cost Impact Proposals




The training guide notes the potential dichotomies that could
coexist when more than one change is considered simultaneously:
The accounting changes may have varying implementation
dates, thus affecting different contracts, may be a
mixture of discretionary and sanctioned changes, thereby
affecting the allowability of net increased costs, or
may include both deliberate and inadvertent noncompliance,
which would affect the application of offsets. The point
to remember is this: Multiple accounting changes cannot
generally be considered or audited in the aggregate.
If the contractor does not separate the cost impact by
individual change, the auditor will have to.
Thus, DCAA makes a case for the necessity of considering
accounting changes individually and a requirement that a
contractor identify and submit coit impact assessments of the
changes in the same manner.
The DCAA training guide additionally offers the
first "official" guidance on beneficial detail to be contained
within the CIP above DAR requirements:
The following detail should be requested from the con-
tractor by the AGO to adequately evaluate the proposals
and negotiate the price adjustment:
A. A listing of all CAS-covered contracts and sub-
contracts, including the contractor/subcontract number,
purchasing office, contract type, funding provisions, and
period of performance.
B. The impact of each contract/subcontract, including
(where appropriate) the following:
1. Target/estimated cost










Admittedly, this information should be available in the con-
tract administration office. However, it is much more
convenient to the AGO to have the contractor specify this
detail, the collection of which should require less effort
than that required by the AGO. Each aspect, moreover, must
be considered in the negotiation of contract price adjustments:
the incentive structure of the contract will affect the in-
crease or decrease in cost allocation borne by the Government;
targets and ceilings may require adjustment after the price
has been changed; and profit or fee levels may legitimately
need to be considered for adjustment to follow the adjustment
to cost levels. Inclusion of this detail forces the contrac-
tor to consider the effects of these factors and this consi-
deration establishes a common baseline for the subsequent
negotiation.
Finally, the DGAA training guide contains the
first mention of any required substantiation necessary with
the submission of the cost impact proposal:
The provisions of DAR 3-80 7.3, Gost or Pricing Data, apply
to cost impact proposal submission. Accordingly, when a
contract price adjustment proposal includes, for any indi-
vidual negotiated contract, aggregate increases and/or
decreases in costs plus applicable profits expected to
exceed $100,000, the contractor is required to submit cost
or pricing data in accordance with DAR 16-206 and to complete




Thus / DCAA recommends the use of a DD Form 633, Contract
Pricing Proposal, when appropriate, as a summarization of the
CIP and applies the certification of cost or pricing data
provision of the Truth in Negotiations Act when the cumulative
effect of the contract's increases and decreases exceeds
the P.L. 87-653 threshold.
C. GUIDANCE ON CIP PRICING METHODOLOGIES
After examining the guidance and direction available to
the ACO on the form and substance of the cost impact proposal,
in terms of format, data and substantiation requuirements
,
it is appropriate to discuss the pricing methodologies utilized
for the quantitative assessment of the shift in cost allocation
caused by the CAP change. Both recommendations and mandates,
general and specific, on the appropriate methodology for each
circumstance are available to the ACO, auditor and contractor
from three disparate sources.
1. CASB-Generated Methodologies
DOD contract administrators and procurement policy
makers have looked first to the Board's Rules and Regulations
as a source of guidance on the assessment of cost impact.
The sole pricing methodology described by Part 3 31 pertains
only to noncompliant changes to firm fixed-price contracts:
Subsequently, if the contractor fails during contract
performance to follow his disclosed practices or to comply
with applicable Cost Accounting Standards, any increased
cost to the United States by reason of that failure must
be measured by the difference between the cost estimates
used in negotiations and the cost estimates that would
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have been used had the contractor proposed on the basis
of the practices actually used during contract performance.
This methodology, referred to as contract repricing, gener-
ally involves an attempt to compare the proposal cost data
and the disclosed or established practices that were used
to justify the original negotiated price with a price developed
from the proposal cost data and the performance noncompliant
practices discovered. The difference between the two prices,
the agreed-upon fixed price, and the price that would have
been agreed on had the contractor proposed, using the
original cost estimates, with the noncompliant practices, is
the cost impact. One interviewee summarized contract repricing
in this fashion:
It is not uncommon to have to determine after the fact
what the cost impact of different events might have been.
That's the case whenever you're in the process of measuring
anything like damages. You're in a constructive, imputed
environment you discover the facts after the event and
you have to go back and try to reconstruct what the event
would have been like had the facts been known. The purpose
of equitable adjustment in the Government procurement
environment, the courts have said, in a delay or engineering
change order scenario, is an attempt to place the parties
back in the position they would have been in had the event
not occurred. That's basically what we expect to be accom-
plished under changes in CAP ' s . We expect to discover what
the contract price would have been had these new facts
[the noncompliant practices] been known at the time of
negotiation. It's essentially a reconstruction.
Thus, the CASH offers the primairy guidance on the appropriate
pricing methodology to be used to assess cost impact when
^"^4 CFR 331. 70 (b:
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noncompliance is discovered in a firm fixed-price contract.
The noncompliant CAP ' s are imputed into the negotiations
with the original cost estimates. The difference between the
fixed-price and the reconstructed price is the cost impadt.
If the noncompliant practices result in a lower level of
cost allocation to that firm fixed-price contract, the cost
impact is considered increased costs.
The repricing methodology is simply a variation on
the methodology utilized to assess the effect of defective
pricing. In defective pricing, however, the CAP ' s are held
constant and the cost data varied over the two comparisons.
2. Alternate Pricing Methodologies
In December 19 76, the CASE recognized the existence
of an alternate, method of pricing the effect of CAP changes.
Though the Board intended this method as an option in the
firm fixed-price noncompliance scenario, it was the first
CASE sanction of the "estimate-to-complete" or "current cost"
method:
...If, however, negotiations were not based on the cost
estimates, or if the cost estimates which were used are
not readily determinable by the procuring agency, any
increased costs to the United States by reason of that
failure may be measured by the difference between the
costs that would have been allocated if the failure had
not arisen and the costs that will be allocated under the
practice followed or to be followed by the contractor....
^^CASE Proposed Rule, Part 331.70(b), January 1977.
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Though this option was merely proposed and never adopted by
the Board, it provides an introduction to the estimate-to-
complete methodology currently in use to price the cost impact
of changes to new Standards and voluntary changes.
Estimate-to-coraplete (ETC) pricing involves the use
of current cost data and estimates to establish the cost impact
of changes to CAP's. The contractor is requested to propose
the cost of completing the contract, from the implementation
date of the change to performance completion utilizing the current
cap's and the changed CAP's. The quantum difference is considered
the cost impact of the change. That cost impact, considering the
type of contract and the type of CAP change, will be utilized by
the ACO to determine the potential incurrence of increased costs
or the level of the equitable adjustment due the contractor.
ETC pricing is generally prospective in nature,
utilizing current cost estimates, where repricing is both
retrospective and prospective, depending upon when the
noncompliance will be corrected, utilizing original cost
estimates. The ETC method is a variant of the methodology
recommended by ASPM No. 1 for pricing contract change orders.
In the ETC method, however, the addition or deletion of costs
is caused by the changes in cost accounting practices, not a
change in the level of effort.
Other methodologies currently in use to price contract
change orders cannot be successfully adapted to assessing
cost impact of CAP changes. Each recognizes, either objectively
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or subjectively, the deletion of old work, change over from
old work to new work and addition of new work; all phenomena
inapplicable to a change in cost accounting practices. The
"Total Cost Method," the least favorable of all performance
change pricing methodologies, which weighs the total actual
cost against the total originally expected cost, can be dis-
missed for the same reasons it is criticized as an approach
to changed work. It is unable to distinguish costs related
to the change from costs caused by inefficiency or other
factors.
3. Current POD Guidance
On 17 December 1976, the DOD CAS Working Group pro-
vided the first official guidance to ACO's and contract
auditors on pricing methodologies for cost impact assessment:
Cost adjustments under either mandatory, (a) (4) (A) , or
voluntary, (a) (4) (B) , changes should generally be the
net difference between the current estimated cost to
complete using the old accounting methods and the same
estimate reconstructed to reflect the new methods.
Adjustments relating to noncompliance, (a) (5) , under firm
fixed-price contracts, must comply with the CAS Board's
requirements to use original cost estimates reflecting
the noncompliant and compliant treatments. Should this
prove impracticable, the problem should be forwarded through
appropriate channels to the CAS Working Group.
Though DAR, DLAM and ASPM No. 1 are silent on pricing
methodologies, DCAM essentially echoes the guidance provided
'^^DOD CAS Working Group Item 76-9 of 17 December 1976.
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by the Working Group. These latter two sources of direction
and advice form the sum total of DOD guidance on cost impact
assessment for the AGO and auditor.
D. SUMMARY
The purpose of this Chapter was to identify the statutory,
regulatory and practical environment surrounding the adminis-
tration of Cost Accounting Standards. In the course of re-
viewing this environment, the conceptual and procedural
obligations on each party defined by the CAS Contract Clause
and the CAS Administration Caluse were described. Additionally,
the roles and responsibilities of the primary Government
players in the CAS administration process were discussed. As
a result of the background established, a model of CAS
administration was presented that detailed the actions and
decision points involved in the implementation of changes to
cap's or the discovery of noncompliance. Out of this model,
the cost impact assessment cycle, the heart of CAS adminis-
tration, was presented. The major milestones of the cycle
were represented as a schedule, utilizing the time constraints
prsented by DAR and, specifically, the CAS Administration Clause,
The remainder of the Chapter served to cite and summarize
those passages of official and semi-official guidance available
to the primary Government representatives in CAS administration,
the ACO and auditor, on the nature of the two-stage assessment
proposal and the cost impact pricing methodologies endorsed
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and in use. As a result of culling references from DAR, DLAM,
DCAM, Working Group advisories and other sources, this
section of the Chapter reviewed the sum total of the guidance
available to DOD contract administrators on cost impact
assessment.
The AGO assumes the responsibility of guiding covered
contracts through GAS administration with little more
official guidance and background than has been presented here.
The administration process remains a highly complex evolution.
The difficulties and hindrances encountered by the DOD con-
tract administrators dealing with those inherent complexities
during the life of the contract largely determine the nature
and success of the procurement agency's response to the needs
recognized with the inception of Gost Accounting Standards.
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IV. HINDRANCES TO THE COST IMPACT ASSESSMENT PROCESS
For Cost Accounting Standards to be an effective system
of Governmental controls on the cradle to grave treatment of
costs associated with negotiated defense contract proposals
and performance, it is vital that the consistency edicts and
the increased costs prohibition of the system be accompanied
by a regulated, workable process of correcting the effects
of inconsistency on the parties by either preventing, or
amending, the payment of increased costs or by restoring the
contractor to his original stature with a settlement for any
damages borne by him. As the system's predominant adminis-
tration and compliance monitor, the Department of Defense
makes use of the cost impact assessment process to respond
to this need. Thus, cost impact assessment, the measurement
of shifts in costs between contracts due to alterations in
cost measurement, assignment and allocation, is necessary
and significant to CAS administration.
This Chapter will discuss the hindrances to successful
administration of the cost impact assessment process discovered
during the course of the research. Citations of the problems
will rely heavily upon the findings of prior studies and the
independent observations of involved industry and Government
officials interviewed. Where opposing views were collected.
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both assertions will be presented. Suggestions for resolution
of some issues / where received or developed, will also be
offered.
A. PROBLEMS WITH THE PRICING METHODOLOGIES
Chapter Three briefly introduced the pricing methodologies
in use to assess cost impact. A more extensive exploration
of contract repricing and the estimate-to-complete methods
is necessary, however. A thorough search of the limited
literature published was conducted and extensive discussions
with accountants and auditors from both sectors were held
in an effort to determine the mechanics of the two methodologies
In the course of this research, flaws and trade-offs inherent
within these pricing techniques were revealed. The results
of this portion of the study are presented in this section.
1. Contract Repricing
This methodology is an analogue of the traditional
technique utilized to assess the effects of defective pricing,
Certified cost or pricing data subsequently found to have
been inaccurate, incomplete or noncurrent as of the effective
date of the certificate. '
The neasurement of any quantum increase caused by less than
current, accurate or complete cost or pricing data is accom-
plished by reconstructing the proposal, replacing the defective
data with the valid data discovered. The difference between
'ASPM No. 1, p. 1A-B7.
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the defective and valid cost estimate, burdened with subsequent
allocations of indirect cost pools and profit loading, is the
defective pricing impact and the amount proper for downward
contract price adjustment. In theory, this method of assess-
ment and adjustment presumes that the previously agreed upon
price would have been decreased by the amount of the defect,
plus related indirect expenses and profit, had the defect
been known at the time of negotiation.
Contract repricing also attempts to impute the later
discovery of facts, the noncompliant change in accounting
practices, to an earlier time frame, when those facts, had
they been known, would have affected the outcome of price
negotiations. The CASE requires the AGO to reconstruct a
contract price, using original cost estimates, with both
compliant and noncompliant CAP's. The difference between the
two prices is the cost impact.
One interviewee argued that P.L. 91-379 was a response to
the cost effects experienced by the contract parties when the
contractor fails to comply with accepted or assumed methods
or techniques of cost measurement, assignment or allocation:
Congress obviously intended something to be done. Look
through the legislative history. You will find that one
of the things they were concerned about was the contractor
who negotiates a price on one basis and then switches his
accounting practices and, as a result, the costs that were
to be thrown against that contract suddenly do not appear.
That alone, in the view of many people, was a basis for
reducing the price of that contract, because the Government
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made certain assumptions that the contractor would maintain
consistency [in his cost accounting practices or compliance
with CAS ] for the life of the contract.
When those assumptions fail to hold in performance, action
must be taken to prevent the contractor from recovering reim-
bursement twice for the costs shifted. The measurement of
the shift is accomplished by interpolating the negotiation
cost assumptions into the noncompliant practices. Contract
repricing accomplishes this assessment for all types of
contracts.
The Board's mandate in Part 331.70(b)/ that cost impact
of noncompliance in firm fixed-price covered contracts
...must be measured by the difference between the cost
estimates used in negotiations and the cost estimates
that would have been used had the contractor proposed
on the basis of practices actually used. .
.
validates contract repricing as the proper methodology for
assessing cost impact for noncompliant changes. It is
therefore appropriate to explore the mechanics of contract
repricing in noncompliance scenarios.
a. Proposal Reconstruction
A strict interpretation of the Board's requirement
to reprice the contract utilizing original cost estimates
would seem to direct the ACO to establish cost impact as the
quantum difference between the compliant proposal and a
restructured "noncompliant" proposal. This, in fact, is an
accurate representation of the methodology utilized in defective
pricing. In one example of a series of scenarios presented.
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ASPM No. 1 suggests that the reconstruction of proposal
costs leads to a valid measurement of the effects of
defective pricing:
Four . Proposal includes total material at $650. Analysis
of selected items on the bill of materials shows them to
be overpriced an average of ten per cent. Total estimate
is reduced ten per cent to $585 for negotiation objective.
Post-award audit shows a subcontract item, not one of the
items sampled in analysis, estimated initially at $100
but actually contracted for, two weeks before negotiations
started, at a price of $75. Defect: $25 plus burden and
profit. (You relied on the -$100 even though the bill of
materials was reduced 10%)
.
This guidance seems to discourage any inclination of the AGO
to assess the defect as $22.50 ($25 x 90%), to represent
the effect of the proposal reduction achieved during negotia-
tions. Avoiding, at this point, any discussion of the equity
of ignoring the proposal reduction achieved, the problems
inherent in "proposal reconstruction" as a subset of contract
repricing can be examined.
The detail with which the contractor proposes to perform
the contract can vary widely. At one extreme, the contractor
may be predominantly, or exclusively, dependent upon Government
work, may be required to disclose his cost accounting practices
and may have provided elaborate substantiation of his cost
estimates via certified cost or pricing data. At the other
end of the spectrum, however, may be a contractor new to
Government performance requirements, exempted from the submission
^ASPM No. 1, p. 9B12.
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of a Disclosure Statement and competing for a contract that
will benefit from adequate price competition, thereby
inapplicable to the dictums of the Truth in Negotiations
Act. Under different circumstances/ each offeror could
conceivably be eligible for award of a covered contract and
each susceptible to CAS noncompliance. The proposal submitted
by the former would be detailed and exposed to rigorous
contract audit; the proposal submitted by the latter might
be limited to a priced offer only, devoid of cost detail.
Incidence of noncompliance in either case, however, would call
for proposal reconstruction in order to assess cost impact.
Solid, justifiable, proposal reconstruction requires
a thorough knowledge of the contractor's disclosed and
established cost accounting practices and original cost est-
imates, substantiated by cost or pricing data. If this
information is available, the cost impact of noncompliance
can be assessed by developing a "noncompliant" contra-proposal
that incorporates the noncompliant treatment of original cost
estimates. An estimated total cost could then be abstracted
and the impact, if it resulted in the allocation of a lower
level of costs to a firm fixed-price contract or a higher
level of costs to a flexibly priced contract, would become the




Lacking the necessary proposal cost detail to
perform proposal reconstruction, efforts to assess cost
impact of noncompliant changes are stymied. Short of re-
opening negotiations to establish a cost element breakdown
of the original proposal, a laborious and unattractive pros-
pect, the AGO is left with no solution, under present CAS
Rules and Regulations. The Board has offered two remedies
to this problem, one which was not adopted and one which
remains in the "proposed rule" stage as of this writing.
The previously-mentioned 1977 proposal to offer
the estimate-to-complete pricing methodology as an alternative
to contract repricing, when proposal cost detail is inadequate,
was deleted from the change proposed to Part 331:
On December 29, 19 76, a proposal was published in the
Federal Register to amend 331.70(b) which, if adopted,
would have permitted procurement agencies to use either
an estimate-to-complete approach or an original-negotia-
tion-data approach to determine increased costs paid by
the United States. As proposed, agencies would have been
authorized to use the estimate-to-complete method when
negotiations had not been based on cost estimates or such
estimates were not readily determinable by the procurement
agencies
.
Most of the comments received expressed opposition to all
or part of the proposal. Upon reexamining the subject in
light of the comments received, the Board concludes that
the proposed alternative method would not provide sufficient
improvement in the administration of Standards to warrant
its adoption.
Its deletion was a reaction to criticism of the estimate-to-
complete method, which will be discussed in a succeeding section
3General Comments prefacing amendment of 4 GFR 331, 43 F.R,
9775, 10 March 1978.
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of this Chapter, and the cojnraon industry perception that
the rule change would leave the choice of pricing methodology
to the procurement agency, not subject to negotiation.
The Board's second, and most recent, attempt to
ameliorate the difficulty inherent in assessing cost impact
of noncompliance in a contract lacking sufficient proposal
cost detail was offered in a proposed rule amendment to Part
331, published 8 February 1980:
...the Board proposes to amend 331.30(b) to exempt firm
fixed-price contracts which are awarded without submission
of any contractor cost data.
The proposal to exempt firm fixed-price contracts which re-
quire no proposal certification or submission of cost estimates
for analysis is a sound solution. Contract prices that are
not determined on the basis of cost estimates, and therefore
unaffected by the contractor's disclosed or established CAP ' s
,
need not be adjusted for a deviation discovered or subsequent
change to practices. Price fairness and reasonableness have
been established through alternate means.
b. Price Restructuring
There are strong arguments levied against proposal
reconstruction. In addition to the difficulty inherent in the
attempt to interpolate current knowledge of the change into a
proposal that was submitted months prior to the attempt, a
question of equity exists:




Adjustments based on the contractor's original proposal
can overstate or understate the true amount of [cost
impact and therefore] "increased" cost paid by the
Government.
In the majority of cases, the Government negotiator and
contractor reach agreement upon a contract price less than
that proposed by the contractor. Depending upon the size of
the reduction achieved by the Government, assessing cost impact
by means of proposed levels of cost elements may result in
an inequitable downward adjustment to the contract price.
Defective pricing guidance from ASPM No. 1 notwithstanding,
measuring cost impact via a proposed level of costs, when
neither the proposal price nor the magnitude of the proposal
cost elements were agreed upon by the contract parties , leads
to an adjustment that will make the Government more than
whole; that will collect, or prevent, increased costs and more.
To avoid the potential for inequitable price
adjustments another variant of contract pricing is widely
utilized. This alternate subset of contract repricing may be
referred to as "price restructuring," since it establishes
the negotiated contract price as a baseline, not the proposal
cost estim.ates. Cost impact is then assessed as the difference
between the agreed upon price and the price that would have
been agreed upon had the noncompliance been known during




negotiations. But price restructuring is not without its
complications
.
Given a detailed cost proposal, the contractor's
estimates of cost elements, assignment of direct costs and
allocations of indirect cost pools to the contract are known
and available for proposal reconstruction. When price restruc-
turing is chosen, however, the baseline used for comparison
is limited to the contract price. Cost impact assessment
requires knowledge of, or agreement upon, cost elements.
These elements are then subjected to the compliant and non-
compliant treatment and the quantum between resultants is the
cost impact of the noncompliance. In order to utilize price
restructuring, a method or technique of restructuring, or
breaking down, the price into cost elements is needed.
One way suggested by a private sector accountant
interviewed to restructure the price into cost elements is
to prorate the proposal
:
If I were required to reprice the contract, I would use
a very simplistic method, taking the proposal costs and
scaling them down to the agreed upon price. I don't
know any other way to do it.
Admittedly, this method is simplistic and arbitrary.
Nonetheless, "shrinking the proposal" may be utilized.
An alternate method to restructure price would
require reopening negotiations with the contractor to agree
on a cost breakdown of price. But this would require negotiating
levels of cost elements to reach agreement on details at
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mid-performance when this agreement was neither feasible
nor attempted during the original price negotiations. When
recovery, or reduction, of costs is dependent upon negotia-
tions, and each party is aware of the effect agreement on
cost elements will have on the cost impact determinations, the
probability of successfully negotiating a restructuring of
price will be extremely low. As one interviewee stated:
The biggest problem in repricing is you've got one price
and both parties will tell you they got there different
ways
.
Neither method available for price restructuring
will bring a wholly satisfactory solution to both parties in
all circumstances. One contractor's representative argued
that repricing the contract through price restructuring is
not viable:
...shrinking the proposal to the price agreed upon in the
negotiations could create some major distortions in what
the contractor would have to absorb. This could also result
in an inequity. If the Government succeeded in reducing
the contractor's proposal by ten per cent, it does not
follow that repricing the contract by reducing each element
in the contractor's proposal by ten per cent would be either
in the best interest of the Government or the contractor.
Reopening negotiations to establish cost elements would
almost certainly result in an impasse and would seldom
lead to agreement. That would be opening Pandora's box.
I don't have any resolution to the question...
c. Other Difficulties with Contract Repricing
Several interviewees reported that allegations
of defective pricing by contract auditors were a natural out-
growth of any attempt to reprice a contract via price
restructuring. One Government official interviewed independently
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raised the issue when questioned as to the recommended method
of adjusting proposal price to agreed upon price:
Any .. .adjustments have to made in profit. Otherwise, the
contractor is guilty x»f defective pricing. . .The only
horse-trading should be over profit!
Though charges of defective pricing might cloud the cost im-
pact issue, some auditors have apparently used this threat
to convince noncompliant contractors that proposal reconstruc-^
tion , and the larger cost impact determined thereby/ is the
proper method to assess cost impact. One accountant for a
raarjor electronics firm claimed that this is a frequent
Government tactic:
That's what I mean by problems of interpretation. DCAA
will start the conversation by saying. Now if you want
to change this [cost element], you're guilty of defective
pricing!
Thus, attempts by the contractor to restructure
the price by reducing cost elements from the proposal have
been occasionally thwarted by Government charges of defec-
tive pricing. These charges, in the contract repricing arena,
however, are inappropriate and invalid. Defective pricing
determinations are based upon the contractor's knowledge of
costs at the time of negotiations. Unless it can be proved
that he presented certified cost or pricing data that he knew
was noncurrent, inaccurate or incomplete, defective pricing
is not an issue.
One contractor's representative warned that any
attempt to negotiate cost elements, either as a result of a
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lack of proposal detail or in an attempt to restructure price,
would inevitably have to be based on the contractor's cost
experience. The Government could question allowability and
allocability only, not reasonableness, of incurred costs:
When you go back and assess cost impact via repricing, in
effect you're opening the door for a renegotiation of the
contract. There's no question about it. The result of
that would be the contractor would end up getting actual
costs plus profit. Especially if the contract is closedl
This renegotiation would seldom be in the Government's best
interest.
Industry representatives were also wary of revealing
actual cost data that might be required for any renegotiation:
Two years after the fact, you want to know our costs? And
whether we've overrun and underrun, you're going to forget
what we incurred and renegotiate? No wayl We'll never
succeed in containing the negotiation to just the cost
impact of the CAP change. We'll find creeping in the effects
of inflation, the fact that we planned to do it this way,
but we did it that way, we had a switch in our make-or-buy
plan, we planned no overtime, but we had to work it and
all sorts of other things. Realistically, if we had an
underrun on an FFP , I defy anyone to say that the Government
would ignore thati But if a contractor had an overrun, the
Government would leave him with it
I
Contract repricing, under many circumstances, may
be feasible and the most theoretically valid cost impact assess-
ment pricing methodology to apply to proposal noncompliance,
i.e., noncompliance discovered in the contractor's proposal.
It can also be used to measure the cost impact of violations
of Standard 401, when the contractor proposes with one set of
cap's and performs with another. In each case, if sufficient
cost data is available, or if agreement between parties can be
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reached on the levels of cost elements in the proposal or
price, contract repricing can assess the shift in allocation
caused by the deviation in practices. If, however, noncom-
pliance is the result of a shift in practices raid-perforinance,
or performance noncompliance, contract repricing cannot be
adapted.
Performance noncompliance may result from a vol-
untary change or misinterpretation of the implementation
requirements of a new Standard. Whatever the source, the
AGO and auditor must assess the cost impact related to a period
of noncompliance that begins after a compliant period of
performance immediately following award. The pricing methodo-
logy utilized to assess this impact must be capable of incor-
porating these facts. Utilization of contract repricing would
dun the contractor for the period in which he was compliant,
unless it was possible to reprice his proposal to recognize
the CAP alteration at mid-performance. Despite assurances to
the contrary by several Government officials interviewed,
interpolating the effect of performance noncompliance upon
the proposal would require the prior submission of the con-
tractor's intended schedule for incurring costs. Contractors
are rarely required to submit this type of information. As
one responded:
Normally, you don't have a time-phased proposal. You might
have a schedule of costs on a year-by-year basis, but what




As will be discussed in the following section of this Chapter
the cost impact of performance noncompliance might better be
assessed by the estimate-to-complete method.
d. Summary
Thus, contract repricing, theoretically valid
and analogous to the accepted method of assessing cost impact
of defective pricing, is not without its complications. The
methodologies that utilize the contractor's proposal as a
baseline, proposal reconstruction or shrinking the proposal
to establish a cost breakdown of price, may require some
manipulation of the original cost estimate. The proposal
might have to be reduced by any costs declared unallowable
before the computation of cost impact. Or, the AGO may not
desire to accept the profit level proposed by the contractor,
and instead, may want to substitute one determined by Weighted
Guidelines. The latter action may lead to immediate disagree-
ment. Other drawbacks have been recognized. Proposal
reconstruction may not be adaptable to circumstances where a
sufficient level of proposal cost detail is unavailable.
Additionally, this method may result in an overstatement or
understatement of cost impact. Price restructuring may require
arbitrary or laborious analysis techniques to subdivide the
agreed upon price into cost elements. Defective pricing
allegations or the reluctance or requirement to use actual
cost data in either technique may obscure or frustrate the
process. Finally, no methodology for contract repricing is
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available to properly measure the cost impact of performance
noncompliance.
2. Estimate-To-Complete Method
The estimate-to-complete (ETC) pricing methodology
is considerably less complex to utilize than the contract
repricing methodology. Computation relies upon current cost
data and a prospective forecast of cost estimates (where con-
tract repricing is based upon original cost estimates and
recomputation of proposal costs or contract price). As such,
ETC is an analogue of the traditional method of assessing the
cost impact of contract change orders. It requires a proposal
of costs to complete performance both with the change and
without the change and the production and certification of
actual cost experience to the point of the change. Utilizing
this analogy, the ETC methodology of assessing cost impact
of cost accounting practice changes can be explored.
a. The Methodology
ETC pricing is appropriate when the Government
receives advance notification of the impending change in CAP ' s
.
This notification is contained within the contractor's proposal
to make voluntary changes or mandatory changes to implement
new Standards. Assessment and negotiation of the cost impact
can then proceed in much the same manner, and under similar
bargaining conditions, as the original price negotiations.
When the contractor proposes a change, he is
required to submit a proposal that provides a forecast of
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costs to complete the contract with the change in CAP's and
a forecast of costs to complete the contract without the
change in CAP's. His data on costs incurred to date, i.e.,
current costs, should be certified and summarized on a Form
DD 633 and serve as the cost or pricing data utilized to develop
both estimates. The quantum difference between the two ETC
forecasts is the cost impact of the change and, once audited
and subjected to cost and/or price analysis, should be utilized
to develop the ACO's negotiation objective. The contract
price adjustment, equitable adjustment or downward only, will
be dependent upon the source of the change.
b. Problems with the ETC Methodology
The ETC methodology can be complicated signifi-
cantly by the presence of undefinitized contract change orders
and the inclusion of the costs of these changes in the fore-
casts. Because these costs associated with the completion
of contract modifications remain the subject of future nego-
tiations, they must be eliminated from both ETC estimates. If
they are not deleted, any subsequent attempt to price the cost
of contract change orders will result in a double consideration
of the costs: once, during the cost impact assessment process,
when they may muddle the measurement; and again, when the change
order is negotiated. Though this segregation of costs from the
forecast is required, it may be difficult to accomplish with
any degree of precision. The price of the change, nonethe-
less, is most properly assessed after the cost impact assessment




Another problem inherent in the ETC methodology
is common to techniques currently in use to price contract
change orders. Though ACO's may find it possible to delete
the costs of unpriced changes in performance from the ETC
forecasts, they may find it a challenge to reasonably assure
themselves that the effects of conditions unassociated with
the change in CAP ' s are eliminated from the assessments.
There is a danger that the effects of inefficiency or infla-
tion, that lead to overruns, or the effects of cost reductions
or business prudence, that lead to underruns , may irrevocably
color the forecasts. One commentator declared that the 1977
reaction to the Board's proposal to offer ETC as an endorsed
pricing methodology was due to similar concerns in an FFP
scenario
:
There were substantial objections to [ using] .. .ETC for
the very simple reason that you could end up with the
ETC swing, in theory, exceeding the whole [FFP] contract
price. Thus, if you use ETC, you're working with current
costs. And you can get some wildly inflated prices. As
a result of which, you can recover costs far, far more
than you would have using repricing.
The use of current cost data, though convenient, carries with
it the hazard that factors unrelated to the contractor's
change in CAP ' s may magnify or diminish the actual cost impact.
The ETC pricing methodology, however, will inevitably
attribute the cost impact to the accounting change only (thus,
the necessity for eliminating costs associated with unpriced
change orders) . The ACO, under the principle of equity, is
charged with making a contract adjustment, either up or down,
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seeking a prevention of increased costs or an equitable ad-
justment/ that returns both parties to a footing equivalent
to that enjoyed by each before the change. This implication
requires the AGO to insure that neither the contractor's profit
nor loss position is increased as a result of the CAP change
and contract price adjustment.
Hal Sharp, the author of Procurement Associates' "Cost
Impact Studies Contract Price Adjustments" chapter, in
Cost Accounting Standards , suggests that a simple scaling-up
or scaling-down of the ETC-measured cost impact may be effected
to alleviate the cost phenomena external to the accounting
change:
...the current cost method [(ETC method)] is used and the
results are adjusted in relation to the negotiated cost
or price and the estimate-at-completion of the contract.
Sharp thus recommends that the impact measured by the ETC method,
when it is suspected that the measurement has been over- or
understated, be multiplied by a ratio of the original nego-
tiated contract price divided by the EAC without the change
(costs incurred to date plus the ETC forecast without the
change) . This adjustment would diminish the impact measured
when the contractor is in an overrun situation and increase
it when the contractor is in an underrun situation. Though
this solution may be as arbitrary as that suggested for price




restructuring, it accomplishes the purpose intended. During
one interview, it was discovered that this method was actually
utilized in a cost impact assessment:
We had to submit a cost impact proposal for CAS 410 that
was as complicated as you could get... What we did was
take the original definitized contract, purge out those
elements of costs that were related to subsequent changes
in scope, non-definitized work, and take the indicated
final cost and compute a percentage ratio of negotiated
cost to it. We then applied that ratio to the impact....
It was messy ... (but) we understood what we were doing.
Finally, the performance noncompliance issue may
be discussed. The ETC methodology, in its assessment of a
period of performance and associated cost allocation that is
only a portion of the entire performance period, i.e., the
period from the implementation of the CAP change to performance
completion, is better suited to performance noncompliance.
As previously discussed, repricing can only be successfully
utilized if it is capable of interpolating into the proposal
the effect of the mid-performance noncompliant change. Unless
the contractor has proposed in a manner that indicates his
intended schedule of incurring costs, repricing cannot capture
the effect of the contractor's actions. Therefore, except
in cases where the noncompliant change is implemented at the
beginning of a fiscal year, it appears that the ETC methodo-
logy should be applied. In cases where the cost impact assessed
thereby may not be representative of the impact that would be
measured by repricing, if the latter were feasible, a strong
argument can be made for using the Sharp multiplier to adjust




As noted by an interviewee, there are objections
to the estimate-to-complete method:
The ETC [method] may not be the most accurate. Not as
clean, as black and white, as an auditor would like
they'll want to reprice. But [repricing] is optimum,
not realistici
Nonetheless, it is widely used and accepted for the measurement
of cost impact of mandatory and voluntary changes.
The simplicity of the ETC methodology should not,
however, mislead the ACO into ignoring its weaknesses. The
costs associated with undefinitized changes must be eliminated
from the forecasts. Additionally, care must be taken to avoid
the overstatement or understatement of cost impact that may
be inherent in the use of current cost estimates, yet unrelated
to the accounting change. Consideration of the use of the
Sharp multiplier should be given if the impact is believed
to be significantly inflated or deflated. The cost impact of
performance noncompliance should be assessed via the ETC
methodology, again with consideration of the multiplier, except
in the few cases where repricing can feasibly capture the
effect of the noncompliance.
3. The Appropriate Methodology
The previous discussion makes it apparent that each
of the major cost impact assessment pricing methodologies
pose potential problems of equity and practicality. Additionally,
since slight variations on each methodology are available
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for use, each forces the AGO to weigh the trade-offs inherent
within the variants and the choice of methodology. Generally,
the trade-off is made between the precision offered by the
methodology chosen and the administrative cost and feasibility
of its use.
It is possible to make some generalities. Repricing
seems to be the most valid option when a GAP deviation occurs
in the proposal, or when the measurement, assignment or
allocation technique used throughout performance represents
a deviation from the GAP's disclosed or established. Given
the necessary detail available, a reconstruction of the pro-
posal may yield a theoretically valid and precise assessment
of impact. Gonversely, price restructuring, a repricing
variation, may be the most appropriate when the agreed upon
price represents a significant reduction from that proposed.
In both cases, actual cost data may be utilized to assist in
establishing a negotiated cost baseline from which assessment
can be made. Although the case was argued, in the repricing
discussion, that the AGO should introduce actual cost data
only as a last resort, a renegotiation of proposal or price
elements may be equitable and feasible for both parties.
The estimate-to- complete methodology appears to be
sound when the AGO is called upon to assess the impact of a
period that is less than the period of performance, as in
mandatory and voluntary changes and performance noncompliance.
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The ETC method can also be adapted, and the cost impact
measured thereby adjusted, to diminish the effects of cost
growth or reduction unrelated to the accounting change.
Since the AGO is responsible for the proper assess-
ment of cost impact and the equity of related price adjustments,
it shold be apparent that, within the general guidelines
outlined above, the impact assessment process must be flexible
enough to maximize equity and feasibility in the choice of
pricing methodology.
Unfortunately, as mentioned in Chapter III, DOD
regulatory guidance does not encourage this necessary flex-
ibility. In fact, as evidenced by the DCAM passage cited
below, it requires a methodology in one case, performance
noncompliance, that seems inappropriate and often infeasible,
in view of the earlier discussion:
Consequently, if the contractor failed to accumulate
costs in consonance with its disclosed or established
practices and applicable standards, the appropriate ad-
justment for the noncompliance will be computed as
described [(contract repricing)]. For noncompliances on
flexibly-priced contracts the "increased cost" to the
Government is the difference between the current cost
at completion under the noncompliant method and the same
estimate reconstructed under the compliant method.
Cost adjustments for either mandatory or voluntary changes
should generally be the net difference between the current
estimated cost to complete under the old accounting method
and the same estimate reconstructed to reflect the new method.




No DOD policy-making orgainization offers any further
elaboration on the variants available within each methodology
that can be adapted to the pricing task. Interviews conducted
for this study indicate the|.t the minimal pricing guidance
published is rigidly implemented in the field with generally
no allowances for flexibility, even within the guidelines. As
a result, disagreement between parties over the methodology
appropriate to the circumstances protracts the cost impact
assessment process, at best a lengthy evolution, and impedes
resolution.
In view of the variety of CAP change scenarios that
can be posited, the range of cost detail that can be avail-
able to hinder or facilitate the measurement, and the necessity
to address feasibility and equity in the choice of method,
an agency-wide policy of pricing flexibility and additional
guidance on pricing methodologies may be needed.
B. PRC^LEMS WITH THE CAS ADMINISTRATION PROCESS
Any close scrutiny of Cost Accounting Standards admin-
istration and any frank discussions with affected and involved
personnel will reveal to the researcher a host of issues and
opinions challenging the viability and propriety of the process,
This is neither surprising nor particularly revealing. CAS
remains a highly emotional and controversial program.
But discovery of procedural and conceptual problems that
actually frustrate the cost impact assessment of CAP changes.
133

the heart of CAS administration, should be followed by a more
intensive study, particularly if a solution to the problems
is within DOD's power. A discussion of these hindrances to
the efficient conduct of the impact assessment process
follows.
1. Inability to Identify the Contract Universe
When a CAP change is proposed, or a deviation dis-
covered, in one contract, an analysis must be made of all
covered contracts to investigate the source or destination
of the costs shifted by the change. In general, a change in
measurement, assignment or allocation methods causes move-
ments of costs that were not anticipated in each contract's
pricing structure. The shift in costs must be traced through
each contract containing the CAS Contract Clause. By vittue
of the inclusion of this clause in the contract, action by the
parties to amend the effects of the shift is required.
In a 1976 report to Congress, GAO charged that
difficulties in identifying the CAS Contract Universe, those
covered contracts and subcontracts open, and potentially
affected, during the lifetime of the CAP change, were preventing
the thorough analysis required of cost impact. Many DCAS
regional and plant offices were attempting to maintain local
records from which the contractor's CIP listing of covered
contracts could be verified. GAO felt this was both time
consuming and inaccurate.
° Status Report on the Cost Accounting Standards Program
Accomplishments and Problems," PSAD-76-154, 20 August 1976.
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In response to GAO ' s criticism, the DOD CAS Working
Group advised ACO's to require covered contractors "...to
maintain a system for identifying accurately and completely..."
9the CAS Contract Universe. The DCAA auditor is now required
to verify the presence, and effectiveness, of the contractor's
system in many cases, not each individual CIP listing:
At larger contractors the auditor should review the adequacy
of the contractor's procedures and report to the AGO if
the contractor does not maintain the required records. Once
the procedure has been validated, the auditor should perform
limited test checks of contract listings on specific cost
impact proposals to assure the continuing effectiveness of
the system. The auditor should report exceptions to the
cost impact proposal evaluation listing. For smaller con-
tractors the auditor should test the listing of CAS -covered
contracts against FAO files of active cost reimbursable
contracts and listings of CAS-covered fixed-price procurement
actions available within DOD.
In addition, the Contract Administration Report (CAR) presently
tracks the status, and specifically identifies the presence
of the CAS Contract Clause, of every prime contract administered
by the DCAS Region, by contractor, on a monthly basis.
Difficulties remain in the DOD solution to the GAO
discovered problem of identification of the CAS Contract
Universe. DOD requires PCO's to pass a contract to the appro-
priate contract administration activity for CAS matters even
if the buying activity retains the other administration
9






responsibilities. One interviewee claimed that this direc-
tive was frequently ignored. Non-DOD federal agencies with
CAS applicability frequently award covered contracts to con-
tractors who also perform DOD covered contracts. Thus, the
DCAS AGO will not be aware of the presence of non-DOD covered
contracts in the contractor's plant unless CAS administration
authority is specifically delegated to him. Finally, no
reliable system to make the ACQ aware of covered subcontracts
affected by a contractor's CAP change exists. After unsuccess-
fully attempting to require cognizant ACO notification by the
subcontractor/ the prime contractor is now required by the
CAS Administration Clause to notify the ACO when the CAS Contract
Clause is flowed down to a subcontractor. DCAS field per-
sonnel interviewed do not believe this is working well either.
Therefore, it is not presently possible for DCAS or DCAA
personnel to independently verify or catalog the CAS Contract
Universe at a contractor's plant. As a result, inordinate
reliance must be placed on the contractor's system for identifying
covered contracts affected by a change in CAP ' s . Responding
to a question concerning the success of the Working Group
solution, a DOD official stated:
-••^DAR 3-1208 (a) .
•''^DAR 7-104. 83(b), section (e) .
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Some contractors have good systems; some do not I As a
result, we presently have no assurance that the contract
universe is accurately represented in the CIP. But we
don't have a better answer.
2. Lack of Contractor Cooperation
In addition to requiring the contractor to identify
the CAS Contract Universe, the CAS Administration Clause
requires the contractor to submit both the statement of gen-
eral dollar magnitude and, after an appropriate period of
review, the cost impact proposal in the form and manner
specified by the ACO. Not infrequently, a contractor dis-
agrees with an ACO determination made in the course of the
cost inpact assessment process and ceases to comply with
further requirements of the CAS Administration Clause. Some
reasons for, and the impact of, this willful lack of cooperation
need to be considered.
a. Contractor Noncompliance
Disagreement with any of the number of determi-
nations made by the ACO may lead the contractor to noncomply
with provisions of the CAS Administration Clause. A deter-
mination on an auditor's charge of CAS noncompliance, on the
interpretation of a new Standard, on the desirability of a
voluntary change, on the materiality of an allocation shift,
on increased costs or on a contract price adjustment may lead
to heated debate and, in some cases, a formal dispute that
stops the assessment process. One industrial association
representative interviewed claimed that the nature and volume
of supporting cost detail required by the ACO was frequently




Contractors will seldom flat out refuse to submit a CIP.
Instead, they will argue whether one is necessary or
whether the detail the AGO asks for isn't too exacting.
Generally, no matter what the size or materiality of the
cost impact, AGO's will ask for the same amount of detail
and data.
A Government respondent agreed with this contention, admitting
"We ask for too much [supporting data and detail] [we believe!
more is better, whether we can use it or notl" Another
Government official interviewed, however, disagreed:
One problem the Working Group considered, but rejected,
was why not limit what the AGO's can ask for. But, so
far, there is no need to do that. No one has proved to
the Working Group that AGO's are requesting an inordinate
or unreasonable amount of data. I've heard no examples
of AGO's going off the deep end.
For whatever reason, some contractors have often stymied the
cost impact assessment process by refusing to accede to the
AGO's requests for proposals or data. This inability to
resolve an issue may affect proposals in process, imminent
awards or final settlement of completed contracts. The pri-
mary effect, however, of contractor defiance of the Glause
provisions, is the stipulation that the AGO and auditor assess
cost impact.
b. Independent Assessment of Gost Impact
The feasibility of an independent Government
assessment of cost impact was a point of discussion during
each of the research interviews. Generally, Government
personnel were confident that the auditor had the information
and access to records necessary to perform the task; several
contractor's representatives felt they did not. At issue was
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the availability of budgetary data and information concerning
the contractor's commercial sales base, each important to
the prospective pricing needed for a precise cost impact
assessment. If the contractor has forward pricing rate
agreements (FPRA's)/ this information is accessible to the
Government. Lacking FPRA's, many of those interviewed in
the private sector felt they could successfully withhold
commercial and budgetary data from the scrutiny of Government
auditors. But the inability of Government representatives
to independently catalog the CAS Contract Universe is
another deficiency.
c. Attempts at Solution
Two distinctly different strategies to induce
the contractor to collaborate in the cost impact assessment
process after an initial refusal to comply have been identified.
Many Government personnel interviewed believed
an independent assessment that deliberately overstates the
cost impact of the change and the impending downward contract
price adjustment will force the contractor to submit his own
proposal, supported by data formerly withheld from the Govern-
ment, to refute the auditor's estimate and head off a unilateral
determination. But one DOD official reported that this
"estimate it high" tactic had backfired, relating an ASBCA
decision on a contractor's dispute of the ACO's liberal
independent assessment. In this case, the Board failed to
find a strict accounting basis for the Government's determination
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of quantum and decided in favor of the contractor. The
same official recommended that the CAS Administration Clause
be amended to give the Government rights similar to those
specified in the Terminiation for Convenience of the Government
Clause
:
(c)...Upon failure of the Contractor to submit his termi-
nation claim within the time allowed, the Contracting
Officer may determine, on the basis of information avail-
able to him, the amount, if any, due the Contractor by
reason of the termination and shall thereupon pay to the
Contractor the amount so determined. .
.
(g)...if the Contractor has failed to submit his claim
within the time provided in paragraph (c) .. .hereof , and
has failed to request extension of such time, he shall
have no right of appeal.
Instead of eliminating the right to dispute the
Government's independent assessment, a DCAS proposal to
amend the CAS Administration Clause would give the Government,
many officials believe, the "hammer" necessary to force
compliance with the Clause. As recommended by DCAS, the
change would provide:
If an adequate [cost impact] proposal is not provided
within the specified time, or any extension thereto
granted by the cognizant Contracting Officer, an amount
not to exceed 10% of each subsequent payment
request may be withheld until such time as a proposal
has been provided in the form and manner specified by
the cognizant Contracting Officer.
^^DAR 7-103.21.
DLA-ACA Memorandum for the Director, DAR Council, DAR
Case 78-400-9, 21 March 1980, p. A-2.
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The heated reactions of the industry personnel interviewed
to the proposed amendment seem to indicate it would be
effective. One respondent, however, was not pleased with the
Government intention:
Solving problems via contract clauses and actions contri-
butes to the adversary relationship between Government
and industry. We should try to solve them via the give
and take of negotiations, recognizing thfet there's some
right and wrong on both sides.
3. Problems in Roles and Relationships
A brief discussion of the roles of the Government
players in CAS Administration was presented in Chapter Three
in an attempt to situate each member in the process. Much is
left to be said, however, on the relationship of each principal
to the ACQ, the central Government representative in CAS
matters, and on the role of the ACO as a factor in, or hin-
drance to, the efficient conduct of cost impact assessment,
a. ACO-PCO Relationship
Lamm's dissertation argued that the inception of
CAS strengthened the ACO ' s position in the procurement process,
16
relative to the PCO. Five years later, the average PCO
has resigned from the consideration of CAS administrative
matters, both in deference to the ACO's decision-making role,
acknowledged by regulation, and by personal preference. The
PCO's involvement in the present CAS environment is limited
16David V. Lamm, "Administration of CAS," p. 280.
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to a perfunctory invitation to attend the negotiation of
larger contract price adjustments. In fact, most PCO's have
limited their post-award interest in CAS to matters that
threaten the stable funding profile of the contract. This
resignation is unfortunate; the PCO is in a position of
unique leverage in his relationship with the contractor that
can be used to assist the AGO in persuading or compelling
the contractor to comply with the CAS Administration Clause.
One CAS Specialist interviewed reported that his region
had been particularly successful eliciting CAS administration
support from PCO's.
b. ACO-Auditor Relationship
Much has been written on the overwhelming influ-
ence of the DCAA auditor on the ACO ' s actions in CAS
administration matters. Lamm acknowledged contractor's claims
that auditors, not ACO's, were making the important CAS
17decisions. A Logistics Management Institute report,
commissioned by the Working Group, asserted that ACO's were
18
overly reliant upon the auditors' recommendations. Each
of the private sector representatives interviewed decried
the power of the DCAA auditor in CAS matters.
"^Ibid, p. 258.
18
Logistics Management Institute, "Administration of
Cost Accounting Standards," January 1979, p. iii.
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It is not surprising that auditors are criticized
for their roles in CAS administration. They bear the respon-
sibility of advising the AGO on every aspect of the accepta-
bility and compliance of the covered contractor's cost
accounting system. DCAA personnel are therefore required to
be the resident Government experts in GAS matters, a role
that runs the gamut from routine audit responsibilities to
field interpretation of GAS mandates. As the principal GAS
advisors, they are bearers of the bad tidings of noncompliance
in the eyes of the contractor. One could hardly imagine a
Government role more highly characterized by, and contributoiry
to, Industiy-Government dissent.
One must search further, however, for the rationale
behind charges levied against DGAA auditors in GAS adminis-
tration. No complaints of substance are made of the auditor's
traditional attest, assure and advise roles. Instead, industry
personnel interviewed specifically objected to the influence
auditors were capable of wielding over the AGO's determinations.
One contractor's representative reported:
We had a situation where our change methodology was agreed
to in writing by the AGO. Shortly thereafter, the DGAA
resident auditor started second-guessing the methodology.
And [he] disagreed with it and pressured the AGO to withdraw
the agreement. Thus, as the LMI study pointed out, [AGO's
arej afraid to disagree with DGAA. .
.
The "influence" auditors can bring to bear on an
AGO's determination is a matter of some debate. Some Government
auditors and ex-auditors interviewed argued that GAS has
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traditionally and rightfully been the sole province of DCAA.
Several expressed a concern that an ACO's "reasonable"
determination, made after rejecting the auditor's advice and
accepting the position of the contractor, could result in a
wrong-headed inteirpretation of a Standard, bringing about
effects unintended by the CASE, that, in turn, would lead to
a dangerous/ detrimental precedent in future CAS disputes.
One Government commentator even suggested that the AGO should
simply make the auditor's recommendation his determination
and force the contractor to challenge the issue at the Board
of Contract Appeals.
But many respondents saw the proper AGO-auditor
relationship differently. In reaction to the suggestion that
the AGO indiscrimately accept the auditor's finding, a former
Government accountant argued:
There is real danger if, in any procurement action, the AGO
takes somebody else's evaluation at face value. It
happens probably due to the AGO's constraints on time and
talent. But it's bad business unless there is some real
basis in which we can say the auditor's word is well rea-
soned and logical. There are too many variations in
auditors and their points of view. They all have built-in
biases and blind spots. By their very training, they like
to hold firm to principles and to certain ideas they have
about how things ought to be done. They see things as
black or white and are very uncomfortable with any position
in the middle, where GAS issues tend to fall.
Dave Lamm suggested that "...auditors make very narrow,
conservative and strict interpretations of Standards" and that
"...the auditor [is J... an additional force [for the AGOj to
19
contend with." This discussion is not intended to denigrate
19
David V. Lamm, "Administration of GAS," pp. 250-252.
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the value of the auditor's recommendations, but to argue that
the auditor reaches his position from an accounting point of
view, unbalanced by the other considerations the AGO must
weigh before he makes a business decision. Thus, the auditor's
decision cannot always be assumed to be the best one.
The "pressure" an auditor can exert on an ACO's
determination is evident. DCAA recommends to its auditors:
...we have some means available to challenge AGO decisions...
If the AGO is not responsive to the audit recommendations,
contact the regional CAS monitor for assistance. If
appropriate, the FAO manager, acting together with the
regional GAS monitor, should attempt to influence the. .
.
agency... If that support is still not requested, and its
absence could adversely affect the Government's interests,
the issue should immediately be referred to Headquarters
for appropriate action.
DGAA has established a network, within its organization, to
collect the reports of field auditors who believe AGO's have
made inadequate determinations, contrary to the recommenda-
tions made by the auditor. Issues that are believed to be
signigicant are discussed and resolved between DGAS and DGAA
headquarters. There is no evidence, however, that the
determination of any AGO has been overturned as a result of
this liaison. This network, however, is very similar to that
formed in response to a 19 69 GAO recommendation, requiring
DGAA to report to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
20
DGAA, "Gost Impact Proposals and Contract Price
Adjustments," Advanced Gost Accounting standards, PP« 18-19.
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Defense (Installations and Logistics) any cases where the
contracting officer failed to abide by the auditor's advice.
The practice was eliminated after David Packard, then Deputy
Secretary of Defense, questioned its propriety:
We should avoid actions by auditors in their advisory
capacity which appear to dispute or question specific
decisions of the contracting officer. The escalation
of possible disputes relative to specific decisions
should be avoided.
In 1979/ DCAA proposed the adoption of a DCAA
Form 2 that would bring to the auditor's recommendations
on CAS and overhead matters much the same "determination"
quality currently vested in the DCAA Form 1 for unallowable
and unallocable costs. Ostensibly, the proposal was aimed
at streamlining the cost impact assessment process, allowing
the contractor 60 days to appeal the auditor's determination
before it became a final and binding decision of the ACO.
Each of the military services and DLA were adamantly opposed
to the proposal, claiming it would usurp and undermine the
decision-making authority of the ACO. As a result of the
resistance, DOD failed to adopt the proposal. The attempt,
however, is emblematic of the problematic ACO-auditor
relationship in CAS matters.
^"DSD Memo to ASD(C) and ASD (I&L) , "Role of the Defense
Contract Auditor," 9 October 19 70.
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c. ACO-Price Analyst Relationship
The relationship between the AGO and price analyst
is one new to CAS matters. Traditionally, price analysts
were assumed by many field personnel to be incapable of
comprehending the complex accounting issues of CAS, given
their lack of accounting background. But DCAS policy, one
interviewee stated, identified the price analyst as the
intermediary in all financial matters between the ACQ and
the auditor. A Government official explained:
We've always felt CAS was a field pricing team effort.
But practice was not married to policy [in the case of
the price analysts]
.
As a result of the latest DLAM change, the price
analyst's duties are very similar to those performed by
the auditor. Some Government personnel interviewed believed
that this move was made to provide the AGO team support and
a more balanced viewpoint, from which he might not benefit
when the auditor is his sole CAS advisor. One supporter of
the change explained:
. . .with the third change to DLAM, we have created a role
for the Price Analyst. We had to get the pricers to
recognize their obligations in this area. The AGO should
not be all alone [in CAS matters]. He should be able to
get assistance from his team.
It is the opinion of this researcher that the DCAS intent
behind the new role for the price analyst is a recognition
that the AGO needs the additional leverage of a team assistant,
responsible to him, to counterbalance the power wielded by
the auditor. One ex-auditor interviewed, however, felt the
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change would hinder more than help the AGO determination:
That the AGO needs a member of his own staff to evaluate
the auditor's submission I don't understand. . .The accounting
review is then duplicated. Why? This creates a variance
in advice to the AGO. Not that the AGO does not have a
right to question the reliability and conclusions of any
of his advisors including the auditor. But I am mystified
as to why we have built a system that gives the AGO an
inherent ability to challenge the auditor.
The effect of the new role assumed by the price analyst on
the AGO-auditor relationship will have to be assessed in
the future. Obviously, however, the pressure and influence
formerly exerted by the auditor in GAS matters will be
challenged.
d. The AGO Role
Any review of the roles and relationships of
Government personnel in the GAS process must ultimately
concentrate on the principal Government figure in Gost
Accounting Standards issues, the AGO. Both the roles estab-
lished by DOD regulations and those assumed by him in the
field deserve consideration. During the course of this study,
four AGO roles in GAS administration were identified: princi-
pal Government representative, GAS generalist, decision-maker
and adjudicator. Each role will be explored.
(1) Principal Government Representative . Since
the inception of GAS, DOD has developed and implemented the
rol6 of the AGO as the single face to industry in Gost Accounting





contract administration activity: the assignment of a single
cognizant AGO to each contractor facility. As the sole Govern-
ment representative in GAS matters, the AGO becomes the focal
point for contractor-requested interpretations and deter-
minations. One auditor interviewed argued that when the AGO
assumes the other roles , he frequently forgets his primary
role as representative of the Government, and, ultimately
as advocate of the Government's interests. Other roles,
as decision-maker or adjudicator, should remain secondary,
the auditor claimed.
(2) CAS Generalist . DAR 1-406 lists 69 duties
that the AGO is responsible for shouldering. Obviously,
it is not intended that the AGO be a specialist in each field
necessary to carry out his duties. DOD has created the concept
of the contract administration team. Under this aegis, the
AGO can benefit from the technical advice of many staff
specialists, in law, engineering, quality assurance, cost/price
analysis, and the recommendations of the auditor. As a
result, the AGO need only be a generalist, with a working
knowledge of the technical fields, but privy to and reliant
upon the recommendations of specialists:
The concept of a contracting officer that underlies many
DAR policies and procedures is that of a specialist in
the fundamental. .. and procedural requirements of contracting
and a generalist in most of the other disciplines involved
in the acquisition process. Under this prevailing concept
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a contracting officer is a manager, a problem solver, a
person who accepts responsibility and gets things done
by marshalling the resources of the organization.
One recent study asserted that more than a general knowledge
of CAS and cost accounting on the part of the AGO was neces-
sary in view of the complex and controversial issues thei AGO
was required to address: "Only a relatively few AGO's have
the time and background to perform GAS administration
O A
adequately." The DOD GAS Working Group came to the same
conclusion in an earlier field survey:
Ideally, all contracting officers should be capable of
understanding GAS problems and making their own decisions
based on that knowledge. However, it does not appear
that DOD procurement organizations require AGO's to
have a background in accounting. Informal discussions
with personnel who teach the GAS workship at ALMG indicate
that a number of AGO's attending that course have been
unable to understand the complex accounting which is
inherent in GAS. Under these circumstances it cannot be
expected that many AGO's will be able to deal with GAS 25
unless they are first taught the fundamentals of accounting.
One ex-Government official interviewed agreed that GAS
issues placed an undue burden on the AGO:
The role of the AGO as a generalist DOD clings to this
concept. But is isn't fair to him that they put him in
this position and don't give him the education, training
and tools necessary to make sound business decisions. Other-
wise, he's in the business of accepting whatever various
specialists give him. The Government is not getting their
money's worth and he is not doing his job. He's just a
figurehead.
^^LMI, "Administration of GAS," p. 3-2.
Ibid.




Several industry representatives charged, and a few Govern-
ment personnel admitted, that the average ACO was sadly
deficient in the fields pf accounting necessary to understand
CAS Rules, Regulations and Standards and the implications
of DAR implementing regulations, in their present form. If
one accepts this view, the allegation that ACO's are overly
reliant upon the auditor's recommendations rings true.
(3) Decision-Maker . In its investigation of the
role of the contracting officer, the Commission on Government
Procurement recommended:
Clarify the role of the contracting officer as the focal
point for making or obtaining a final decision on a pro-
curement. Allow the contracting officer wide latitude
for the exercise of business judgment in representing the
Government's interest. °
The preceding Chapter's model of CAS
administration graphically portrayed the numerous decision
points in the process whereupon the ACO is called to make a
determination. In recognition of this, the Working Group
calls for sound decision-making by ACO's:
Contracting Officers are. .. charged with exercising their
best judgment on each individual impact study in a way
that protects the best interest of the Government and
considers the equity, fairness and materiality of the
matter.
The ACO, as a generalist and manager of
personnel assets with technical knowledge, is in the unique
2 6
As cited in "Administration of CAS," David V. Lamm, p. 29 7,
27
DOD CAS Working Group Item 76-8 of 17 December 19 76.
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position necessary to be the Government decision-maker. He
is able to consider viewpoints of legal, accounting and
engineering specialists, weigh the inherent biases of each
position, and make an independent business decision for which
he is held accountable. This accountability generally insures
the Government against arbitrary and capricious determinations.
The decision will have to equally consider both interest of
the Government and equity for the contractor. For these
reasons, it is generally acknowledged that no alternate member
of the contract administration team is capable of making the
type of decision required. In a letter to the Director, DCAA,
Rear Admiral Gerald T. Thompson recognized this truism:
I appreciate that the auditor may not always agree with
the contracting officer as to the basis for. .. [contract
price] adjustments. However, the integrity of the entire
acquisition process rests on the fact that advice received
from the contract auditor, CAS specialists, attorneys, and
others is advisory in nature, and that one individual, the
contracting officer, has responsibility for the final
decision. ^°
Admiral Thompson's sentiments echoes those expressed by
Secretary Packard nine years earlier:
Nevertheless, contracting officers' decisions on matters
of contract pricing have to take into account many factors
in addition to those presented by the auditors. It is,
therefore, necessary that all those responsible for fur-
nishing support to the contracting officer understand the
role they should play.^"
^^RADM Gerald T. Thompson, Deputy Director, DLA (CAS)
letter to Frederick Neuman, Director, DCAA of 2 7 August 19 79




Yet, Cost Accounting Standards issues
present special challenges to the AGO as decision-maker. His
actions are scrutinized closely by the DCAA auditor, DCASR
CAS Specialist and the CAS Board of Review. Each possesses
the power and influence to bring special pressures to bear
on the final determination. One Government official even
indicated that he was capable of threatening an AGO's con-
tracting officer's warrant if the AGO "stubbornly" held to a
decision the Board of Review failed to ratify. This example
does not reflect official DOD policy, but it is illustrative
of the environment within which the AGO must make a GAS
determination. This environment is perceived by the con-
tractor and examples of it were often cited during the
interviews as the primary obstacle to the efficient conduct
of the cost impact assessment process
:
The issue has always been that the AGO looks to other
people to make the decision. He should have absolute
authority and enough confidence in himself, or in the
system to support him, so that he will know his decision
will stick. So it's a two-pronged attack that is needed
he needs both technical and political support. The fact
is that CAS has introduced a paranoia into contract
administration.
(4) Adjudicator . As a subset of his decision-
making role, the AGO assumes the role of adjudicator when
a contractor initially submits an appeal of a final deter-
mination. In this role, where the contractor receives the
first hearing of his dispute, the AGO must weigh the contractor's
position carefully against that of the Government. He is
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called upon to be a judge, not a Government advocate, and
impartially reach an equitable finding. Frequently, this
requires him to hear the contractor's argument and the
argument of one of his own advisors. He must consider each
opinion and the facts presented by each side in light of
the other's position. The AGO, as the contractor's court
of first resort, must, above, all, be judicious.
Because of the propensity of auditors and
contractors to line up on opposite sides of CAS issues, the
AGO frequently finds his role as adjudicator in conflict
with his role as primary Government representative. Some
Government officials interviewed felt that the AGO could not
or should not perform his adjudication role in GAS issues if
it meant that a finding would be issued in favor of the
contractor and contrary to the auditor's advisory opinion.
Typical of these remarks are those made by a DOD policy-maker;
If the AGO is acting as an intermediary between the con-
tractor and the auditor in CAS matters, he's assumed the
wrong role.
The same respondents were in favor of settling CAS disputes
in the ASBCA, bypassing the AGO.
e. Summary
The roles and relationships assiomed by Government
personnel in CAS administration and therefore, in cost impact
assessment, complicate and confuse the process. Contractors
are intimately aware of the conflicts and may be able to take
advantage of the dissension. Government bargaining power is
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threatened when a contractor is aware that members of the
contract administration team are split on the issues. Both
the AGO and auditor are placed in difficult positions and the
credibility of each is threatened when the conflict becomes
known
.
4. Sketchy and Inadequate Guidance
The greater portion of Ghapter Three served to illus-
trate the paucity of unified guidance, elaborations or
illustrations necessary to supplement GASB mandates and DAR.
The AGO and auditor are too often provided little, or no,
substantive direction in the daily procedures to be followed
in administering a covered contract. The guidance available
in Working Group papers is administered rigidly and not
accepted as advisory. Left to fend for themselves, both AGO
and auditor are forced to make their own interpretations of
field problems experienced or delay the execution of the cost
impact assessment process in anticipation of direction from
Headquarters or besieged GAS monitors and specialists. Each
of these contentions is based upon repeated assertions from
the variety of industry representatives interviewed.
But the lack of agency guidance has been an issue for
over five years. In his doctoral dissertation, Lamm recommended
the establishment of a GAS administration policy that would
consider all aspects of the cost impact assessment process.
The 19 76 GAO report recommended:
^^David V. Lamm, "Administration of GAS," p. 311.
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...that the Secretary of Defense direct the Cost Accounting
Standards Steering Committee and Working Group. .. [to] ..
.
formulate uniform procedures and requirements relative to
identifying the universe of covered contracts affected by
a cost impact proposal; preparing cost impact proposals,
including the extent of supporting data required; and
measuring increased cofet.
The Working Group has responded fully to the first recommen-
dation only and briefly noted the existence of two alternate
pricing methodologies, providing only general direction on
their appropriateness to various situations. The JMl study
recommended the consideration of the publication of a CAS
32
administration manual to answer the need for more guidance.
The Working Group rejected this recommendation.
Confusion over issues, both basis and specialized,
vital to proper CAS administration, exists in abundance.
One comment, typical in the interviews of both Government
and industry personnel, was made by a contract auditor:
There is a void in guidance, set-up and form as to the CIP.
There is no general agreement on how to calculate cost
impact. Perhaps it's because we've concentrated on adequacy
and compliance reviews. Nonetheless, cost impact assess-
ment has been generally overlooked and the sparse guidance
that does exist is not clear.
This section of the Chapter will briefly ennumerate
some of the issues that confuse or compound the process. Some
solutions to the issues will be recommended in Chapter Five.
^^GAO PSAD 76-154, p. 26.
^^LMI, "Administration of CAS," p. 4-3.
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It is the purpose of this section to illustrate the types of
issues that require additional DOD policy and guidance.
a. The Statement of General Dollar Magnitude
Information required on the statement of general
dollar magnitude, as it is currently structured, has not been
considered useful to the cost impact assessment process. As
evidenced in Chapter Three, DAR allows no materiality deter-
mination to be made as a result of the general dollar magnitude
statement; the AGO is required to pursue the cost impact proposal,
In recognition of the statement's seeming lack
of usefulness, DCAA has proposed a change to DAR that would
require the net cost increases and net cost decreases to be
33
specified by type of contract. As a result of this reor-
ganized initial stage of the two-stage impact assessment
proposal, the AGO would be authorized to determine the
materiality or immateriality of the allocation shift and,
if the impact is immaterial, stop the process without the
requirement of a GIP.
The computation of accounting information required
to assemble the statement of general dollar magnitude, even
in the revised form proposed, remains as extensive as that
required for a cost impact proposal by contract. Granted, the
-5 ->
DGAA PGD/H6 Memorandum for Ghairman, DAR Gouncil, OUSD
(R & E), of 11 March 1980.
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new format would provide increased visibility by type of
contract, thereby eliminating any confusion engendered by the
opposing definitions of increased cost in firm and flexibly
priced contracts. It would, however, remain a laborious
assessment for the contractor. Other options for an aggregate
study of cost impact are possible that are easier to perform.
These options will be discussed in the succeeding chapter.
b. Materiality
As discussed above, materiality determinations can
presently be made only after a contract-by-contract study
under current DAR requirements. In Chapter Five, concurrent
with the discussion of the aggregate impact assessment study,
scenarios will be offered where a materiality determination
can be made without the necessity of either a statement of
general dollar magnitude or a cost impact proposal. These
examples deserve DOD consideration and official sanction.
c. Certification of CIP Cost or Pricing Data
Interview respondents were at variance over the
requirement for contractor certification of cost or pricing
data to support CIP's. This issue will be discussed in the
following Chapter.
d. Sampling
Legitimate, valid, sampling techniques are recognized
as useful tools in both forward pricing and auditing. It is
the opinion of this researcher that these techniques would
prove to be similarly useful for cost impact assessment.
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Some suggestions and general guidelines are needed for their
use when a CAP change affects a multitude of contracts.
e. Simultaneous CAP Changes
The DCAA prohibition on the presentation or
consideration of simultaneous accounting changes contained
within their Training Guide presents problems. As Hal Sharp
notes, attempting to artificially separate changes that are
made simultaneously to allow ease of audit in turn creates
conceptual problems:
It would be unusual that a contractor would only contemplate
a single accounting change each year. The CASB has been
promulgating about three or four new standards each year,
all of which might not impact the contractor. .. .Although
it would be "nice" to have a detailed proposal for each
accounting change, it would be impractical and not produce
any more accurate results in the end. Technically, mul-
tiple accounting changes become a "chicken and egg"
situation, as to which change came first, the standard or
the voluntary. If changes were made one at a time, instead
of all at the beginning of a fiscal year, then the first
change would create a different accounting base for the
second change, etc. 34
Substantive guidance is needed to assist ACO's and auditors
in dealing with simultaneous changes in CAP ' s and the compu-
tation of cost impact in this situation. The recommendation
contained within the DCAA Training Guide, to demand individual
CIP's for each accounting change, is not realistic.





Any substantive guidance on the foimat presentation
of the contractor's CIP submission that would facilitate the
audit and consideration of contract price adjustments would
be extremely helpful to field administrators. One auditor
complained during an interview that he could frequently not
tell "what the amounts listed mean" when he received the CIP.
The Working Group survey concluded that:
Cost impact proposals vary greatly as to format and detail.
ACO's and auditors are not consistent in their requirements.^
g. Pricing Methodology Confusion
A major portion of this Chapter was devoted to an
exploration of the two basic pricing methodologies and the
variants thereof for assessment of cost impact. As shown,
some methods are appropriate in some accounting change scenarios
and others inappropriate; some variants might provide a more
equitable method than others under given circumstances. A
need for further guidance seems to be indicated,
h. Other Problems
Several other issues, not included in the enumera-
tion above, including profit adjustment, restructuring of
incentive criteria and the timing of contract price adjustments,
deserve consideration. Research indicates that attempts to
35]X)D CAS Working Group Field Survey, p. 27.
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develop guidance for field personnel is ongoing at the DCAA
and DCAS regional levels, usually under the auspices of
issuances of the CAS monitors and specialists. Much of the
regional instruction seemed, to this researcher, to represent
solid, sincere efforts to provide unified and useful assis-
tance to personnel required to administer covered contracts
on a daily basis. DOD policy-making officials interviewed,
however, claimed that a similar headquarters project to
produce a CAS administration manual is infeasible. The variety
of situations possible, with as many contractors in as many
locations, it was argued, does not lend itself to a head-
quarters solution. It is the opinion of this researcher that
the successful regional guidance attempts and IX)D element
headquarters' refusal to undertake a broader based approach
to more substantive direction to CAS administration are in
contradiction
.
More extensive guidance, not regulation, may be
needed on the assessment of cost impact. A CAS administration
manual, stressing flexibility and equity and the variety of
solutions available to problems that confound the process, free
of accounting jargon, seems both feasible and desirable. An
attempt to provide general guidelines on the CIP and impact
assessment will form the basis of Chapter Five. As a result,
it will be shown that a structured approach can serve to




It was the intention of this Chapter to review those
problems that exist in the CAS administration environment
that actually hinder the cost impact assessment process. In
the course of this review, confusion over, or misapplication
of, the pricing methodologies, procedural and conceptual
problems, including the roles and relationships of Government
players, and the lack of guidance on specific issues, were
identified as hindrances to the efficient conduct of cost
impact assessment. Some possible solutions to the obstacles
were presented; some procedural guidelines for ACO's will be
recommended in Chapter Five.
The complexity and confusion of Cost Accounting Standards
administration leads to attitudinal problems among affected
personnel, both in industry and Government. Though outright
refusal to comply with the regulations provided was not dis-
covered during the course of the research, some hostility
and resistance to CAS was noted among industry and Government
personnel. These attitudes were manifested in frequent
examples of failures to drive the cost impact assessment process
through to conclusion.
One industry representative interviewed cited a specific
case where the impact assessment cycle was over 600 days long,
only to have the ACO determine the issue immaterial at the
end of that time. Two individuals, one Government and one
industry, complained of separate cost impact cases that had
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been outstanding since 1977 and were still awaiting resolution.
A 19 77 GAO follow-up report of DCAS administrative efforts
audited 37 cases selected at random and was critical of the
delays in settlement of 12:
We believe there is a need to emphasize the importance
of prompt action by contracting officers in settling
noncompliance cases. Protracted settlements usually
involve excessive investments of time by contractor
and agency officials and adversely affect the relationship
between contracting parties. -^^
The delays experienced, and their causes, were the subject
of each interview conducted. Industry and Government personnel
cited a variety of reasons to explain the lack of timeliness,
from "vacillation preventing an AGO final determination," to
"the bureaucratic procedures of separate DCAS/DCAA channels,"
to "contractor refusal to cooperate." It is the opinion of
this researcher that the problems currently existing as a
result of CAS implementing regulations, and the environment
within which covered contracts are administered, directly
and indirectly contribute to delays in the cost impact
assessment cycle.
The effects of outstanding, unsettled CAS issues confound
the procurement process. While changes to CAP ' s are being
scrutinized, the contractor is unable to confidently price
future proposals. Forward pricing rate agreements (FPRA's)
cannot be entered into and savings and reserve clauses are
^^GAO Report PSAD-77-158 of 17 August 1977, p. 3
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attached to the contracts, forcing later resolution of the
issues. As the process drags on, accounting information
in the CIP may become old and invalid, or harder to identify
and substantiate. Finally, while impact is being assessed,
individual contracts may close out and funding for subsequent
adjustments may disappear. A change in cost accounting
practices inherently introduces turmoil into contract account-
ing and pricing. If the Government allows its administrative
actions to inhibit quick settlement of the change issue, the
turmoil will inevitably affect the procurement process itself.
The AGO should be reestablished as the dominant decision-
maker in GAS matters and other members of the procurement and
administration team must offer him their undivided support.
A better system of tracking the GiS Gontract Universe should
be sought. A guidance manual on common GAS administration
problems and cost impact pricing methodologies could be
developed that will simplify the process, remove the present
confusion and enhance the AGO's decision-making abilities.




V. A ME.THODOLOGY FOR COST IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Chapter Three presented an in depth review of Cost Account-
ing Standards administration and the environment within which
cost impact assessment of cost accounting practice changes
is performed. That Chapter also detailed the regulations
and guidance published that govern the process. Chapter
Four analyzed the cost impact pricing methodologies, and
their appropriateness in varying circumstances/ and the pro-
blems that hinder cost impact assessment created by insuffi-
cient direction available to the ACQ and auditor and the
rigidity with which the dearth of DOD CAS administration
guidance is implemented. In Chapter Four, it was suggested
that a unified set of sequential procedures, promulgated and
understood to be advisory only, would be helpful in guiding
the ACO and auditor through a coordinated assessment of cost
impact on covered contracts. This Chapter will present one
example of such a set of general guidelines.
It is the purpose of this Chapter to offer a logical,
efficient methodology for assessing the cost impact of changes
in cap's. The Chapter will review each stage of the process,
describing the information needed and the decision-making that
can proceed therefrom. The methodology will provide for a
partial solution to difficulties experienced as a result of
a lack of contractor cooperation. A range of assessment
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methodologies, much wider that presently available or
proposed, to measure cost impact on the CAS Contract Universe,
will also be recommended. In general, this Chapter will
construct a framework that will allow the complex issue of
cost impact assessment to be considered in a series of man-
ageable, finite, activities in order to improve ACO compre-
hension and decision-making ability and the timeliness of
Government administration of the process.
A. THE RATIONALE FOR A NEW METHODOLOGY
Chapter Four presented the basic arguments for the need
for additional agency-wide guidance in cost impact assessment.
It would be helpful, however, before introducing a methodo-
logy that would represent the most wide-ranging CAS guidance
promulgated by DOD, to briefly review three major arguments.
ACO's are not accountants, nor need they be. Despite
LMI's recommendations that DOD undertake an intensive effort
to educate its ACO's to increase their accounting competence,
no major retraining process is necessary in the opinion of
this researcher. An effort is necessary, however, to simplify
and facilitate CAS administration issues, that will enable
ACO's, with a requisite, fundamental knowledge of financial
and cost accounting, to become intelligent consumers of the
LMI, "Administration of CAS," p. 4-2.
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advice of CAS specialists, auditors and price analysts. Such
a move would allow the AGO to retain the traditional role
of CAS generalist, while maintaining, or regaining, the role
of CAS decision-maker.
Industry officials interviewed frequently posed a common
question: "What is the Government buying, a weapons system
or an accounting system?" While legitimate needs for Cost
Accounting Standards in the defense procurement environment
were established in Chapter Two, it is vital that the manner
in which the Rules, Regulations and Standards are implemented
and administered not stymie or impede the procurement process.
Evidence of the delays, and ramifications of the delays,
currently experienced in CAP change administration were pre-
sented in Chapter Four. An orderly procedure, that lends
itself to prompt execution, expedient dismissal of immaterial
issues, and timely resolution, is needed to combat the industry
perception that GAS is more important than the procurement
it regulates.
Chapter Four's discussion of cost impact pricing methodo-
logies demonstrated that certain methodologies, and variants
thereof, might be more feasible and equitable than others
under differing circumstances. Chapter Four also suggested
that simpler tests for cost impact materiality might be
possible than are presently permissable or proposed. During
the course of the research, however, it was discovered that
the minimal guidance available to ACO's and auditors on the
assessment of cost impact was enforced with the same
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rigidity as the CAS mandates themselves. It is the opinion
of this researcher that DOD administration guidance should
be characterized by flexibility and adaptability that
encourages the AGO to use his discretion, with the best
interest of the Government in mind, in considering the
feasibility and equity of the cost impact assessment process
chosen. As indicated by one industry representative, present
DOD regulations fall short of this goal:
...people involved in this, DGAA and the AGO, have to be
more open-minded and flexible and concentrate on the
"prudent businessman" concept: what is appropriate; what
makes sense. We have situations where Government people
have said, "We agree with you, but we can't let you do
that."
DOD guidance should present the pricing and assessment options,
the shortcuts available, and the arguments for and against
each. Such official sanction will allow the AGO to exercise
flexibility in administering cost impact assessment in the
manner most feasible, equitable and appropriate.
The balance of this Ghapter, therefore, will be devoted
to a recommendation of a new cost impact assessment methodo-
logy that recognizes and responds to the need for simplifi-
cation, the need for expedient resolution and the need for
flexibility in GAS administration.
B. QUALIFIGATION OF THE GRANGE
Upon receipt of a contractor's proposal, or the discovery
of a change in cost accounting practices, the Administrative
Contracting Officer should begin preparations for the cost
168

impact assessment process. Continuing liaison with the
contractor, the solicitation and collection of preliminary
information and an advance agreement between the parties
is necessary to insure that the impact assessment process
will be executed and resolved smoothly after it is initiated.
Effort expended in these early phases, devoted to the "quali-
fication" of the CAP change, a period where it is analyzed
and scheduled, where the population of potentially affected
contracts is surveyed and where the pricing methodology
appropriate to measure the effect is established, will serve
to thoroughly prepare the ACO for the impending assessment
of cost impact over the entire CAS Contract Universe. As
stated by one auditor interviewed:
The ACO should come to the cost impact assessment with
the same type of information he would gather prior to
price negotiations on the performance of a contract change
order.
1. The Substance of the Change
With the assistance of his CAS experts, the auditor
and price analyst, the ACO should first come to a thorough
understanding of the ramifications of the accounting change.
Examples of change scenarios are offered below for illustration,
a. Accounting CAP Changes
Some changes result from continued refinement of
the contractor's cost accounting system.
(1) A Shift From Indirect to Direct . A contractor
who reclassifies costs to switch elements of an indirect cost
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pool to direct costs may alter the direct loadings on
covered contracts, reduce the level of costs in, and the
allocation rate of, the pool from which the costs were
shifted, and possibly increase the allocation to the covered
contracts of any cost pool which utilizes as a base the
newly-designated direct costs.
(2) Changes in Allocation Bases . A CAP change
that alters the manner in which an indirect cost pool is
allocated could potentially increase or decrease the allocation
rate utilized to burden covered contracts.
b. Organization CAP Changes
Other changes may result from internal reorganization
of a service center, division or plant.
(1) Pool Reorganization . Any merger or split
of organizational entities would lead to a similar merger
or split of overhead pools associated with the entities. A
larger or smaller cost pool would lead to a corresponding
increase or reduction in allocation rates for the pool.
2. The Ripple Effect
Once the primary effect of the accounting change has
been ascertained, the ACO must gain an understanding of the
"ripple effects" of the change through the contractor's
accounting system.
a. A Simplified Accounting System
In general, a simple rule suggested during one
interview with a Government accountant can be utilized to
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determine the nature of the ripple effect:
Is the cost [increased or decreased by the change] part
of the base of some other allocation? If so, the impact
of the change will continue to ripple down.
Figure 5-1 can be utilized to demonstrate the ripple effect.
Accounting changes made to the sequence of cost allocation
will have the greatest effect if the change is made at the
beginning of the sequence, at the left in Figure 5-1, and
the least effect if the change is made at the end, at the
right in the Figure. Thus, a change in direct cost loading
or measurement on a contract will change the allocation of
direct cost, including the costs of a production center
(sequence #1 and #2) , the allocation of any overhead cost
pool utilizing previously increased or decreased direct costs
as a base (sequence #3) , and the allocation of management
pools (sequence #4) utilizing total cost impact as a base.
A change in the allocation of costs to, or from, the manage-
ment pools may only affect allocation of the pools to the
contract (unless a cost has been diverted to or from the
management pool from or to an earlier source in the sequence
in which case the shift must be traced from the source) . The
resident auditor's assistance will be necessary for this
analysis. A "roadmap" of the accounting system similar to
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3. Adequacy Determination and Compliance Advisory
Formal liaison by the AGO should be made with the
contractor if any problems are encountered in determining
conceptually the direct or indirect effects of the accounting
change on the contractor's allocations of costs to covered
contracts. Once this analysis is complete, the contractor's
description of a voluntary or mandatory change must be trans-
lated into an amendment to keep the Disclosure Statement
accurate, current and complete. An initial advisory opinion
on the compliance of the change with Cost Accounting Standards
should be requested from the auditor and the ACO, in concert
with the auditor, should inform the contractor of preliminary
findings . A change discovered or proposed that may result
in a final noncompliance determination should be discussed
by the parties. Modifications to the existing or future
practices may be suggested by either contract party for the
purpose of avoiding, or amending, a practice that is susceptible
to a finding of noncompliance. Every effort should be made
to resolve disagreement between parties.
4. Timing of the Change
If the contractor has proposed a change to existing
practices, the impact assessment process should commence at
least 180 days prior to implementation of the new practice.
Hal Sharp suggests that a common understanding can be developed
through negotiation of an advance agreement between parties
in the intervening time period.
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...Ideally it would be helpful if the Government and the
contractor could agree. .. [to] ... a. . .proposal and negotiation
process backing off about five to six months before the
next fiscal year when the accounting changes would take
place.
^
A contractor's efforts to effect changes to his CAP ' s with
less than sufficient advance notice to the Government should
be resisted; proposals to implement new Standards should be
sought at least six months prior to the required implementation
date.
An advance agreement, or memorandum of understanding,
should be initiated between parties that details the time
frames of the change. This agreement must set forth the
mutually acceptable implementation date of the mandatory or
voluntary alteration in CAP ' s or the date when a questionable
practice discovered by the Government could be modified if
it is eventually found to be noncompliant. The agreement
should also establish a cut-off point, concurrent with its
execution of both parties, wherein the contractor agrees to
introduce no further proposals for CAP changes until the
issue in question is resolved. This action will prevent any
further compounding of the cost baselines for each contract
from which cost impact will be measured. If none exists, a
commitment from the contractor to propose future changes for
once a year implementation only may also be attainable. As
one interviewee suggested:





You have to be able to some way draw the line. For that
reason you'll find that if you attempt to make accounting
changes more than once a year, you're in deep trouble.
Theoretically, CAS could be issued to be effected at any
time. Normally, a voluntary change, unless there's a
drastic change in conditions in a company's sales base,
is generally implemented at the beginning of a fiscal
year. So are the Standards, in general. So it's a lot
better to establish a working rule that you back off
three or four months. There will be no new changes after
that (there could always be exceptions)
.
This "moratorium" should be, as suggested, 90-120 days prior
to the implementation date of the new practices. The imple-
mentation date, ideally, should be concurrent with the
beginning of the contractor's fiscal year.
5. CAS Contract Universe
As discussed in Chapter Four, the population of covered
contracts potentially affected by the proposed or discovered
change, or the CAS Contract Universe, cannot be identified
independently at the contract administration office.
Therefore, the contractor's cooperation in assessing the
Contract Universe is essential.
The contractor should be requested to submit a schedule
indicating the Contract Universe, by contract type, and
listing the contract number, buying office, incentive or
pricing structure, period of performance and costs incurred





against the CAR or the contractor's existing system for
tracking the CAS Contract Universe, if necessary. An under-
standing should be developed between parties that the pro-
duction of this schedule will be to the benefit of each in
the subsequent impact assessment, since it will allow a
valid stratification of the Universe by the ACO and the
selection of a representative sample of contracts for detailed
cost impact assessment, which may enable an early materiality
determination and/or preclude a detailed contract-by-contract
impact assessment. The contractor should be informed that no
materiality determination can, or will, be made without this
information.
During the course of the research, an alternate system
for tracking the CAS Contract Universe at individual contrac-
tor's plants was identified. The Federal Procurement Data
System (FPDS) , established on 3 February 19 78 by the Office
of Federal Procurement Policy to collect, develop and dis-
seminate procurement information, could eventually be tapped
by the ACO for a timely indentification of covered contract
populations. In its future form, FPDS would have to be much
4
more reliable than it is presently. Additionally, information
concerning covered subcontracts at a contractor's plant could
not be gleaned from it. A workable, FPDS, however, would
4
GAO, "The Federal Procurement Data System Making It
Work Better," PSAD-80-33, 18 April 1980.
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enable the AGO to identify all covered prime contracts
open during a given time period, irrespective of Federal
procuring agency and any specific delegation of administrative
responsibilities
.
6. Forward Pricing Rates
New forward pricing rates, or annualized billing
rates, should be requested from the contractor that represent
the implementation of the new practice proposed or amendment
of the practice discovered. The contractor's proposal for
forward pricing rates will identify the budgeted magnitude
of indirect cost pools and commercial and Government sales
base for the coming year. If FPRA's are not available that
indicate intended indirect cost pool allocation rates before
the change, information on the rates utilized should also
be requested. The comparison of overhead rates before and
after the change will prove useful for si±)sequent materiality
determinations
.
7. Final Gompliance Determination
A final determination of the compliance of the new
practice must be made by the AGO before the impact assessment
process can proceed. It has been purposefully sequenced,
however, to be made after information on the GAS Gontract
Universe and the effects of the change on overhead allocation
rates has been received from the contractor. As a result,
if the contractor determined to be in noncompliance refuses
to cooperate further, the AGO should have acquired enough
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information to enable the auditor to begin a valid independent
assessment of impact. If delaying a final noncompliance
determination until the requisite accounting proposals and
CAS Contract Universe information is made available is
unsuccessful, i.e., if the contractor refuses to provide
details until a determination is made, the ACO may be
threatened by the contractor's ability to frustrate the assess-
ment by refusing to cooperate. Without a "hammer" to force
compliance with the CAS Administration Clause, the methodology
described herein will not appreciably enhance cost impact
assessment. The balance of the procedures listed in this
Chapter are detailed with the assumption that contractor
cooperation can be won.
8. Negotiation of Pricing Methodology
Once the source of the CAP change has been identified,
discussion between contract parties should commence in an
effort to reach agreement on the most appropriate, i.e.,
most equitable and feasible, pricing methodology for the
assessment of cost impact. Chapter Four's extensive discussion
of the pricing methodologies and the generalities made at
the conclusion of the discussion is summarized in Figure 5-2.
In addition to consideration of information available, and
necessary, for the pricing techniques, two ratios (contract
price to proposal price and contract price to estimate at
completion without the change) are utilized to determine the
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measure of "significance" is provided; it is believed that
this decision can best be reached between parties. Represen-
tative contracts can be chosen by the parties from the
contractor's schedule provided to test the significance of
the ratios.
The notion of making the pricing methodology the
subject of negotiation between parties was discussed during
many of the research interviews. Two respondents took
different stands on the issue. One ex-auditor supported the
notion
:
[The parties should] Agree on a CIP. .. [pricing]
methodology just like they would agree to the conditions
of a audit sample of a stratified population.
A former price analyst, however, argued that certain quali-
fications were necessary before he could accept the
negotiation of price methodology:
Aren't you foreclosing certain rights [of the Government]
by agreeing to the... [pricing] .. .methodology early on?
Do you want to go that far? The Government will want
to know the financial impact of the decision before you
make it. How much can you give away? It might work
if we know the [accounting] system well enough, but
usually we don't I
In the opinion of this researcher, the procedures described
thus far provide for the ACO's working knowledge of the
accounting system and allow for some preliminairy tests of the
methodology chosen when the significance of the two ratios
shown in Figure 5-2 is determined. With this knowledge, and
the best interest of the Government in mind, it is believed
that the AGO can reach a sound negotiation objective as to
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the appropriate pricing methodology. In the interests of
equity, feasibility and a continuing atmosphere of mutual
cooperation, the choice of pricing methodology should be
subject to agreement between parties.
9. Conclusion of CIP Preliminaries
The advance agreement that was initiated at the
beginning of the process should nov; be concluded by detailing
the nature of the agreements reached by the parties . In
addition to the time frames of the change already included,
the implementation date of the change proposed or the initiation
date and scheduled correction date of the change discovered,
the nature and description of the change, the Contract
Universe schedule, the results of the ACO's compliance deter-
mination, and the pricing methodology to be utilized should
be incorporated. Each of these details will serve to define
the subsequent cost impact assessment process, "bind" the
parties to that definition and the agreements reached and limit
the use of infoimiation provided for the process to that purpose
only. The advance agreement should be concluded with a commit-
ment to mutual cooperation between parties in the cost impact
assessment, perhaps specifying that the Government will keep
its requests for cost impact proposals and supporting infor-
mation "reasonable" and that the contractor will respond to
such requests "promptly." Once executed, the stage is set
for the actual assessment of cost impact.
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C. QUANTIFICATION OF THE CHANGE
The materiality and assessment methodologies presented
herein are presented in order of their complexity, and,
therefore, cost to administer and execute. The AGO needs
to be guided continually by the CASB's materiality criteria,
especially the following exhortation:
The cost of administrative processing. .. shall be considered.
If the cost to process [the cost impact assessment] exceeds
the amount to be recovered, it is less likely the amount
will be material.
During the Lamm study, it was discovered that:
Several ACO's...have determined rather substantial cost
impacts (several hundred thousand dollars) to be
immaterial because it would require more in administrative
costs to make the adjustments than the amount that would
be recovered or paid out.
Therefore, the ACO should approach the impact assessment
methodologies predisposed to keeping the process as simple
as the best interest of the Government allows and with a
resolution to dismiss the issue as soon as it can be determined
to be immaterial.
1. Techniques for Assessment
The ACO need not commence the cost impact study with
the first assessment technique described herein. If his
understanding of the change indicates, or the earlier tests
of the pricing methodology agreed to suggest, a more extensive
^4 CFR 331.71(a) (6) .
David V. Lamm, "Administration of CAS," p. 238.
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assessment technique must be used, the process should be
initiated there. Except in extraordinary cases, however,
the assessment process should not commence by requiring the
contractor to submit a detailed, and fully substantiated,
contract-by- con tract CIP. Instead, the first impact study
initiated should be the one that promises a reasonably
precise determination with the minimum investment in time
and administrative cost.
a. Gross Effects Study
As a result of the contractor's description of
the change in CAP's, the ACO should have developed a working
understanding of the gross effects, or the immediate impact
of the shift in costs, of the change on covered contracts.
If a shift in direct cost allocation to contracts will be
the result of the change, a few of the larger individual
contracts that contain significant levels of the direct cost
can be selected to determine, by the pricing methodology
chosen, the level of increase or decrease in the magnitude
of that element. If the amounts are considered material
to the contract prices or costs, the ACO should proceed to
an aggregate impact study. If the change in direct cost loading
is judged immaterial, the changes in allocation of indirect
cost pools that will result from the direct cost shifts should
be traced. If the total impact, cumulative shifts in direct
and indirect cost, within the contract is immaterial, the cost
impact of the change can be considered immaterial. If not, an
aggregate impact study is required.
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Audited overhead forecasts produced by the
contractor during the preliminary phases can be used to
measure the gross effects of the shift in costs if the CAP
had initial impact therein. The impact may be represented
as a percentage change in the pool's allocation rate on the
larger contracts and the ripple effect should be traced to
the final allocation. Again, if this test indicates the
cost impact is immaterial, no further study is required.
If the impact is material to the cost or price of each contract,
an aggregate impact study should be performed.
It should be noted that a study of the gross
effects of the CAP change in order to make a materiality
determination is not presently sanctioned by, or proposed
for inclusion in, DAR.
b. Aggregate Impact Study
An alternate assessment methodology, an aggregate
impact study, may be utilized for both materiality and cost
impact determinations. Unlike the gross effects study, the
determinations are not solely reliant upon a detailed assess-
ment of a few large contracts selected from the CAS Universe.
Instead, this study assesses the impact of larger contracts,
stratified by type, verifies the results of this assessment
against a legitimate sample of contracts and prorates the
impact determined thereby over the population of covered
contracts. Since it does not lend itself to contract price
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adjustment of individual contracts, this study is most
appropriate for cost impact determination when earlier
analysis indicates that cost impact on individual contracts
may be immaterial, but that the cumulative effect over the
Contract Universe is material.
CD Simplified Study . A few large contracts,
selected from each class of contract types, should be analyzed
by the AGO, using the predetermined pricing methodology. As
Hal Sharp recommends, however, impact upon the allocation of
costs from management pools is ignored in the simplified
version of an aggregate impact study:
Do not adjust costs that are normably controlled by
management on a total dollar basis such as IR&D, B&P,
and G&A. Assume no change in total^cost even though
cost distribution may be different.
Net impact determined on each group of large contracts should
then be compared to results of a similar study on a scientific
sample of contracts from each class. If results are reason-
ably comparable, as a percentage of total cost or price on
each contract studied, a midpoint percentage for each class
of contract, between the results of the two studies, can be
prorated over all contracts and a total cost impact figure
computed. Conversely, if both studies indicate an immaterial
impact, the process need proceed no further.
7





In recognition of the fact that larger
contracts that contain a high level of the cost element
impacted will be affected most by an alteration in CAP ' s
,
the first study can be expected to produce the most signi-
ficant findings. It would not be valid, however, to prorate
results from the initial study of large contracts over the
CAS Contract Universe. Therefore, a comparison of the ratios
of net impact to total cost or price, by type of contract,
is made to those from a scientific sample, drawn from the
stratified population where each member has an equal probability
of being selected. If the results are consistent, it is
legitimate to apply them over all contracts. If the results
are not consistent, a more detailed study is warranted.
(2) Detailed Study . The sole variation between
the detailed methodology and the simplified one previously
described is the inclusion, in the former, of shifts in allo-
cations within management pools. This study is particularly
appropriate for materiality and cost impact determinations
when the CAP change represents an alteration in the measurement,
assignment or allocation of costs to and from the management
pools themselves. Again, however, results of the detailed
study may only be considered legitimate, and suitable for total
cost impact assessment, if the net impact assessed in the large
contract sample and the scientific sample are consistent.
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c. Threshold Contract-By-Contract Study
A contract-by-contract study may be limited to
larger contracts only, contracts of a certain type, or
contracts that contain a stated percentage of the cost element
impacted by the change. In the case of mandatory and volun-
tary changes, it may be appropriate to limit the study to
those that are less than a certain percentage complete, e.g.,
75 per cent, since the cost impact is likely to be relatively
insignificant on contracts with small estimates-to-complete.
Professional judgment must be used to determine
whether the study performed on the reduced population should
be simplified or detailed.
A threshold contract-by-contract study should be
initiated when cost impact on some contracts is considered
material but it is reasonable for the ACO to assume that
cumulative impact upon individual contracts below a certain
threshold is immaterial.
d. Contract-By-Contract Study
The most complex assessment methodology is the
one performed routinely under present regulations. All
covered contracts in the Contract Universe affected by the
change are assessed, using the pricing methodology established,
Either a simplified or detailed study of all contracts may be
performed. The contract-by-contract assessment methodology
should be used when it is reasonable to expect that the impact
on each contract in the CAS Contract Universe will be material
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and that most, or all, active contracts should be adjusted
to amend or reflect the impact.
2. Proposal Format
During the quantification process, assessment metho-
dology instructions to the contractor should include specific
requirements on the format and presentation of the contractor's
submission. The ACO's proposal information requirements and
organization instructions must be appropriate for the pricing
and assessment methodologies utilized for the study, consider
the leadtime allowed the contractor and the administrative
effort required to produce the information and geared to
enhance ease of audit. The auditor's format recommendations
should be requested.
In general, all studies should be presented in a
fashion that summarizes net cost impact determined on each
contract scrutinized. A schedule, by individual contract,
should be attached that follows the cost element-by-cost
element format of, or utilizes, a DD 633 and indicates con-
tract cost before the change and contract cost with the
change incorporated. The contracts studied should then be
summarized to show net increase, or net decrease, by contract
type. Although they are not necessary for inclusion for each
contract studied, the contractor should be informed that
accounting work papers may be requested on selected, or all,
contracts studied. These may be used by the auditor to verify




Any pricing methodology that utilizes current cost
data to establish a baseline (estimate-to-complete or,
possibly, a negotiated proposal or price cost breakdown) may
require the contractor's certification that current, accurate
and complete cost or pricing data was utilized for the estimates
The contractor should also be informed that production of
the cost or pricing data substantiation may be required during
proposal audit, but that cost or pricing data need only
be identified when the impact proposal is initially submitted.
It may be legitimately argued that any subsequent proposal
for a change, accounting or performance, to a contract that
required certification of cost or pricing data during original
price negotiations should also be certified, however, current
interpretation of P.L. 87-653 requirements only necessitates
certification when aggregate increases and decreases on costs
exceed $100,000.
Audited impact proposal submissions should be used
as the basis for initially notifying, in writing, cognizant
PCO's of contracts that are susceptible to more significant
price adjustments as a result of the CAP change.
3. Determination of Net Effects to the Government
Depending upon the source of the practice change, the
AGO should use the audited proposal to determine net increase
or decrease in costs by type of contract, by buying office,




The cuiuulative effect to the Government of the
CAP Change may be determined by offsetting contract higher
levels of cost allocation against lower levels of cost
allocation within each contract type grouping and group net
increases against group net decreases, as recommended in
Working Group Item 76-8.
b. Increased Costs
Discretionary and noncompliant changes must be
analyzed to determine the potential for, or payment of,
o
increased costs. An "expenditure schedule," showing the
history of cost vouchers reimbursed and partial or progress
payments made for each contract studied, must be submitted
by the contractor. Generally, if the impact assessment
process can be concluded before the implementation date of
the discretionary change, no increased costs will have been
paid. For noncompliant changes, increased costs paid should
be determined by applying a net increase to contract cost
ratio to every payment made under every contract impacted
from the date the noncompliance began to the date of the last
payment made before the contractor corrected practice.
Potential increased costs will be discussed in the





Increased costs paid under the contract, as a result
of a noncompliant change, will result in an assessment of
interest penalties against the contractor. One methodology
successfully utilized by an AGO was discovered during the
course of the research. The period of increased cost payment
was plotted for each contract on a time line chart. A mid-
point was selected between the date of initial increased cost
payment on the first contract awarded and the date of first
payment on the last contract awarded. The appropriate simple
interest rate was then applied to the net increased cost
paid on all contracts over the midpoint to interest repayment
date. In the opinion of this researcher, this
represents an equitable and fairly precise methodology.
Interest penalties, however, may also be determined and
accumulated on each individual contract.
5. Profit or Fee Adjustments
In anticipation of contract price adjustments, profit
or fee structures must be scrutinized for possible adjustment.
This subject is highly controversial, as noted during the
Working Group Field Survey:
The question of whether and how profit should be adjusted
when CPS cost adjustments are made has been raised in
the Working Group several times. Generally, it was
concluded that profit adjustments should be made if cost
adjustments are significant. At the CAS Workshop
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conducted by ALMC, Fort Lee, Virginia, attempts to teach
methods for profit adjustment have generated such
controversy that this section is no longer taught.
The AGO should be guided by the CASB Regulations, which
provide:
...the United States [must] not pay increases costs,
including a profit enlarged beyond that in the
contemplation of the parties to the contract when
the contract costs, price, or profit is negotiated....
This rule, pertaining to the noncompliant and discretionary
change prohibition of increased costs, should also be extended
to equitable adjustments made necessary by mandatory or
sanctioned changes. In general, profit or fee impact must
be considered whenever a CAP change leads to a material net
increase or decrease in costs in a covered contract. If
profit or fee is not included in the adjustment, the pricing
stabilization need to which CAS responds remains unanswered.
The Working Group and all interviewees questioned on the
subject reached the same conclusion.
All respondents to the interviews were in favor of
using the original negotiated rate in determining the level
of profit or fee adjustments. The net increase or decrease
in costs on each contract studied and being considered for
adjustment would simply be multiplied by the negotiated rate.
^EXDD CAS Working Group Field Survey, p. 20.
1°4 CFR 331.70(c)
.
DOD CAS Working Group Field Survey, p. 20.
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Total contract impact would be the sum of profit or fee
impact and cost impact. In firm fixed-price contracts, how-
ever, a profit rate must be agreed upon by the parties.
Unless the rate was established as a result of the pricing
methodology utilized (proposal reconstruction or price
restructuring) , the AGO should negotiate a profit rate for
the adjustment with the contractor, utilizing the original
post-negotiation memorandum to reach a negotiation objective
for each FFP contract.
6. Contract Price Adjustments
An extensive treatment of contract price adjustments
12
will not be attempted here. Since, however, it is the
concluding step of the impact assessment process, some
general guidelines for shifts in incentive structures and
contract prices and techniques to effect adjustments will be
offered. The CASE requires contract price adjustments if the
cost impact is material.
a. Incentive Restructuring
Whenever a material cost impact is determined on
an open fixed-price incentive (FPI) or cost-plus -incentive-
fee (CPIF) contract, target cost, target price, ceiling
price and minimum and maximum fee provisions of the contract
if applicable, must be adjusted. If the incentive structure
12Interested readers will find the subject fully explored
in the Lamm study.
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is not adjusted, it will no longer serve, in the manner
intended during price negotiations, as a cost reduction moti-
vator for the contractor and substantial cost overruns or
under runs could be experienced. If, however, the incentive
contract is all but complete and failure to make an adjustment
will not drive the contractor over or under the point of
total assumption in an FPI contract, or outside or inside
the range of effective incentive in an CPIF contract, an
adjustment to incentive provisions can be waived.
Restructuring the incentive provisions as the
result of a material cost impact is a relatively simple
process. The example below will serve to illustrate the
technique:
FPIF Contract CPIF Contract
Original Original
Target Cost 200,000 300,000
Target Profit 20,000 (10%) 30,000 (10%)
Target Price 220,000 330,000
Ceiling Price 240,000(120%) Not Applicable
Minimum Fee Not Applicable 15,000 ( 5%)
Maximum Fee Not Applicable 45,000 (15%)
Share Ratio 80/20 80/20
If a higher level of costs of $50,000 to the FPIF contract
was the result of a mandatory change, target cost should be
increased to $250,000 and the FPIF structure recalculated
around the new target costs utilizing the original negotiated
profit and ceiling percentages. If, as a result of a non-
compliant change, a $40,000 lower level of costs was allocated
to the CPIF contract, a similar recalculation should be
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effected. The restructured incentive provisions for each
contract are illustrated below:
FPIF Contract CPIF Contract
Restructured Restructured
Target Cost 250,000 260,000
Target Profit 25,000 ( 10%) 26,000 ( 10%)
Target Price 275,000 286,000
Ceiling Price 300,000 (120%) Not Applicable
Minimum Fee Not Applicable 13,000 ( 5%)
Maximum Fee Not Applicable 39,000 ( 15%)
Share Ratio 80/20 80/20
Current field practice and the interviews with
Government and industry personnel support the conclusion that
the incentive share ratio should not be adjusted. Generally,
interviewees argued that the shift in costs caused by a
change in CAP ' s does not lead to a change in the level of
effort on the contract, as is the case in a performance
change, and, therefore, the share ratio should not be altered.
An opposing argument, however, could be advanced.
A substantial shift in costs to an incentive contract alters
the allocation of risk assumed by the Government and the
contractor. A large shift to the contract may increase the
risk of performance; a shift from the contract may reduce the
risk. If the risk inherent in performance is substantially
altered by a CAP change, the ACO may find it necessary to
review the share ratio, and, in some cases, adjust it to
reallocate risk between the contractor and the Government.
This decision must be left to the ACO's professional judgment
and his consideration of each incentive contract structure.
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b. Price Adjustment Techniques
Defense Procurement Circular 75-6 offered the
following guidance on contract price adjustments:
Although these paragraphs permit offsets among CAS con-
tracts, price adjustments to each CAS contract are not
precluded if necessary. In most cases / adjustments to
each contract will be necessary, unless the amounts
involved are considered to be insignificant...
Hal Sharp, therefore, recognizes two techniques for adjusting
prices of affected covered contracts: the net increase or
decrease method, where, after maximum use of offsets, the
net increase or decrease to the Contract Universe is parceled
out over selected contracts whose prices are adjusted; and
the individual contract price adjustment method, where the
price of each individual contract affected by the change is
14
adjusted. Each technique will be briefly explored.
(1) Net Cost Increase or Decrease Adjustment .
After the net effect on costs to the Government has been
determined, after all increases have been offset against all
decreases, the net increase or net decrease is prorated to
all, or some, of the affected contracts. Adjustments to
one contract of each contract group, one contract from each
buying activity, or large contracts only have been suggested.
If the ACO utilizes this methodology, both cost impact and
funding levels on individual contracts will be minimally
13As cited in Cost Accounting Standards , Procurement




affected. The price of this convenience, however, is the
loss of pricing stabilization on contracts that were affected
but were not adjusted to reflect their total impact Thus,
this technique is not appropriate in situations where the
cumulative effect of immaterial cost impact on each individual
contract is considered material.
(2) Individual Contract Adjustment . Once the net
effect of the CAP change has been determined on individual
contracts, each contract is adjusted, upward or downward,
to reflect the shift. Though this technique promotes pricing
stability, it may be laborious and lead to funding problems,
forcing obligation or deobligation of funds. It is most
appropriate when cost impact on each contract is considered
material.
(3) Other Alternatives . There is, of course, a
middle ground that may be reached by the ACO, adjusting some
contracts to reflect their individual cost impacts and
subjecting others to the net increase or decrease method.
The ACO may, for example, choose to adjust only incentive
contracts individually or only contracts that have experienced
an impact to contract price ratio above a certain quantified
threshold. The contract price adjustment technique should
remain within the ACO's discretion so it can be flexible
enough to meet the variety of scenarios possible.
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c. Effecting the Adjustment
The AGO should use price reductions or increases
to adjust firm fixed-price contracts and cost disallowances
and/or adjustments to funding features to adjust flexibly
priced contracts.
In discretionary or noncompliant changes, the
net impact will be in the form of increased costs paid and
potential increased costs. A supplemental agreement with the
contractor should be sought that lowers the prices or funding
features of the contracts to be adjusted. Since it is not
equitable to collect increased costs that have not been
incurred as of the date of the adjustment and because
immediately imposing the total downward adjustment upon the
contractor may cause capital problems and affect performance,
the agreement should specify an amortization schedule of
the decreases, effected by cost disallowances or a reduction
in progress payments, over the remaining life of the contract.
Interest penalties or increased costs on closed contracts may
be paid by check by the contractor.
Equitable adjustments for sanctioned and mandatory
changes should be handled similarly. The supplemental agree-
ment should specify increases in progress payments or billing
prices for contracts that rate upward adjustments.
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D. OTHER ITEMS OF INTEREST
1. Negotiation
The cognizant AGO is required to conduct negotiations
and execute supplemental agreements on behalf of all Govern-
ment agencies. PGO's must be invited to attend negotiations
if the price on any one of their contracts will be increased
by $10,000 or more. These negotiations are final and the
agreement binding, despite any subsequent evidence that
actual cost impact on a contract was greater or lesser than
expected.
2. Effects on Subcontracts
The cognizant AGO will negotiate cost impact on the
contractor's covered subcontracts, however the supplemental
agreement to adjust subcontract price must be made between
the subcontractor and the next higher tier subcontractor or
the prime contractor. DAR 3-1207 (c) (iii) requires the AGO to
forward a copy of his post-negotiation memorandum specifying
the agreement made with the contractor on subcontracts to
the cognizant AGO of the next higher tier subcontractor or
prime contractor. The process is continued until the proper
adjustment is reflected in the prime contract.




3. Multiple Accounting Changes
If the iroplementation dates are the same and each
change is eligible for equitable adjustment, or each will
lead to downward adjustment only, multiple accounting changes
may be made simultaneously. If these conditions are not
met, however, the contractor should be required to phase in
the changes at intervals in order to allow a separate impact
assessment for each implementation date, each adjustment
allowed for the changes or each correction of a noncompliant
change.
E. THE PRECISION OF COST IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Each impact assessment must be tempered by realism on
the part of each party. As one interviewee stated:
We don't know and never will know exactly what the [total]
impact was [of the accounting practice change] that's
why these things are negotiated.
Because the impact assessment is based upon pricing methodo-
logies that rely upon estimates, perhaps compounded by further
estimates if he uses one of the shortcut assessment methodologies
suggested in this Chapter, the ACO must direct the process
pragmatically. A Government official interviewed argued:
Bottom- line is we're doing prospective negotiations on
something that is not accurate the ETC is inaccurate,
the cost impact is inaccurate. [But] To try to get
more precise would be like using learning curves, guessing
Tl
,
guessing the slope and then carrying out the answer
eight decimal places. It's important to keep this in
mind. You're not dealing with one contract, which is
complicated enough to negotiate, but with all the
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contractor's contracts. And you're trying to stop the
world from rotating so you can make an accounting assess-
ment on something that will be certainly less than one
per cent of the value of any contract.
Given the lack of precision in the best, most meticulous,
assessment of cost impact, and the requirement for the
parties to negotiate and agree upon contract price adjustments,
the AGO must be concerned with feasibility and practicality
throughout the process and consider trade-offs when necessary
between the "precision" of the measurement and its cost
to administer and execute.
F. SUMMARY
This Ghapter portrayed a framework in which the cost impact
assessment process can be approached flexibly and, when
justified, in a more simplified manner than present DAR GAS
administration regulations allow. The AGO was presented
with a structured set of procedures designed to minimize the
time investment, in some cases, necessary for resolving CAS
issues and a variety of options for assessment methodologies
that can be chosen to fit appropriate scenarios. General
procedural guidelines and contractor information requirements
were recommended. Some phases of the process were only
discussed briefly, however, the guidance presented ife meant
to be one example only of the type of additional guidance
needed by AGO's. The recommended methodology has been
summarized in Appendix D.
201

Order can be brought, and improvement made, to CAS
administration that will enhance the ACO's decision-making
capabilities, introduce flexibility and adaptability, and
reduce the delays and confusion inherent within cost impact
assessment. A CAS administration manual, dealing with CAS
issues as briefly, or more extensively than, this Chapter
may assist DOD in attaining order and achieving improvement.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of the research documented herein, the study's
findings can be listed and central arguments can be summar-
ized. This final Chapter offers the conclusions drawn by
the researcher concerning the assessment of cost impact of
cost accounting practice changes on covered contracts. In
line with the conclusions that are presented, a series of
recommendations to improve this aspect of Cost Accounting
Standards administration will be made. A response will be
made to each of the research questions posed in Chapter One.
Finally, suggestions for further research on the cost impact
assessment process, or ancillary issues, will be advanced.
A. CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions reached as a result of the research are
presented below.
Conclusion #1 - The cost impact assessment process, as it is
presently structured and regulated by Defense Acquisition
Regulations, is not the efficient, effective mechanism needed
to amend the effects of an alteration in cost accounting
practices .
DOD contract administrators are currently required to
obtain a statement of general dollar magnitude from the con-
tractor proposing a change to CAP ' s , despite its lack of
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usefulness to the AGO. The AGO and auditor are presently
incapable of independently verifying the GAS Gontract Universe,
the identification of which is vital to the assessment pro-
cess, and must rely upon the contractor's system of identifying
contracts affected by the change. The impact assessment
process can be easily stymied by an uncooperative contractor
who refuses to conply with the GAS Administration Glaus e.
At a minimum, the impact assessment process, even if the
change results in an immaterial cost impact, presently requires
approximately 180 days to resolve. Each of these shortcomings
contributes to the inefficiency and ineffectiveness.
Gonclusion #2 - Gost impact assessment is administered
inflexibly by the majority of POD personnel, with little con-
sideration given to the appropriateness, feasibility and
equity of the methodologies chosen .
Ghapter Four of this research indicated that variants
on pricing methodologies and assessment methodologies are
generally not considered. Gontract repricing is the pricing
methodology mandated to assess the cost impact of performance
noncompliance, despite the frequent absence of the proposal
detail needed to utilize it. Proposal reconstruction has
been utilized with little regard given to the equity of
ignoring the reduction of the proposed price to the agreed
upon price achieved during negotiations. AGO's are required
to obtain a contract-by-contract cost impact proposal from a
contractor who makes a GAP change, despite the existence of
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of several valid assessment methodologies that could be
performed with a smaller investment of time and effort.
Conclusion #3 - Additional agency-wide guidance on cost impact
assessment is needed by POD personnel to overcome the complex-
ity and confusion that characterizes the present CAS
administration environment .
Guidance available to ACO's and auditors is sketchy and
inadequate. Administering CAP change issues / with only the
brief discussion contained within Working Group Items to
supplement DAR requirements, inevitably leads to questions
concerning CIP format, substantiating cost or pricing data,
materiality determinations, techniques to effect contract
price adjustments and a variety of other challenges. Real-
world CAP change scenarios are frequently further complicated
by the multitude of active and closed contracts affected and
the potential for simultaneous practice changes. An agency-
wide effort to deal with many of the varied scenarios and
common difficulties experienced by contract administrators
needs to be mounted.
Conclusion #4 - Roles of, and relationships between. Govern-
ment players in CAS administration are confused, conflicting
and a hindrance to the resolution of CAP change issues .
A "turf" problem between the ACQ and auditor, DCAS and
DCAA, exists in CAS administration that is neither healthy
nor beneficial to the efficient conduct of cost impact
assessment. There have been attempts to elevate the auditor's
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CAS recommendations to the AGO to determinations . The average
AGO finds his traditional decision-making role challenged by
the power wielded by, or his over-reliance upon, the contract
auditor. A potential exists for industry exploitation of
this conflict within the contract administration team.
B. REGOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations that address the problems inherent within
the present cost impact assessment process, and noted in the
preceding conclusions, are directed to DOD.
Recommendation #1 - Publish a GAS administration manual which
would, among other things, focus on the various pricing and
assessment methodologies and the techniques suitable for
effecting contract price adjustments .
More extensive guidance, not direction, on the day-to-day
issues facing the administrators of covered contracts can be
provided. This will serve to introduce flexibility into the
cost impact assessment process. Additionally, the process
can be simplified by presenting it in a series of manageable,
finite activities that the average AGO, despite his non-
accounting background, can direct. Much of the confusion and
complexity can be eliminated and appropriateness and equity
promoted by means of a GAS administration manual. Such an
effort is both feasible and desirable and best accomplished
at the DOD level. Ghapter Five and Appendix D of the research
attempted to provide an example of the guidance needed.
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Recoinmendation #2 - Amend the Cig Administration Clause to
provide the Government a contractual right to resolve CAP
change issues unilaterally^ not subject to appeal^ when the
contractor refuses to submit a cost impact proposal .
This method of compelling the contractor to cooperate
during the cost impact assessment process seems the most
effective solution discovered in the course of the research.
The CAS Administration Clause should be amended to reserve
for the Government the right to assess cost impact, and make
contract price adjustments from the best accounting data
available when the contractor refuses to submit the information
required. The contractor would have no right to appeal this
determination (similar to the provisions of the Termination
for Convenience Clause) . The very existence of this option
will succeed in winning cooperation from most contractors.
To maintain control over the use of this unusual measure, it
is recommended that DOD require a determination be made at
some level above the ACO before it is exercised.
Recommendation #3 - Utilize an improved Federal Procurement
Data System to enable contract administrators to independently
assess the CAS Contract Universe at a covered contractor's
plant .
This action will require active DOD participation in re-
solving the current inadequacies of the FPDS. When reliable
information is available from the System, however, DOD should
initiate action to: (1) provide regional FPDS access to its
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field contract administration activities; and (2) recommend
to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy that covered
subcontracts be input into FPDS upon prime contractor noti-
fication that such a contract has been awarded. These actions
will make the AGO capable of verifying the covered contracts
and subcontracts that may have been affected by a CAP change,
and less dependent upon the contractor's proposal.
Recommendation #4 - Promulgate a high-level POD policy state-
ment to strengthen and support the proper role of the ACQ
and reestablish the relationships between the procurement and
contract administration team members in CAS issues .
The role of decision-maker in CAS matters must be restored
to the ACQ via a clear agency-wide sanction. The power
exerted by the contract auditor must be restrained and the
proper AC0-auditc3r relationship, clearly subordinating the
auditor to an advisory capacity, must be reestablished.
PCO's must be formally required to assist in the effort to
win contract compliance with provisions of the CAS Adminis-
tration Clause. Price analyst training must be intensified
to insure that they are capable of providing an alternate
source of recommendations on CAS matters to the ACQ. Each
of these actions, promulgated under a DOD policy statement
umbrella, will provide the political support the ACO needs
to eliminate conflict. The policy statement would be most





C. REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In order to respond to the primary research question,
four subsidiary questions were posed. Responses to the
research questions can now be provided, beginning with the
subsidiary questions and culminating with the primary question.
Subsidiary Question #1 - What are the requirements of the
mandatory Cost Accounting Standards Clause concerning the
measurement of cost impact and the nature of POD and contractor
response to these requirements ?
The CAS Administration Clause requires the contractor to
submit to the ACO an adequate description of any change pro-
posed to his disclosed or established cost accounting practices
at least 60 days prior to its implementation. With the
description, the contractor is required to submit the initial
stage of a two-phased quantitative proposal of the cost
effects of the change, a statement of general dollar magnitude,
indicating the cumulative increases and decreases caused by
the change. If the change is determined compliant, the
contractor is required to submit a contract-by-contract cost
impact proposal identifying the cost impact on each contract
in the CAS Contract Universe. Once audited, this proposal is
utilized by the ACO to assess cost impact, make materiality
and increased costs determinations, negotiate contract price
adjustments with the contractor. DOD contract administrators
have, in general, attempted to comply with their obligations
under the Clause; contractor compliance with the Clause has
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has been spotty. Efforts are undeirway to amend the Clause
to provide the Government a capability of enforcing its
requirements upon uncooperative contractors.
Subsidiary Question #2 - What guidance/ regulatory and other-
wise/ has been provided POD contract administrators in this
area and/ specifically/ where is it lacking ?
' DAR Sections 3-1200 to 3-1214 provide the most substantive
regulatory guidance available to the AGO. the DLAM does
not appreciably supplement this information. DOD GAS Working
Group Items provide only brief discussions on GIP formats/
the use of the offset mechanism and the two basic cost impact
assessment pricing methodologies. In total/ guidance to
contract administrators is lacking on pricing methodology
options/ alternate cost impact assessment methodologies and
techniques to effect contract price adjustments. Materiality
criteria/ GIP cost or pricing substantiation and simultaneous
CAP changes need exploration. A unified/ step-by-step source
of instruction and options concerning the phases of cost
impact assessment is not available to contract administrators.
An attempt to answer such a need was presented in Chapter Five.
Subsidiary Question #3 - What pricing methodologies have been
developed and are being utilized?
Contract repricing/ an attempt to interpolate, after the
fact/ the change proposed or discovered into the negotiation/
and the estimate-to- complete method, where current cost data
is utilized to measure the cost differential associated with
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the incorporation of the CAP change, are the two methodologies
in use. Research indicated that a variant of each methodo-
logy has been used infrequently. The Working Group has
directed that contract repricing be utilized to assess the
cost impact of CAS noncompliance and that ETC be utilized
in all other change source scenarios. No further guidance
on the use of each basic methodology, and appropriate variants
thereof, has been made available to DOD contract administrators
Chapter Four addressed this subject in detail.
Subsidiary Question #4 - Can a model be devised to structure
and simplify the real-world accounting variations in which
cost allocation shifts or deviations in the measurement of
costs are manifested?
Such a "model" was devised during the course of the
research. This model, a sequential presentation of the
procedures to be followed by the ACO, and the information
necessary to assess cost impact, was described in Chapter
Five. A summarization of Chapter Five, presented in the
structured format of a model, is contained in Appendix D.
Each effort was designed to illustrate one example of
supplemental guidance that could be made available to DOD
contract administrators.
Primary Research Question - How can the cost impact of changes
to, or noncompliance with, cost accounting practices or Cost
Accounting Standards be measured?
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Conceptually, cost impact can be assessed by identifying:
(1) the nature of the change and its effect on the accounting
allocation sequence; (2) the appropriate cost baseline
(original or current cost data) from which cost shifts can
be measured; and (3) the population of affected contracts.
Once this information is known, the pricing methodology,
that utilizes the baseline and most accurately measures the
shift in costs, can be applied to the contracts. An assess-
ment methodology can be developed that allows a total cost
impact measurement, of reasonable precision, over the CAS
Contract Universe with the minimum investment of time and
effort. Such a measurement will allow the ACO to make
materiality determinations and develop a contract price
adjustment technique suitable for the assessment methodology
and responsive to the needs originally identified during
CAS implementation.
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following areas have been identified as potential
subjects for further research:
1. A computerized cost impact assessment model to test
the relative accuracy of the pricing and assessment methodologies
proposed in this thesis;
2. An in-depth analysis of contract price adjustment




3. The development of a set of procedures and decision
criteria to be utilized in auditing and approving a proposal
for simultaneous CAP changes.
E. CLOSING STATEMENT
It is not expected that every reader will agree with the
conclusions and recommendations developed as a result of
this study. It is anticipated, however, that consideration
of the arguments presented herein, will lead to a review of,
and, hopefully, subsequent improvement in, the guidance






COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (19 78 MAR)
(a) Unless the Cost Accounting Standards Board has
prescribed rules or regulations exempting the contractor or
this contract from standards, rules and regulations promul-
gated pursuant to 50 U.S.C. App. 2168 (Pub. L. 91-379,
August 15, 19 70) , the contractor, in connection with this
contract shall;
(1) By submission of a Disclosure Statement, disclose
in writing his cost accounting practices as required by
regulations of the Cost Accounting Standards Board. The
required disclosures must be made prior to contract award
unless the Contracting Officer provides a written notice
to the contractor authorizing post-award submission in
accordance with regulations of the Cost Accounting Standards
Board. The practices disclosed for this contract shall be
the same as the practices currently disclosed and applied
on all other contracts and subcontracts being performed by
the contractor and which contain this Cost Accounting Stan-
dards clause. If the contractor has notified the Contracting
Office that the Disclosure Statement contains trade secrets
and commercial and financial information which is privileged
and confidential, the Disclosure Statement will be protected
and will not be released outside of the Government.
(2) Follow consistently the cost accounting practices
disclosed pursuant to (1) above in accumulating and reporting
contract performance cost data concerning this contract. If
any change in disclosed practices is made for purposes of any
contract or subcontract subject to Cost Accounting Standards
Board requirements, the change must be applied prospectively
to this contract, and the Disclosure Statement must be amended
accordingly. If the contract price or cost allowance of this
contract is affected by such changes, adjustments shall be
made in accordance with subparagraph (a) (4) or (a) (5) below,
as appropriate.
(3) Comply with all Cost Accounting Standards in effect
on the date of award of this contract or if the contractor
has submitted cost or pricing data, on the date of final
agreement on price as shown on the contractor's signed certi-
ficate of current cost or pricing data. The contractor shall
also comply with any Cost Accounting Standard which hereafter
becomes applicable to a contract or subcontract of the
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contractor. Such compliance shall be required prospectively
from the date of applicability to such contract or subcontract.
(4) (A) Agree to an equitable adjustment as provided in
the changes clause of this contract if the contract cost is
affected by a change which, pursuant to (3) above, the con-
tractor is required to make to his established cost accounting
practices whether such practices are covered by a Disclosure
Statement or not.
(4) (B) Negotiate with the contracting officer to determine
the terms and conditions under which a change may be made
to either a disclosed cost accounting practice or an established
cost accounting practice, other than a change made under
other provisions of this subparagraph (4) : Provided , That
no agreement may be made under this provision that will
increase costs paid by the United States.
(4) (C) When the parties agree to a change to either a
disclosed or an established cost accounting practice, other
than a change under (4) (A) above, negotiate an equitable
adjustment as provided in the changes clause of this contract.
(5) Agree to an adjustment of the contract price or cost
allowance, as appropriate, if he or a subcontractor fails to
comply with an applicable Cost Accounting Standard or to
follow any practice disclosed pursuant to subparagraphs (a) (1)
and (a) (2) above and such failure results in any increased
costs paid by the United States. Such adjustment shall pro-
vide for recovery of the increased costs to the United States
together with interest thereon computed at the rate determined
by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to Public Law 92-41,
85 Stat. 97, or seven per cent per annum, whichever is less,
from the time the payment by the United States was made to
the time the adjustment is effected.
(b) If the parties fail to agree whether the contractor
or a subcontractor has complied with an applicable Cost
Accounting Standard, rule or regulation of the Cost Accounting
Standards Board and as to any cost adjustment demanded by the
United States, such failure to agree shall be a dispute con-
cerning a question of fact within the meaning of the disputes
clause of this contract.
(c) The contractor shall permit any authorized repre-
sentatives of the head of the agency, of the Cost Accounting
Standards Board, or of the Comptroller General of the United
States to examine and make copies of any documents, papers, or
records relating to compliance with the requirements of this
clause.
(d) The contractor shall include in all negotiated
subcontracts which he enters into the substance of this clause
except paragraph (b) of this section and shall require such
inclusion in all other subcontracts of any tier, including the
obligation to comply with all Cost Accounting Standards in
effect on the date of award of the subcontract or if the
subcontractor has submitted cost or pricing data, on the date
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of final agreement on price as shown on the subcontractor's
signed certificate of current cost or pricing data. This
requirement shall apply only to negotiated subcontracts in
excess of $100,000 where the price negotiated is not based on:
(1) Established catalog or market prices of commercial
items sold in substantial quantities to the general public, or
(2) Prices set by law or regulation, and except that the
requirement shall not apply to negotiated subcontracts other-
wise exempt from the requirement to accept the Cost Accounting
Standards clause by reason of Section 331.30(b) of Title 4,
Code of Federal Regulations (4 CFR 331.30(b)).
However, if this is a contract with an agency which permits
subcontracts to appeal final decisions of the contracting
officer directly to the head of the agency or his duly
authorized representative, then the contractor shall include
the substance of paragraph (b) as well.
NOTE: In any case where a subcontractor determines that
the Disclosure Statement information is privileged and con-
fidential and declines to provide it to his contractor or
higher tier subcontractor, the contractor may authorize
direct submission of that subcontractor's Disclosure Statement
to the same Government offices to which the contractor was
required to make submission of his Disclosure Statement. Such
authorization shall in no way relieve the contractor of
liability as provided in paragraph (a)(5) of this clause. In
view of the foregoing and since the contract may be subject
to adjustment under this clause by reason of any failure to
comply with rules, regulations, and Standards of the Cost
Accounting Standards Board in connection with covered sub-
contracts, it is expected that the contractor may wish to
include a clause in each such subcontract requiring the sub-
contractor to ^propriately indemnify the contractor. However,
the inclusion of such a clause and the terms thereof are matters
for negotiation and agreement between the contractor and the
subcontractor, provided that they do not conflict with the
duties of the contractor under its contract with the Government.
It is also expected that any subcontractor subject to such
indemnification will generally require substantially similar
indemnification to be submitted by his subcontractors.
(e) The terms defined in Section 331.20 of Part 331 of
Title 4, Code Federal Regulations (4CFR 3 31.20) shall have
the same meanings herein. As there defined, "negotiated
subcontract" means "any subcontract except a firm fixed-price
subcontract made by a contractor or subcontractor after
receiving offers from at least two firms not associated with
each other or such contractor or subcontractor, providing
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(1) the solitication to all competing firms is identical/
(2) price is the only consideration in selecting subcontractor
from among the competing firms solicited and (3) the lowest
offer received in compliance with the solicitation from among






ADMINISTRATION OF COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (1978 MAR)
For the purpose of administering Cost Accounting Standards
requirements under this contract, the Contractor shall:
(a) Submit to the cognizant Contracting Officer a
description of the accounting change and the general dollar
magnitide of the change to reflect the sum of all increases
and the sum of all decreases for all contracts containing
the Cost Accounting Standards clause ( 7-104. 83 (a) ( 1) ) or the
Disclosure and Consistency of Cost Accounting Practices clause
C7-104-83(a) (2) ) :
(i) for any change in cost accounting practices
required to comply with a new cost accounting
standard in accordance with paragraph (a)(3)
and (a)(4)(A) of the clause entitled "Cost
Accounting Standards" within sixty (60) days
(or such other date as may be mutually agreed
to) after award of a contract requiring such
change;
(ii) for any change to cost accounting practices
proposed in accordance with paragraph (a) (4) (B)
or (a) (4) (C) of the clause entitled "Cost
Accounting Standards" or with paragraph (a) (3)
or (a) (5) of the clause entitled "Disclosure
and Consistency of Cost Accounting Practices"
not less than sixty (60) days (or such other
date as may be mtitually agreed to) prior to
the effective date of the proposed change; or
Ciii) for any failure to comply with an applicable
Cost Accounting Standard or to follow a dis-
closed practice as contemplated by paragraph
(a) (5) of the clause entitled "Cost Accounting
Standards" or with paragraph (a) (4) of the clause
entitled "Disclosure and Consistency of Cost
Accounting Practices" within sixty (60) days
(or such other date as may be mutually agreed
to) after the date of agreement of such non-
compliance by the Contractor.
(b) Submit a cost impact proposal in the form and manner
specified by the cognizant Contracting Officer within sixty
(60) days (or such other date as may be mutually agreed to)
after the date of determination of the adequacy and compliance
of a change submitted pursuant to (a) (i) , (ii) , or (iii) above.
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(c) Agree to appropriate contract and subcontract amend-
ments to reflect adjustments established in accordance with
paragraphs (a) (4) and (a) (5) of the clause entitled "Cost
Accounting Standards" or with paragraphs (a) (3) , (a) (4) , and
(a) (5) of the clause entitled "Disclosure and Consistency of
Cost Accounting Practices."
(d) When the subcontract is subject to either the clause
entitled "Cost Accounting Standards" or the clause entitled
"Disclosure and Consistency of Cost Accounting Practices" so
state in the body of the subcontract and/or in the letter of
award. Self-deleting clauses shall not be used.
(e) Include the substance of this clause in all nego-
tiated subcontracts containing either the clause entitled "Cost
Accounting Standards" or the clause entitled "Disclosure
and Consistency of Cost Accounting Practices." In addition
within thirty (30) days after award of such subcontract submit
the following information to the Contractor's cognizant
Contract Administration Office for transmittal to the Contract
Administration Office cognizant of the subcontractor's facility,
(1) Subcontractor's name and subcontract number,
(2) Dollar amount and date of award.
(3) Name of Contractor making the award.
(4) A statement as to whether the subcontractor
has made or proposes to make any changes
to accounting practices that affect prime
contracts or subcontracts containing the
Cost Accounting Standards Clause or Dis-
closure and Consistency of Cost Accounting
Practices Clause because of the award
of this subcontract unless such changes
have already been reported. If award of
the subcontract results in making a Cost
Accounting Standard(s) effective for the
first time, this shall also be reported.
Cf) For negotiated subcontracts containing the clause
entitled "Cost Accounting Standards," require the subcontractor
to comply with all Standards in effect on the date of final
agreement on price as shown on the subcontractor's signed
certification of current cost or pricing data or date of award
whichever is earlier.
(g) In the event an adjustment is required to be made to
any subcontract hereunder, notify the Contracting Officer in
writing of such adjustment and agree to an adjustment in the
price or estimated cost and fee of this contract, as appro-
priate, based upon the adjustment established under the sub-
contract. Such notice shall be given within thirty (30) days
after receipt of the proposed subcontract adjustment, or such
other date as may be mutually agreed to, and shall include a
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proposal for adjustment to such higher tier subcontract or
prime contract as appropriate.
(h) When either the Cost Accounting Standards clause or
the Disclosure and Consistency of Cost Accounting Practices
clause and this clause are included in subcontracts, the







Emil Bagneschi, AGO, DCASMA San Francisco, California,
25 April 1980.
Rudy Castelli, Director of Finance, Todd Pacific Ship-
yards Corporation, Los Angeles Division, Long Beach,
California, 5 June 1980.
Frank DeVito, CAS Monitor, DCAA San Francisco, California,
16 May 19 80.
Irwin L. Farmer, Manager, Industrial Accounting, Pomona
Division, General Dynamics, Pomona, California,
30 July 1980.
Frank T. Gresik, Jr., Manager, Cost Accounting, Aircraft
Division, Northrup Corporation, Hawthorne, California,
30 July 1980.
Ernest Gutierrez, CAS Specialist, DCASR Los Angeles, Los
Angeles, California, 4 June 19 80.
Gunnar M. Haase, Manager of Cost Accounting, Lockheed
California Company, Lockheed Corporation, 29 July 1980.
Dave Jackson, Manager of Cost Accounting, Financial
Reporting and Data Management, Douglas Aircraft,
Los Angeles, California, 6 June 19 80.
Jack Kendig, Chairman, DOD CAS Working Group, OUSD (R & E)
,
Washington, D.C. , 24 June 1980.
William H. Mearns, Assistant Controller, Pomona Division,
General Dynamics, Pomona, California, 30 July 1980.
Noah Minkin, General Counsel, Cost Accounting Standards
Board, Washington, D.C, 23 June 1980.
Adam Moro, Controller, Manufacturing Division, Airesearch
Company, Division of Garrett Corporation, Los Angeles,
California, 29 July 19 80.
John Nieman, Business Analysis Manager, Litton Corporation,
Beverly Hills, California, 31 July 1980.
Fred J. Newton, Deputy Assistant Director (Acting) , Policy
and Plans, Chief of CAS Division, DCAA, Cameron Station,
Virginia, 20 June 19 80.
Tom Saiki, Manager, Management Reporting and Analysis,
TRW Systems Group, Los Angeles, California, 4 June 19 80.
Robert P. Scott, Chief, Price/Cost and Financial Analysis
Branch, Financial Services Branch, DCAS , Cameron
Station, Virginia, 19 June 1980.
Harold Sharp, Chief of Pricing, Air Force Space Division,
Los Angeles, California, 5 June 19 80.
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Lee Shigut, Controller, Rockwell Corporation, Hawthorne,
California, 31 July 1980.
RADM Gerald T. Thompson, Deputy Director, DLA (CAS)
,
Cameron Station, Virginia, 22 April 1980.
II. Telephonic Interviews
Philip J. Blatteau, Director for Financial Management,
Aerospace Procurement Service Staff, Aerospace
Industries Association of America, Inc., Washington,
D.C. , 11 April 1980.
Tom Burch, CAS Specialist, DCASR Dallas, Dallas, Texas,
15 April 19 80.
Roger Hobrook, CAS Monitor, DCAA Los Angeles, Los Angeles,
California, 8 April 1980.
Dave Relly, Instructor, ALMC, Fort Lee, Virginia, 11
April 19 80.
Delores Taylor, CAS Project Officer, DCAS Headquarters,
Cameron Station, Virginia, 11 April 19 80.
Gary Theus , CAS Specialist, DCASR Cleveland, Cleveland,
Ohio, 15 April 19 80.
Richard P. White, Logistics Management Institute,
Washington, D.C, 16 April 1980.
Edward J. Williamson, Jr., Navy Policy Representative,
Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council, OASD (MRA & L)
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